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ABSTRACT  
Household Income Pooling and  the Demand for Food: 
Does Family Financial Structure Matter?  (August 2006) 
Ernesto Perusquia  Corres, B.A., The University of Texas at San Antonio; 
M.A., The Pennsylvania State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. George C. Davis    
Research on food consumption and expenditures usually employs the use of unitary 
models that do not account for type of family financial structure.  This research presents 
two collective models of household behavior, conditional and unconditional models, 
which were used in the analysis of the household data that came from the “Parental 
Time, Role Strain and Children’s Fat Intake and Obesity Related Outcomes”.  This 
research utilized the Generalized Method of Moments in the estimation of the system of 
expenditures on food at and away from home to test the validity of the unitary model 
by testing one of the implications of this model, the income pooling hypothesis, as well 
as family financial structure.  It was found that the omission of family financial 
structure and not the income pooling hypothesis would lead to the incorrect assertion 
that the unitary model is the correct model for the analysis of intrahousehold allocation.  
The collective models proposed in this research were found to be preferred to those of 
the unitary models.  These two models, conditional and unconditional, not only allow 
for the effect of earned and unearned incomes of fathers and mothers to be different, 
but also incorporate family financial structure into the analysis of expenditures on food 
 iv
at and away from home.  This research shows that the parameters of the unitary models 
are reduced form parameters that do not represent the effect that the variable of interest 
has on the household expenditures category of interest.  This research finds that these 
reduced form parameters show the total effect which is composed of three parts.  First, 
the change in the expenditure category of interest that comes about from a change in 
the variable of interest when we hold family financial structure constant.  Second, the 
change in the expenditure category of interest that comes about from a change in the 
family financial structure.   Third, the change in family financial structure that comes 
about from a change in the variable of interest.    
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                                                                CHAPTER I!      
     INTRODUCTION: INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES  
A. Introduction  
In chapter V of his book Foundations of Economic Analysis, Samuelson (1986) states 
that the single criterion that differentiates modern economic theory (i.e. neoclassical 
economic theory) from classical economic theory is the introduction of the subjective 
theory of value (utility).  Neoclassical microeconomic theory is founded on the 
assumption that an individual’s preferences and tastes can be represented by his/her 
personal rational utility that determines his/her behavior.  The common assumption is 
that an individual’s preferences are represented by a fixed utility function.  The 
consumer’s problem then becomes the maximization of his/her utility, U, which is 
defined over n market goods, ix where i=1,…,n,  available for his/her consumption 
subject to a budget constraint which defines the set of available alternative choices.  The 
budget constraint states that total expenditures on market goods, i i
i
p x , must be no 
greater than total money income, I, ip is the price of market good i, ix  This 
maximization problem is given by: 
(1.1) 
1 ,...,
. .
i
n
x
i i
i
Max U x x
s t p x I
                                                          
! This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Economic Review. 
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The result of this maximization problem is a set of market good demands which are 
functions of market goods prices and total money income.  The market good demands 
are given by: 
(1.2) 1 ,..., ,i nx h p p I
This set-up also leads to the following restrictions: homogeneity, adding-up, 
symmetry, and negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix on demand functions, 
which can be empirically tested with observable consumptions and labor supply.  
Conversely, demand functions that are found to satisfy these theoretical restrictions can 
be shown to be integral to a rational preference ordering. 
In the majority of economic literature, consumers and households are treated as if they 
are the same, and single individual households are lumped together with households 
that have multiple members.  The neoclassical approach assumes implicitly that a 
household, even if it has different individuals, behaves as a single decision-making 
unit.  Furthermore, household labor supply and consumption are considered to be the 
observable result of the maximization of a fixed utility function subject to the household 
budget constraints.  Because the household is treated as a single unit, this framework is 
often referred to in economic literature as the unitary model. 
The validity of the unitary model is questioned on three perspectives: 
methodological, empirical and welfare analysis.  From the methodological perspective, 
it is argued that subjective preferences are inseparable from what is referred to as 
methodological individualism, which asserts that social theories should correspond with 
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individual behavior1.  Therefore, methodological individualism calls for an approach that 
explicitly takes into account the notion that a household is a group of individuals, with 
different preferences and tastes, among whom an intra-household decision process 
takes place.   The distinction between individual and household preferences is 
necessary if household preferences and individual preferences do not coincide.  The 
sociological literature in the area of money management in households pioneered by 
Pahl (1983) shows that since the early part of the twentieth century household and 
individual preferences in industrialized nations have diverged. 
Vermeulen’s (2002) characterization of the unitary model as an empirical straight-
jacket for observable household labor supply and consumption behavior rests on two 
empirical restrictions.  The first empirical restriction of the unitary model is referred to 
as the income pooling hypothesis, which implies that the source of exogenous (nonlabor) 
income is not important in determining the allocation of labor supply and consumption. 
Therefore, only total household nonlabor income matters.  The income pooling 
hypothesis has been rejected by a number of empirical studies such as Thomas (1990) 
and Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997).  The second empirical restriction of the unitary 
model is that the marginal compensated wage changes of two individuals in a 
household have the same effect on each other’s labor supply.  This restriction of the 
unitary model is rejected by, among others, Browning and Chiappori (1998). 
From the welfare analysis perspective, the unitary model faces some difficulties 
when it comes to the normative welfare analysis of household behavior.  Unitary 
                                                          
1 Blaug, M. (1980), The Methodology of Economics. Or how Economists Explain. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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models must impose very strong and restrictive assumptions in order to determine the 
intrahousehold allocation of labor supply, consumption and welfare.  The majority of 
welfare economics only studies the distribution of welfare among households.  One of 
the implications is that the welfare of individuals within the household is not 
important.  The unwarranted acceptance of the unitary model may conceal inequality in 
the distribution of welfare within the household and lead to the underestimation of 
poverty, health status, and access to resources for individuals within the household, i.e., 
women and children.  Therefore, knowledge of the intrahousehold decision process 
may be necessary when trying to evaluate programs that target the welfare of women 
and children. 
The purpose of this literature review is not only to explore the changes that have 
taken place in the study of household behavior since the introduction of the unitary 
model, but also to incorporate the sociological literature on family financial structure in 
the analysis of household behavior.  We pay special attention to the treatment of 
intrahousehold allocation of resources and time.   
The first section of the literature review is dedicated to the study of the unitary 
model with time and household production.  We begin by examining Becker (1965) who 
introduces household production and time into the unitary model.  We then turn our 
attention to extensions to the basic unitary model which do not examine intrahousehold 
allocation of resources.  We divide these extensions into two parts.   
First, we examine the possible limitations of the household production model 
(HPM).  Pollak and Wachter (1975) conclude that joint production, which is inherently 
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important in household technology, breaks the link between the HPM and the 
neoclassical theory in which it is based.  They argue that the break between both 
theories happens because the demands for household commodities become functions of 
commodity prices, which are themselves functions of goods prices and household 
technology.  Therefore, the household production model of Becker (1965) requires two 
strong assumptions about household technology, constant returns to scale and nonjoint 
production, in order for the demand for household commodities to be functions of only 
commodity prices.   
Second, we will look at examples of the HPM paying special attention to the role of 
time.  This research is found in the recreational demand literature.  Within the 
recreational demand literature, we examine four different aspects of the valuation of 
time within the household production model.  We first examine the concept of timing of 
time which was introduced by Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983).  The concept of 
timing of time states that all of time in the time horizon can not be treated the same due 
to the time constraints imposed by one’s type of work.  We then examine the effect that 
work flexibility has in the valuation of recreational time which was introduced by 
Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman (1987).   We then study in McConnell (1992) the dual 
role that time spent onsite has as a source of utility and a cost of engaging in a 
recreational activity.  Finally, we examine the effect that endogenous marginal value of 
leisure time has in terms of both money and time as proposed by Larson and Shaikh 
(2001).  We then turn our attention to the study of the unitary models that account for 
the intrahousehold allocation of resources (Gronau, 1973 and Gronau, 1977). 
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In section two of the literature review, by using game theoretic models we examine 
nonunitary models of household behavior that explicitly take into account the 
possibility of several decision makers in a household.  The first part of section two is 
dedicated to the study of cooperative bargaining models of household behavior based 
on the Nash-bargaining solution concept (McElroy and Horney, 1981; McElroy, 1990 
and McElroy and Horney, 1990).  The second part of section two is dedicated to the 
study of collective models of household behavior based on Pareto efficiency (Chiappori, 
1988a; Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori, 1997 and Browning and Chiappori, 1998).  The 
third and final part of section two is dedicated to the study of noncooperative 
bargaining models of household behavior which may provide noncooperative 
suboptimal outcome (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). 
In section three of the literature review, we examine the empirical results of the 
analysis of time in unitary models using household production methodology.  One 
model by Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) not only examines total household 
consumption but also examines the individual household member’s allocation of time 
between work and household production.      
The two remaining models not only analyze household production and 
consumption of different household commodities but also study the allocation of time 
by individual household members among household production activities, leisure and 
work (Yamada, Yamada and Kang, 1999 and Lecocq, 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In section four of the literature review, we examine two important tests of the 
unitary model that empirically determine the validity of the income pooling hypothesis.  
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The first test of the income pooling hypothesis not only examines whether the unearned 
income of fathers and mothers is spent differently, but also examines the effect that 
income in the hands of the mother and father has on family health and welfare as 
measured by the nutritional outcomes on children (Thomas, 1990).  The second test of 
the income pooling hypothesis makes use of a natural experiment that occurred in the 
United Kingdom that led to an exogenous increase in the unearned income of mothers 
(Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997).   
In the fifth and last section of the literature review, we will examine the role that the 
family financial structure literature can play in the study of collective models of 
household behavior.  The literature of family financial structure can provide us with 
sociological information that may shed light on the decision-making process within the 
household.    
B. Unitary Models  
1. Unitary Models with No Intrahousehold Allocation 
The unitary model was extended by Becker (1965) with the introduction of his 
household production model that added household production and a time constraint to 
the unitary model.  Unlike its predecessors, the household production model (HPM) 
derives its utility from the maximization of the consumption of household 
commodities, which are produced by combining market goods and time, subject not 
only to a budget constraint but also a time constraint.   
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In Becker’s (1965) model, time is divided into two categories: working and non-
working time.  The cost of non-working time is subdivided into direct and indirect.  The 
direct costs are defined as the sum of the market prices of non-working activities while 
the indirect costs are defined as the opportunity cost of time used on non-working 
activities.    Becker’s HPM uses what he terms the full income approach which 
incorporates time into budget constraint by converting time into goods through money 
income.  Becker’s HPM not only allows us to examine the effect that earned income, 
unearned income and market prices have on consumption behavior but also allows us 
to examine the effect that the changes in work productivity, the allocation of time to 
working and non-working activities, has on the set of household commodities 
produced.  Becker’s 1965 HPM is given by equations by: 
(1.3) 
1( ,..., )
. .
,
i
nZ
i i wi
i c o wi
i i i i i i
Max U U z z
s t p x N T w
T T T T
T t z x b z
In this model, N  denotes unearned income, wT  denotes the total time that the 
household spends working, w denotes the wage rate of the household, iT denotes the 
time used in the production of household commodity i , cT  denotes the time spent 
consuming or leisure time, iz denotes household commodity i, ix denotes market good 
i and  ip  is the price of ix .  Household commodity i is produced by combining market 
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goods and time2.  The price of the household commodity i is can be obtained by 
substituting the last three constraints into the first constraint.  The resulting household 
commodity price is given by i i i ib p t w .  The household commodity price has two 
parts:  the sum of the price of the market good per unit of household commodity i ib p
and the cost of time per unit of commodity produced t wi . The sum of unearned and 
earned income, wN T w , when wT  is equal to the total available time of the household, 
0T , gives us the maximum attainable income.  We can see that the maximum attainable 
income can be spent on market goods, i i ib p z , or as forgone income from consuming 
instead of working, i it wz .  The resulting household commodity and market goods 
demands are given by: 
(1.4) 1 1,..., , , , , , ,..., , , , , ,i i n c o w i n c o wz z N w T T T z p p N w T T T
(1.5) 1 1,..., , , , , , ,..., , , , , ,i i n c o w i n c o wx f N w T T T f p p N w T T T
It is important to make the observation that the demands for household 
commodities and market goods can be written as functions of household commodity 
prices and unearned income or as functions of market goods prices, wages which in this 
case give us the value of time, and unearned income because commodity prices are 
defined as functions of market prices and wages. 
Becker’s (1965) model rests on three strong assumptions.  First, it assumes that the 
household exhibits constant returns to scale (CRTS) in the production of household 
                                                          
2
 This production function (1.3) is a fixed coefficient production technology.  The last two equations of  (1.3) 
represent the fixed coefficient production technology which is in terms of it  and  ib  which represent the 
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commodities3.  Second, it assumes that there is no joint production when producing 
household commodities4.  The first two assumptions are consequence of the fixed 
coefficient technology that is employed by Becker (1965).  Third, the household hourly 
wage, w, is assumed to be constant across time and independent of the household 
commodities produced.  From the first order conditions, we observe that the marginal 
utility of the ith household commodity is equal to the marginal utility of income times 
the full price of the ith household commodity, 
iZ i
U .  However, if the household 
wage rate is not constant, w, then the maximum attainable income will overstate the 
money income if the marginal wage rate is less than the average wage rate.  Thus, the 
allocation of money spent on non-working activities will be determined only by the 
effect of income and not by the effect of utility. 
The validity of CRTS in the production of household commodities and non-joint 
production of household commodities made by Becker (1965) have come into question.  
Pollak and Wachter (1975) show that the violation of either of these assumptions 
renders the use of commodity prices useless since demand for household commodities 
would not only become a function of commodity prices but would also depend on the 
household technology, market goods prices and preferences.  This means that 
commodity prices can no longer be interpreted as shadow or implicit prices because we 
                                                                                                                                                                          
input time and the amount of market goods per unit of iz  respectively. 
3
 We can see that the production function given by the last two constraints of (1.3) is linearly homogeneous, 
which implies that doubling the inputs will result on doubling the outputs. 
4
 Becker (1965) not only assumes that 0i
i
z
x
 and 0i
i
z
T
 but also assumes that if a market good or time 
period was used in the production of several commodities that we can separate these joint costs and 
uniquely and fully allocate them between the household commodities being produced.  We can see that 
this is a result of the production function in (1.3) proposed by Becker (1965).   
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cannot untangle the effects of preferences and technology.  In the absence of constant 
returns to scale and/or non-joint production, Pollak and Wachter (1975) argue that we 
must therefore re-write Becker’s (1965) model in the following manner: 
(1.6) 
,
( , )
. .
i c
i c
x T
i i wi
o w c
Max U x T
s t p x N T w
T T T
Here we can see that the utility function is written as a function of market goods 
and time spent consuming.  Pollak and Wachter (1975) formulate the utility function in 
this manner because they argue that due to the violations of CRTS and non-joint 
production, commodity prices are not central to the HPM and that commodity 
demands can be modeled as functions of market goods price, wages, unearned income 
and the household technology.  We find that another reason for this formulation of the 
utility function is that, as argued by Pollak and Wachter (1975), time can in itself be a 
source of utility or disutility.  In other words, time spent consuming yields utility.  The 
solutions to the maximization problem (1.6) are the demands for market goods and 
time, respectively, which are functions of prices, wages and unearned income.   
(1.7) 1 0( ,..., , , , , )i i n wx h p p w N T T
(1.8) 1 0( ,..., , , , , )cc T n wT h p p w N T T
(1.9) ( , , ) i iiI p w Z z
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Therefore, the implicit household income is defined by Pollak and Wachter (1975) as 
(1.9) where the implicit commodity prices are given by , ,i
i
C p w Z
Z
which implies 
that the commodity prices are dependent on the bundle that is consumed5.    
Pollak and Wachter (1975) conclude that if there are non-constant returns to scale 
and/or joint production we are unable to untangle the effects that market goods, the 
household technology and preferences have on household commodity prices.  Pollak 
and Wachter (1975) believe that we are left with two alternatives.  First, we can apply 
the HPM to those activities that do not involve joint production or non-constant returns 
to scale.  This alternative limits the use of the HPM since joint production is not the 
exception but the norm because the time used in the production of household 
commodities can in itself be a source of utility or disutility.  In this case, we would 
estimate household commodity demand with equation (1.4).  Second, we can argue that 
commodity prices are not essential to the HPM and that commodity demands can be 
modeled as functions of market goods prices, wage rate, unearned income and 
household technology. The resulting model is a reduced form model that retains the 
household production model’s emphasis on household commodity demands while 
dispensing with the use of commodity prices.  The reduce form model consists of 
equation (1.7) and equation (1.8). 
                                                          
5 The cost function is given by the following equation: , , wC p w Z N T W  where Z denotes the 
household commodity. 
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2. Extensions to Unitary Models with No Intrahousehold Allocation 
The area of recreational demand has made extensive use of the household 
production model.  It provides numerous examples of the implementation of the HPM.  
This literature extensively discussed problems that have arisen from the use of HPM’s.  
Within recreational demand literature, the travel cost models are an important area of 
study.  The purpose of these models is valuation of non-market commodities such as 
outdoor recreation.  The HPM has been used by this literature to assign value to time 
spent on different recreational activities.  The travel cost models are demand-based 
models that study the use of recreational sites and attempt to estimate the access value 
to a site or sites or to evaluate the elimination of sites. 
The valuation of travel time in a recreational setting provides us with an illustration 
of the use of the HPM.  Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) argue that the 
valuation of travel time by recreational demand models as a proportion of the wage rate 
is not only theoretically inconsistent but also practically unreasonable.  It is their belief 
that different times should be treated differently.  In other words, they believe that the 
timing of time is important.  The time in the time horizon may not be used equally due to 
the work schedule of an individual and/or other time commitments.  Hence, the timing 
of time provides us with a problem that must be addressed by the recreational literature. 
Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) propose a modified HPM that maximizes 
a household utility function, U, which is a function of two types of service flows: a 
recreational service flow, Rz , and a composite non-recreational service flow, 0z .  These 
service flows are subject to two time constraints for recreational activities and work 
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activities, a budget constraint, and a household production technology constraint for  
Rf  and of .  The two budget constraints reflect the importance of the timing of time.  
Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) model is given by: 
(1.10)                                
0
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In this model, Rx Nx 6denotes recreational (non-recreational) market goods with a 
corresponding price of Rp Np , RNiz  denotes the number of trips to the ith recreational 
site where i=1,2, NT RT denotes the time spent in the production and consumption of 
non-recreational (recreational) activities, RTiz denotes the time spent on-site of the ith 
recreational activity, di denotes the round trip distance to the ith  recreational site and c 
denotes the vehicle related travel cost per mile traveled.  Unlike Becker (1965) who 
represents leisure and consumption time of all commodities in a single time category, 
Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) created two distinct leisure and consumption 
time uses: one for recreational activities and a second for nonrecreational activities.  It is 
important to note that in this model the amount of on-site time is assumed to be the 
same for all individuals.  Smith, Desvousges and McGivney’s (1983) find that there are 
three components of the cost of a visit to a site: the vehicle related travel cost, the cost of 
                                                          
6 The household chooses the amount of Rx  and Nx bought and used in the production of recreational and 
non-recreational service flows. 
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travel time, and onsite cost of a trip.  The Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) 
estimated demand function for trips to a recreational site j by individual n is given by: 
(1.11) 2 2
1 1
, , , ,RNi i o R RTi wZ f cd w T T wZ wT N D
Equation (1.11) indicates that the demand for recreational service flows, in this case 
visits to a particular recreational site, is a function of five variables7.  The first variable, 
icd , is the vehicle related travel cost of a trip to a site by an individual8.  The second 
variable, 2
1
o Rw T T , represents the cost of travel time and because the model 
restricts all trips to the same amount of time on site, the onsite time cost of one more 
trip is given by the third variable, 2
1
RTiwZ .  The fourth variable is the total 
household income, wwT N .  The fifth and last variable, D, represents socio-
demographic characteristics of the individual.  They find that the most significant 
determinants of the demand for a recreational site are travel cost and individual taste 
for water recreation.   
Recreational demand literature prior to 1987 did not properly address the valuation 
of non-working time, since not all non-working time can be valuated with the use of the  
                                                          
7 The term 1  is the lagrangian multiplier of the total time constraint and 2  is the lagrangian multiplier of 
the recreational time constraint.  Since 1  and 2  are lagrangian multipliers they are functions of all of the 
parameters to the optimization problem including wages.  The opportunity cost of time is therefore a 
nonlinear function of wages and is the same for both time on site and travel time per  trip. 
8
 Recall that c is the vehicle related travel cost per mile and di is the round trip distance to a recreational site. 
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wage rate but should be valuated with the use of the individuals opportunity cost of 
time. Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman (1987) examine the effect of the recreationalist’s 
labor market situation, that is, whether the work schedule of household members is 
fixed or allows for some flexibility in the work schedule.  In the case of a work schedule 
that has some flexibility, we can trade work time for leisure time at the margin therefore 
total time available becomes the limiting factor.  In the case of a fixed work schedule, 
we can not trade work time for leisure time at the margin, therefore discretionary time 
becomes the limiting factor.  When an individual has a flexible work schedule, the wage 
rate reflects the tradeoff between work and leisure since they can be traded at the 
margin.  When an individual has a fixed work schedule, the wage rate no longer reflects 
the tradeoff between work and leisure, and the opportunity cost is no longer an 
observable parameter.   
Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman (1987) attempt to address this problem with the 
use of two budget or time constraints: one for time spent working at a job with a flexible 
work schedule and one for time spent working at a job with some flex time.   Their 
model is given by: 
(1.12)                                   
,
0
( , )
. .
R N
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In this model, Fw is the wage rate at a job with a fixed work schedule, Dw is the 
wage rate at a job with some flex time in his/her work schedule, WFT is the time spent 
working at a job with a fixed work schedule and WDT  is the time spent working at a job 
with some flex time.   
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(1.13)                         0 0( , , ( ))IR R D WD D N WF F WFz h p w T p w T T w N T T
(1.14)                              0( , , , , , )cR R R N N WF F WFz h p T p T T w N T T
The demands for recreational commodities considering flexible and fixed work 
schedule are given by (1.13) and (1.14) respectively. 
As Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman (1987) point out, maximizing a utility function 
subject to two linear budget constraints or time constraints, creates an implementation 
problem associated with HPM the existence of two duals.  The first dual involves the 
minimization of cost subject to utility and time constraints.  The second dual involves 
the minimization of time costs subject to utility and time constraints.  Each dual is 
associated with an expenditure function and a compensated demand. Both duals yield 
an expenditure function that depends on prices, utility and time cost, , ,e p U TC 9.  
We know from Bockstael and Strand (1985) that compensation can be measured in 
terms of time or money or any combination of the two.  In the two constraint cases, it is 
not plausible to integrate back to expenditure function or to obtain exact welfare 
measures.  In order to obtain these exact welfare measures, Bockstael, Strand and 
Hanneman (1987) propose that we start with the preference structure and explore the 
demand functions that can be derived from alternative utility functions10.  A 
                                                          
9 TC denotes time cost. 
10
 The empirical demand function used by Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman (1987) contained a quality 
variable to help determine among the various choices available.  This was an adaptation of a quantity-
quality model. 
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consequence of this setup is that the utility function considered must be a function of at 
least three goods because it will be maximized subject to two constraints. Therefore, it is 
no longer possible to use the single Hicksian bundle concept.  The researchers find that 
individuals with fixed work schedules have a value of time that is greater than their 
wage rate.  While these individuals are willing to trade work for leisure they are 
constrained by the all or nothing decision they face since they can not engage in 
recreational activities during their work hours.  For these individuals, there is no trade-
off between work and leisure.  The most significant empirical finding of Bockstael, 
Strand and Hanneman (1987) is that the compensating variation measure of money and 
time derived from the expenditure function leads to opposite conclusions about what 
type of individual suffers more from the elimination of a recreational site. 
Prior to 1992 there was no serious attempt in the recreational demand literature to 
deal with the fact that time spent on-site at a recreational activity can involve an 
opportunity cost of time and also be a source of utility.  This dual role of leisure (on-
site) time had been apparent in economic literature since Pollak and Watchter (1975).  
Before 1992, recreational demand theory dealt with this problem by assuming that on-
site time is fixed.  This problem is addressed by McConnell (1992) who relaxes the 
assumption that on-site time is fixed and investigates the consequences of allowing on-
site time, RTz , to be a choice variable.  In McConnell’s (1992) model, on-site time not 
only enters the utility function but it also enters the budget constraint.  McConnell’s 
(1992) model is given by: 
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McConnell (1992) finds that in the single site case when on-site time is endogenous 
we cannot investigate the demand for a site, which in this HPM would be the 
household commodity, through the direct utility function approach.  McConnell (1992) 
states that Roy’s identity must be used, in this case, to derive the demand for trips to a 
recreational site, RNz .  Hence, the demand for trips to a recreational site is given by: 
(1.16)                             ( , , , )/( , , , ) ( , , , )/
RN RT N RN
RN RN RT N
RN RT N
V p p p I p
z p p p I
V p p p I I
However, McConnell (1992) states that due to the nonlinearity of the budget 
constraint the optimal value of onsite time can not be derived from the direct utility 
approach or with the use of Roy’s identity.  Rather, the demands must be derived using 
duality theory by:   
(1.17)                              ( , , , )/( , , , ) ( , , , )/
RN RT N RT
RT RN RT N
RN RT N RN
V p p p I p
z p p p I
V p p p I p
However, McConnell (1992) states that this demand functions cannot be interpreted 
as a welfare measure.   McConnell (1992) concludes that when onsite time is 
endogenous there are two Marshallian demand functions (1.16) and (1.17) which 
represent the demand for trips to a recreational site and the time spent on onsite at a 
recreational site, respectively.  McConnell argues that (1.17) needs to be estimated only 
to attain greater efficiency and not for welfare analysis of trips to a recreational site. 
Larson and Shaikh (2001) show that commonly used two-constraint models such as 
Smith, Desvousges and McGivney (1983) are theoretically inconsistent because they 
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omit the time budget variable in the empirical model.  The time budget variable is 
formed by prices of travel and money income.  The omission of the time budget 
variable invalidates the use of full prices in the HPM.  The inconsistency comes from 
the fact that there are two constraint requirements that need to be met by two constraint 
models in order to be consistent with economic theory that are not met when the time 
budget variable is omitted.   The two requirements are: tj T
pj M
V V
V V
and tj ti
pj pi
V V
V V
. 
 The rationale used for omitting the time budget variable is that it has no effect on 
the demand for market goods.  In contrast to both Smith, Desvousges and McGivney 
(1983) and Larson and Shaikh (2001) present a two-constraint version of the model that 
implies a different time and commodity complementary relationship, and thus a 
different structure of the implicit prices for the recreational services.  Larson and Shaikh 
(2001) unlike its predecessors concludes that time budgets must be included in the 
analysis of two-constraint recreational models since they provide the theoretical 
justification for the use of full prices.   The dual constraint model of Larson and Shaikh’s 
(2001) is given by:  
(1.18)                                                       
0
( , )
. .
x
t
Max U x s
s t p x I
p x T
In this model, x denotes the vector of market goods, p denotes the vector of market 
goods, I  denotes the money budget, tp denotes the price (cost) of time, 0T denotes the 
time budgets, and s denotes a vector of shift parameters.  The estimated incomplete 
demand for recreational services jx  is recovered using two forms of Roy’s Identity:  
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(1.19) 
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As we can see from (1.19), the resulting conditional demand is a function of , , ,tp p s I
and 0T . 
In Larson and Shaikh (2001), the two constraints are separately maintained, with 
time and income budgets pre-determined from a non-modeled first stage allocation.  In 
the first stage of the two step budgeting process used by Larson and Shaikh (2001), 
labor supply is chosen by maximizing utility subject to work time and leisure time.  In 
the second step, time is allocated to different leisure activities given a level of 
discretionary spending and time.  The result of this two-step budgeting process is two 
restrictions which must be met in order to be consistent with the theory.  The first 
restriction relates the observable Marshallian demand slopes in time and money and 
unobservable marginal value of leisure11 and the second restriction gives us Slutsky-
Hicks equations in money and time12.  The two constraints imply there are two Slutsky 
symmetry conditions: one each for the equality of cross money-price and cross time-
price effects.  These conditions suggest a specific structure on how choices respond to 
the relative scarcity of money and time.  The implicit price of recreational services is not 
only a function of market price of purchased inputs, but also an endogenously 
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where z  is the money value of time. 
12
 The Slutsky-Hicks equation in time is j ji ij i
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x x
t T t T
 and the Slutsky-Hicks equation in money 
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. 
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determined marginal cost of time which is given by the ration of the Lagrange 
multipliers. 
(1.20) 0, ,i i D t Dx h p W p s g I W T s
(1.21)              1 1 0,..., , ,i i t n tnx h p z p p z p s g I z T s
In equations (1.20) and (1.21), the variable DW  is defined as the change in the 
demand for market goods that comes about from a change in the price of market goods, 
which is given by i
i
x
p
, and  the variable z  denotes the money value of time.  Larson 
and Shaikh (2001) chose (1.20) and (1.21) because both of these demand equations met 
interior solutions that satisfy the two constraint requirements in the case of exogenous 
and endogenous marginal value of time, respectively.  In both systems of demand 
equations, the cross partial price slopes are symmetric j i
i j
h h
p p
.  The demand 
functions in equation (1.20) and (1.21) have individual full price effects given by 
,i D th p W p s  and 1 1 ,..., ,i t n tnh p z p p z p s  and a common full budget 
effect 0 ,Dg I W T s  and 0 ,g I z T s , respectively. 
While Larson and Shaikh (2001) find that demand systems derived from two 
constraint models that employ full prices and incomes are not consistent with these two 
restrictions, they find that models that use full prices and full budgets are consistent 
with their two restrictions, regardless of whether the value of time is endogenous or 
exogenous.  Larson and Shaikh (2001) relax the link between commodity prices and 
wages and the opportunity cost of time however potentially relevant constraints are not 
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considered.  This model assumes that each unit of good consumed is temporally 
exchangeable with the other units.  Recreational activities are dependent on both the 
amount and the timing of available time.  Time cannot be stored, although it can be 
transferred between periods by changing commitments.  Free time is often available 
only in discrete bundles of time due to fixed work schedules and other time constraints.  
Therefore, the feasible choice of time is constraint in a given time period. 
These recreational demand studies have explored how the household production 
model valuates time.  Smith, Desvousges and McGivney’s (1983) research introduces 
the importance of timing of time which states that time in the time horizon may not be 
used equally due to time constraints.  The research of Bockstael, Strand and Hanneman 
(1987) shows the effect that different types of work schedules have on the value of time.  
McConnell’s (1992) research allows for on-site time to have a dual role as a cost and also 
as a source of utility.  Larson and Shaikh’s (2001) research shows us the restrictions in 
money and time from a unitary model with both time and budget constraints with an 
endogenous marginal value of leisure.    
3. Extensions to Unitary Models with the Introduction of Intrahousehold Allocation 
In the economic literature discussed up to this point, there is no analysis of the 
intrahousehold allocation of resources.  Becker’s (1965) model is modified by Gronau 
(1973) in order to better deal with both household production, the allocation of time and 
intrahousehold allocation of resources.  The first important research that dealt with 
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intrahousehold allocation of resources within the household production model was 
conducted by Gronau (1973) and Gronau (1977). 
Gronau (1973) believes, as Becker (1965) does, that the division of time should be 
between working and non-working time (leisure), but he also believes in a further 
division of work time between work in the market and household production.  Gronau 
(1973) believes that Becker’s (1965) division of time overlooks the wife’s household 
production.  Gronau’s (1973) model accounts for the spouses’ division of time by 
employing individual time constraints that allocate time among the three uses of time: 
leisure, work in the labor market and household production.  In Gronau’s (1973) model, 
we have time constraints for each of the spouses.  This marks a significant departure 
from Becker’s (1965) model which employs a household time constraint that allocates 
time only between working and non-working time.  Another significant difference 
between Gronau (1973) and Becker (1965) is the relative magnitude of wages.  Gronau 
(1973) and Becker (1965) assume that wages are constant across time but, unlike Becker 
(1965), Gronau does not assume wages of spouses to be the same.   Gronau’s (1973) 
model has different wages for each spouse and assumes that husbands’ wages are 
greater than wives’ wages  1 2w w 13.   
Gronau’s (1973) household production model allocates household members’ time 
according to their comparative advantage in the production of household commodities 
and market goods.  Gronau (1973) defines comparative advantage in terms of the 
relative wages of each spouse and the spouses’ efficiency in the production of 
                                                          
13
 Here 1w  is the wage of the husband while 2w is the wage of the wife. 
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household commodities.  Gronau’s (1973) model is discussed under the assumption 
that only two household commodities are produced by the household.  Gronau’s (1973) 
model is given by: 
(1.22) 
1 2
1 2
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In this model, Mx denotes market goods, Hx denotes market foods used in the 
production of household commodities, jiz  denotes the jth household commodity 
produced by individual i , Z denotes the vector of all j  household commodities where 
the  jth household commodity is defined as  
1,2j jiiz z , wiT  denotes the time spent 
working by individual i , jiT  denotes the time used to produce commodity j  by 
individual i , ciT  denotes leisure time or time spent consuming of individual i , 0iT
denotes the total time available to individual i , iw  denotes the wage rate of individual 
i  where 1,2i , Mp  denotes the price of market goods and Hp  denotes the price of 
market goods used as inputs in the production of household commodities.  The total 
amount of goods of market goods, X 14, is the sum of market goods consumed at home 
and market goods used in the production of household commodities. 
The demand for the thj  household commodities is given by:15 
(1.23) 1 2, , , ,j j M Hz f p p w w N
                                                          
14
 We have M HX x x . 
15
 The household commodity depends on the value of market goods used in the production of household 
commodities and the value of time used in the production of household commodities. 
 26
Gronau (1973), like Becker (1965), finds that the marginal cost of producing a 
commodity, *i i x i ip w , has two parts: the cost of market inputs,  i xp , and the 
value of time, *i iw 16.  Gronau’s (1973) model shows that the labor market participation 
decision can be explained by comparing the value of the household member’s time in 
the absence of market opportunities and the potential wage rate.  Therefore, Gronau 
(1973) concludes that one of three following statements must be true of wives that 
participate in the labor market.  First, these wives value of time exceeds their wage rate 
and increases with family income.  Therefore, housewives lack of participation in the 
labor market indicate that in the absence of labor market opportunities their value of 
time would have fallen short of their attainable wage rate.  Under Gronau’s (1973) 
second assumption that the value of time and wage rate are independent and 
identically distributed, if we also assumed that all women in a given age-education 
group anticipate the same wage rate, their participation in the labor market is explained 
in terms of differences the value (price) of time17.  Therefore, Gronau finds that women 
who participate in the labor market are those that have the lowest price of time, i.e. are 
the least productive in the household.  Therefore, the women who do not participate in 
the labor market have average wage rate that are lower than the average cost of their 
time18.  Third, if instead of assuming that women in the same group anticipate the same 
wage, we assume that differences in labor force participation can be attributed to  
                                                          
16
 The marginal product of market inputs (time) used in the production of household commodities is given 
by  1i
1
i . 
17
 We find this in page 643 of Gronau (1973). 
18
 We find this in page 645 of Gronau (1973). 
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differences in wage offers.  We can then conclude that women who participate in the 
labor market are the most prepared, i.e., those that have received the largest wage 
offers.  As a consequence, the women that do not participate in the labor market have 
mean cost of time that fall short of the average wage rate in the market.  Gronau (1973) 
also finds that the household member with the lowest cost of production will produce 
all of the household commodities.  Gronau’s (1973) research assumes that there is 
specialization in household production and states that comparative advantage is 
determined by the relative wage rates of husbands and wives and their efficiency in the 
production of household commodities.  Husbands’ wage rates as a rule exceed those of 
their wives, according to Gronau.  He, therefore, concludes that household production 
is mostly carried out by wives because they are relatively better equipped for this type 
of work. 
There is one serious problem with Gronau’s (1973) empirical estimation.  He 
assumes that the wage rate and the value (cost) of time are independent and identically 
distributed.  This assumption is not logical.  The value of time is assumed to be a 
function of the wage rate which depends on age and education.  Therefore, it must be 
the case that household income is not affected by age and education in order for this 
assumption to hold, but this is not the case because education does affects income. 
In order for us to be able to aggregate time used in household production and 
leisure, it is necessary that the two time uses must be a composite input in the 
production of household commodities. Gronau’s (1977) research deals with this 
problem.  From the composite commodity theorem, we know that in order for two time 
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uses to be composite inputs, the two uses of time must move in a parallel manner so 
that they can be treated as a single commodity.  This implies that ii
ci
T
T
  where  is a 
constant of proportionality and that the two time uses are affected in the same manner 
by all variables.  However, empirical studies have shown that time spent on household 
production and leisure activities are affected differently by changes in socioeconomic 
variables.  Gronau (1977) states that in order to understand why time spent on 
household production and leisure are affected differently by socioeconomic variables, 
we must study the differences between time spent consuming and producing.  He 
believes that while household production and market work are perfect substitutes there 
is no perfect substitute for leisure.  
Unlike Gronau (1973), who uses a household production model for all of the 
members of a household, Gronau (1977) proposes a household production model for a 
single individual which maximizes the quantity consumed of the household 
commodity subject to an individual budget constraint, time constraint and household 
production technology in order to explore the conditions under which we can 
aggregate time used in household production and leisure.  Gronau’s (1977) model is 
given by: 
(1.24) 
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In this model, iw  denotes the wage for individual i , N denotes unearned income, 
WiT denotes time spent working by individual i , ciT  denotes leisure or consumption 
time of individual i , jiT  denotes time used in the production of household commodity 
j  by individual i , Mix  denotes the expenditures on the ith market good, Hix denotes 
household goods of individual i , and Tix  denotes total goods of individual i .  Total 
goods, Tix , can be bought in the market or produced at home.  This implies that market 
goods and household goods are perfect substitutes.  Gronau (1977) measures the value 
of home goods and services, Hix ,  in terms of their market equivalents, Mix .  The 
demand for household goods is given by: 
(1.25) ,iz f w N
Gronau’s (1977) study of how household production is affected by income leads to a 
number of innovations in the household production literature.  One of Gronau (1977) 
empirical finding is that an increase in unearned income leads to a decrease in the 
household production of the non-labor market household members but has no effect on 
the household production of household members that participate in the labor market.  
The income effect is found to work primarily through its effect on leisure.  Labor supply 
is more elastic the greater the sensitivity of the household production to the wage rate.  
Gronau (1977) finds that in the short run there is a negative effect between the wage 
rate and household production.  In the long run, the wage rate is found to have a 
positive effect on education.  Marriage is found to lead to specialization within 
household production.  This finding is rooted in the assumption that individual 
household members do not sell household commodities in the market.  Gronau also 
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finds that there is a tradeoff between goods and time.  Gronau (1977) states that a 
husband’s wage rate is higher than his wife’s due to greater market involvement and 
discrimination.  He also argues that on the job training makes women’s household 
production more efficient.  Within the family, Gronau (1977) argues that there is an 
incentive for wives to trade goods for time.  The extent of wives’ willingness to trade 
home goods for market goods depends on the marginal cost of producing home goods.  
Specialization is found to increase the welfare of the household by increasing the wives’ 
household production and the fathers’ labor force participation.  Gronau (1977) 
concludes that when both household members participate in the labor market and there 
are no goods that are solely supplied through household production, then there are no 
gains from marriage since the household members face the same prices.  
C. Nonunitary Models  
In the early 1980’s, we see a move away from unitary models and toward 
nonunitary models with the introduction of bargaining models of household behavior.  
While unitary models are very limited when dealing with intrahousehold allocation of 
resources, due to the assumptions of the model that treat all individuals in a household 
as a single individual, extensions to the unitary models such as those of Gronau (1973), 
provide a good beginning to try to deal with this problem.  Nonunitary models of 
household behavior provide a more fertile ground for the study of intrahousehold 
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allocation because they model individual members of a household separately instead of 
modeling a household as a single unit.  
Economic models that study the intrahousehold decision process attempt to 
understand the internal structures that motivate and guide patterns of resource 
allocation among household members.  While households are dynamic units with 
respect to their composition and size, the majority of research in the area of 
intrahousehold allocation avoids these complexities by assuming a static and narrower 
framework.  The study of intrahousehold allocation commonly assigns decision making 
over the allocation of all household resources to the same household unit, while the 
appropriate unit of analysis may depend on the resource being allocated.  
1. Cooperative Bargaining Models of Household Behavior 
Cooperative bargaining theory combines in the framework of household model 
elements of cooperative game theory and more specifically of axiomatic bargaining 
theory.  The household members are the agents that attempt to come to an agreement 
on how the gains from cooperation within the household should be divided.  
Depending on the bargaining power of individual household members, we arrive at 
specific intrahousehold allocation equilibrium.  This equilibrium can take on different 
forms depending on the solution concept that is used.  We can arrive at a Nash-
bargaining solution as in the case of McElroy and Horney (1981) and McElroy (1990), a 
Pareto efficient outcome as in the case of Chiappori (1988a), Browning et al. (1994), 
Chiappori (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) or a noncooperative solution as in 
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the case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).  We will discuss each of these models in this 
section. 
The cooperative models of household behavior based on the Nash solution concept 
were introduced by McElroy and Horney (1981).   McElroy and Horney (1981) also 
show that the unitary model results are nested within their Nash generalized model.  
McElroy and Horney (1981) develop a nested test that determines whether the Nash 
demand system collapses to a common preference demand system. 
McElroy and Horney (1981) model the household decision process as a Nash 
bargaining process, which maximizes the utility gain product subject to the household 
budget constraint19.  Their model is given by: 
(1.26)          , , ,, ,
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In this model, mx fx  denotes the market goods consumed by the male (female) 
household member, px denotes public goods consumed by  both household members,  
cmT cfT  denotes the leisure or consumption time of the male (female), pp denotes the 
price of public goods consumed by both household members, mmp mfp  denotes the 
price of the market goods consumed by the male (female) household member, cmp cfp
denotes the price or cost of leisure time consumed by the male (female) household 
member, 0T denotes the total time available to the household,  mN fN denotes the 
                                                          
19
 The gains from marriage are given by: 0
k
kU V . 
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unearned income of the male (female) household member and 0mV 0fV denotes the 
maximum attainable utility (indirect utility) for the mother (father) outside of marriage.   
(1.27)                                ( , , , , , , )j j p mm mf cm cf m fx h p p p p p N N
 
(1.28)                                 ( , , , , , , )p mm mf cm cf m fh p p p p p N N
McElroy and Horney (1981) find that the demand for each good which is a function 
of prices and non-wage incomes is given by (1.27).  The optimal value for the multiplier 
is given by (1.28).   
McElroy and Horney (1981) derive a Nash generalization of Slutsky’s equation for 
their bargaining model20 as well as the Nash generalization of substitution symmetry21.  
When the price effects and the unearned income effects of both mother and father on 
the indirect utilities of unmarried individuals are equal to zero, the authors find that 
uncompensated, compensated and income price effects, as well as the Nash 
generalization of both the Slutsky equation and substitution symmetry collapse to those 
of their unitary model counterparts when both threat points are independent of prices 
and unearned incomes.  Also, when unearned income effects of both mother and father 
on the indirect utilities of unmarried individuals are equal to zero, the Nash 
generalization of Engel aggregation reduces to the neoclassical Engel aggregation.  The 
authors also find that Nash and neoclassical Cournot aggregations are identical.  When 
                                                          
20
 In this model, the effects of prices and unearned incomes on the male and female household member 
threat points, which are defined as the maximum attainable utility outside of the household, are captured 
by the matrix pV  and IV  respectively.    
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these Nash restriction do not collapse to their neoclassical counter parts this implies 
that the Nash demand model does not collapses to the unitary model. 
McElroy and Horney’s (1981) research is criticized by Chiappori (1988b) on two 
grounds: pre-marital utilities (i.e. 0fV and 0mV ) are unknown and the Nash-bargaining 
assumption made by the authors is neither restrictive nor convenient.  First, Chaippori 
(1988b) argues that the Nash-bargaining hypothesis employed by McElroy and Horney 
(1981) is only restrictive when each of the individual’s pre-marital utility functions is 
known.  Therefore, Chiappori (1988b) argues that since we do not know a priori about 
the agents non-marital preferences, we can not say anything about the agents demand 
functions.  Chiappori (1988b) argues that McElroy and Horney’s (1981) definition of the 
Nash substitution symmetry equation which is denoted by G is not invertible.  He then 
shows that by substituting the Nash generalization of Cournot aggregation and Engle 
aggregation into equation G-1 the wrongly specified matrix becomes zero.  Therefore, he 
argues that no matter what matrix  of prices, pˆ ,post-multiplies the right hand side of 
the inverse of G  the product will be always equal to zero.  Chiappori (1988b) also shows 
that the Slutsky matrix is not invertible confirming the fact that G-1 is not correctly 
specified.  Second, Chiappori (1988b) criticizes McElroy and Horney’s (1981) Nash-
bargaining hypothesis on the grounds that it is not convenient or restrictive since they 
assume that pre and post marital preferences are independent.  When preferences are 
unknown, Chiappori (1988b) argues that Nash-bargaining does not imply anything 
more than Pareto efficiency of household decisions process therefore concluding that 
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the collective setting (Pareto hypothesis) would yield a more convenient approach than 
Nash-bargaining. 
McElroy and Horney (1990) and McElroy (1990) reply to Chiappori’s (1988b) 
criticisms of their 1981 model. McElroy and Horney (1990) discard Chaippori’s (1988b) 
criticism of their model while conceding that the empirical applications were not clear.  
McElroy and Horney (1990) state that Chiappori’s (1988b) criticisms of their 1981 work 
is based on the Nash generalization of substitution symmetry.  The Nash generalization 
of substitution symmetry not only generalizes the observable neoclassical substitution 
matrix but also allows for the separate effects of the male and female household 
members income effects to be observed.   
McElroy and Horney (1990) state that Nash generalization of substitution symmetry 
requires that we have knowledge of the threat points or at least knowledge about their 
sensitivity to changes in prices and unearned incomes.  McElroy and Horney (1990) 
state that there is no reason to assume that there is knowledge about the threat point 
when the direct utilities are unknown.  However, they believe that Chiappori (1988b) 
overlooked the fact that the threat points can be estimated with the use of econometric 
techniques that account for selectivity into and out of marriage.  McElroy and Horney 
(1990) also state that it is true that the data requirements for the explicit estimation of 
the Nash-bargaining model go beyond prices, family income, aggregate consumption 
and labor supplies of each spouse.  This does not, however, mean that there is no 
empirical content in the Nash generalization of substitution symmetry.  The empirical 
content of McElroy and Horney’s (1981) model is discussed in McElroy (1990). 
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McElroy’s (1990) research shows how the augmented unitary model can be nested 
within the Nash bargained model and how in turn we can nest this model within a 
broader unrestricted model.  McElroy (1990) also discusses the data that is necessary for 
the estimation and outlines the estimation process that needs to be used to test this 
nested hypothesis.   
McElroy’s (1990) research studies whether the opportunity cost of family 
membership matters for the intrahousehold allocation of income and therefore the 
demands.  The determinants of the opportunity cost of family membership are treated 
as parametric variables called extra environmental parameters (EEP’s).  The EEP’s serve 
as pure shifter’s of the threat points.  In the indirect utilities of McElroy (1990) unlike 
those of McElroy and Horney (1981), the EEP’s shift the maximum values of the utility 
that an individual can obtained outside of marriage.  In other words, the EEP’s shift the 
threat points in the Nash bargained model but do not affect prices and nonwage 
incomes faced by married individuals and are, therefore, parametric to the bargaining 
outcome.  The use of EEP’s is a clear departure from McElroy and Horney (1981).  
McElroy (1990) states that the Nash model can jointly analyze household formation and 
the allocation decision process. 
McElroy’s (1990) model differs from to McElroy and Horney (1981) model (1.26) in 
that it incorporates EEP’s, 'i s into the maximization problem.  McElroy’s (1990) 
maximization problem is given by:   
(1.29) 
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The solution to the maximization problem yields a system of demands similar to 
those in McElroy and Horney (1981) but with the addition of extra environmental 
parameters:  
(1.30) , , , , , , ,j j p mm cm mf cf f m jx h p p p p p N V
The Nash demand systems are functions of prices of public goods, market goods 
consumed by each household member, the price of leisure for each household member, 
unearned incomes of each of the household members, and EEP’s that affect both 
household members.  The EEP’s help in the identification of the Nash model and also 
provide rich and fertile new grounds that aid in the exploration of household behavior.   
The EEP’s discussed by McElroy (1990) encompass a large number of parameters 
that include parameters that describe marriage markets, parameters that characterize 
the legal structure within which marriage and divorce occur, and parameters that 
characterize government or private transfers that are conditioned on marital or family 
status.   
McElroy (1990) states that the opportunity cost of being married in the unitary 
model is zero which, therefore, implies that only pooled income matters.  This means 
that there are two restrictions implied by unitary models.  The first restriction is that the 
EEP’s of father and mother have no effect.  The second restriction is that the unearned 
incomes of the father and mother are spent in the same manner and hence only total 
unearned income matters.   
The matrix of partial derivatives of EEP’s with respect to the consumption goods 
available is denoted by: x .  McElroy (1990) finds that the larger the effect that EEP’s of 
 38
an individual have on their threat point the larger the effect that the EEP’s will have on 
the demand for the consumption good for that individual.  McElroy shows that the 
Nash aggregation condition can be extracted from matrix x .  The Nash aggregation 
condition limits changes in demand due to changes in EEP’s to movements along the 
budget constraint.   
McElroy derives the fundamental matrix equation of Nash bargaining by collecting 
the partial derivatives of the F.O.C’s with respect to , p,  and I.  With the aid of full 
income and the fundamental matrix equation of Nash bargaining, McElroy shows that 
we can derive the general characteristics of a complete system of Nash bargained 
demand functions regardless of the type of utility function used. 
McElroy augments the fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer 
demand in terms of partial derivatives by allowing both time endowments associated 
with labor supply and the zero derivatives of the neoclassical F.O.C’s with respect to 
the EEP’s.  
McElroy shows that the Nash demand system exhibits well defined Nash 
uncompensated and Nash compensated income effects, as well as separate income 
effects for each household member.  McElroy argues that these three effects are related 
to the Nash generalization of the Slutsky matrix and its properties of symmetry and 
negative semidefinite.   
McElroy states that pV , IV  and V  record how the threat point shifts from changes 
in prices, income and EEP’s, respectively.  If m’s and f’s incomes affect demands in the 
same manner then we get the unitary model’s substitution matrix and therefore only 
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total unearned income is important.  McElroy shows that matrix G captures the 
component of the Nash generalization of the substitution matrix that comes about from 
the income and price changes on the threat points, pV and IV , respectively.  McElroy 
shows that if 0p IV V  not only is the Nash generalization of the substitution matrix is 
symmetric and negative semi-definite but the unitary model’s substitution matrix will 
also be symmetric and negative semi-definite.   
McElroy derives the Nash generalization of Cournot aggregation from the 
differentiation of the budget constraint with respect to prices and incomes respectively. 
McElroy shows that if we constrain the Nash fundamental equation by setting, 
0p IV V V , we get the augmented unitary fundamental equation which leads us to 
the conclusion that the Nash demand system is a generalization of the unitary demand 
system. 
McElroy (1990) concludes that the empirical content of the Nash bargaining model 
can be derived from the budget constraint and the fundamental matrix equation of 
Nash bargaining.  The empirical content, she argues, can be summarized by four 
conditions.  First, the Nash generalization of the Slutsky matrix must be symmetric.  
Second, the Nash generalization of the Slutsky matrix must be negative semidefinite.  
Third, there must be separate income effects for the father and mother.  The fourth 
condition states that changes in the EEP’s affect the demand for household 
consumption goods according to x  defined previously. 
Chiappori (1991) questions the validity of McElroy and Horney’s (1990) and 
McElroy’s (1990) claim that the independent estimation of the threat points leads to 
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testable restrictions that can be placed on household behavior by pointing two.  First, 
Chiappori (1991) states that the basic model stipulates that we should estimate not only 
the indirect utility function for each individual but also that we should estimate the 
direct utility function for each individual.  While McElroy (1990) states that we can 
estimate the indirect utility functions from a distinct sample of divorced individuals, 
McElroy (1990) makes no mention of how we should estimate the direct utilities of each 
spouse.  Second, the Nash bargaining solution Chaippori (1991) states is not invariant to 
a non-decreasing transformation of preferences, threat points or both.  Therefore, 
McElroy’s (1990) procedure would require a cardinal representation of preferences to be 
estimated from independent data.  He says that this is impossible given that an 
independent estimation cannot provide more than an ordinal representation of indirect 
utilities.   
2. Collective Models of Household Behavior 
In addition to the problems outlined by Chiappori (1991) about the Nash bargaining 
models of McElroy and Horney (1981) and McElroy (1990), there is an even more 
important criticism of the Nash bargaining models of household behavior.  If the 
empirical implications of the Nash bargaining model are rejected, then it is impossible 
to determine whether the bargaining setting in general is rejected, the Nash solution 
concept chosen is rejected, or both are rejected.   The collective models of household 
behavior that are based on Pareto efficiency such as Chiappori (1988a, 1997), Browning 
et al. (1994), and Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide an alternative to Nash 
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bargaining models.  These models do not place a prior restriction, by assuming a 
particular solution concept such as Nash, on which point on the Pareto frontier will be 
chosen by the household.  Collective models of household behavior are based on the 
weaker restriction of Pareto efficiency but still allow us to derive some testable 
implications of the model and help us identify an important part of the intrahousehold 
decision process and individual preferences.  We will hereafter refer to this as the 
collective model of household behavior.  
The collective models of household behavior based on Pareto efficiency were 
introduced in the economic literature by Chiappori (1988).  Chiappori (1988) believes 
that previous collective models that used equilibrium concepts such as the Nash or 
Kalai-Smodorinsky were unable to test the collective setting separately from the 
equilibrium concept chosen.  Therefore, Chiappori (1988) believes the rejection of the 
collective model could not be attributed to the collective setting, the equilibrium 
concept chosen or both.  He also believes that the lack of sociological data about the 
decision process renders the decision process a black box. 
Chiappori (1988) employs Pareto efficiency, which is a less restrictive solution 
concept.  In other words, he assumes that the outcome of the decision process is Pareto 
efficient.  He develops an income sharing rule that is a mapping which is a reduced form 
model that summarizes the decision process of the household as shown below.   In 
essence, the income sharing rule takes into account the spouses’ wages, ww and fw , and 
total household unearned income,  N ,  and determines the allocation of unearned 
household income among the spouses,  fN and wN .  Chiappori (1988) defines an 
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income sharing rule as a mapping 
2 2:G .  The income sharing rule 
mapping is represented by: 
(1.31) , , , , ,w f w f f ww w N G w w N N N
For a given income sharing rule, Chiappori (1988) states that a unique pair of labor 
supply functions can be derived.  However, he states that there is no way to observe the 
household income sharing rule.  Chiappori (1988) goes on to states that for any pair of 
labor supply functions or conversely demands for leisure it is possible to find two 
utility functions Uw and Uf  and a sharing rule such that the labor supply functions or 
demands for leisure are the solutions to a utility maximization problem. 
The bargaining power within a household depends not only on the level of 
unearned income but also on the wages of each individual household member.  
Chiappori’s (1988) collective model explores two different preference structures: 
altruistic and egoistic preferences.  In the altruistic case, household member i cares in a 
non-paternalistic manner about his/her spouse’s utility.  The altruistic model is given 
by: 
(1.32)                     , , ,
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In this model, k represents a strictly positive function of male and female wages 
respectively, mw and fw ,  and unearned income N.  We also have that ciz  represents 
the private consumption of individual i , ciT  represents leisure of individual i ,  and 0iT   
represents total time available for individual i .  In this model, private consumption is 
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not observable.  However, we can observe labor supply and leisure demand.  The 
demand functions for private consumption and leisure time demanded are given below 
by (1.33) and (1.34) respectively.  These demand equations will be the same for the 
altruistic and egoistic cases. 
(1.33) , , ,ci i j ci iz f w w N f T w 22 
(1.34) ( , , )ci i jT f w w N
Collective rationality is satisfied by a parametric specification in the case of the 
altruistic model if three conditions are satisfied.  First, the marginal utilities of each 
spouse private consumption is proportional distributed according to the sharing rule23.  
Second, the wage rate of the ith household member is equal to the ration of his/her 
marginal utility of private consumption to his/her marginal utility of leisure24.  Third, 
the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure of the spouses is equal to the ratio of their wages 
times the sharing rule25.  
The definition of collective rationality with altruistic  agents, Chiappori (1988) states, is 
more than a transposition of the usual revealed preferences conditions26.  The observed 
bundle is the best in a collective, Pareto optimality sense; hence, for each j, there must 
                                                          
22 
ciz  can be expressed as a function of ciT  and iw  because the maxim in the altruistic case possesses a 
separability property because it is a linear combination of  two functions. 
23
 Therefore, we have 
ci cj
ji
z zU kU .   
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 In other words, we have 
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i i
L i zU w U . 
25
 This is equal to 1
2
1
1
2
2
L
L
U w
k
wU
. 
26
 The bundle observed is the best among all the bundles which are financially available when wages are 
given by jmw  and 
j
fw , and unearned income is given by jN . 
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exist a j  such that i j jU U  is maximized.  Second, only total private consumption is 
observable and represented in the constraint. Therefore, it is efficient for the data to be 
collectively rational for some , jjcm cfz z satisfies this constraint.  Chiappori (1988) finds 
that the demand for private consumption can be represented as a function of leisure 
time demanded and the wage rate and can be characterized up to an additive constant.   
In the case of egoistic preferences, the utility of an individual household member is 
a function of his/her private consumption and leisure and is subject to his/her 
individual budget constraint.  The egoistic model is given by: 
(1.35)                          ,
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From the first order conditions of the egoistic model, we get one condition, 
i
i
i
L
ii
z
U
w
U
, that must be satisfied by a parametric specification in order to satisfy 
collective rationality of egoistic agents (CREA).  In other words, the marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for private consumption for individual i  must be equal to the 
wage rate of individual i .      
Similar to the case of altruistic preferences, collective rationality with egotistic agents is 
more than a transposition of the usual revealed preferences conditions.  The observed 
bundle is the best in a collective, Pareto optimality sense; hence, for each j, there must 
exist a j  such that i j jU U is maximized.  Second, only total private consumption is 
observable and represented in the constraint. Therefore, it is efficient for the data to be 
collectively rational for some , jjcm cfz z satisfies this constraint.  Chiappori (1988) finds 
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that the demand for private consumption can be represented as a function of leisure 
time demanded and the wage rate.   In the case of egoistic agents, the demand for 
private consumption cannot be characterized up to an additive constant. 
If the revealed preference conditions like their altruistic counterparts are met, then 
we will get the best available bundle among the ones which are financially available. 
Chiappori (1988) concludes that in the case of altruistic preferences only revealed 
preferences or non-parametric techniques can be used to differentiate between the 
collective model and the neoclassical model. 
In Chiappori (1988a), we are unable to identify the sharing rule in the case of 
altruistic preferences.  Browning et al. (1994) for the first time are able to identify 
Chiappori’s income sharing rule with altruistic preferences with the use of assignable 
and exclusive goods.  Public goods are defined by Browning et al. (1994) as those goods 
that are consumed by all household members.  Private goods are defined as those 
goods that are purchased and consumed by one individual household member while 
exclusive goods are defined as those that are only consumed by one individual.  
Therefore, non-public goods are defined as those goods that are exclusive and/or 
private.  The income sharing rule is defined as the outcome of the decision process that 
explains the division of expenditures on non-public goods between spouses.  It is 
important to note that this income sharing rule in Browning et al. (1994) is different 
than the one proposed by Chiappori (1988a).  In this formulation, we have that the 
income sharing rule is a function of individual money incomes of the mother and the 
father, mI and fI , EEP’s faced by the mother and father, m  and f , private 
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consumption of the father and mother are , mx  and fx , iE  denotes the total 
expenditures of individual i
, 
and E  denotes total household expenditures where 
m fE E E .   
(1.36)                                           ( , , , , , )m f m f m fI I E E
The income sharing rule gives us the share of individual 'i s  total expenditures as a 
function of exogenous variables that affect the decision process but do not affect 
preferences, the budget constraint or the consumption set.  The income sharing rule of 
Browning et al. (1994) is denoted by (1.36). 
The identification of the income sharing rule in the case of altruistic preferences has 
four requirements.  First, there must be some non-public good such that m fE E E .  
Second, there must be at least one exclusive or non-public good for each household 
member.  Third, each individual household member’s subutility function must be 
separable with respect to non-public goods consumption such that for 
( , ) ( , )j j m m j f fx x E x E  and either ( , ) 0j m mx E  or ( , ) 0j f fx E .  The subutility 
functions for individual m and f are given by mV  and fV , respectively. The model 
proposed by Browning et al. (1994) is given by: 
(1.37) ,
, , ,
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Browning et al. (1994) defines in page 1074 the expenditures of mother and father 
with the use of the sharing rule as:  
(1.38) ( , , , , , )m m f m f m fE I I E E E
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(1.39) 1 ( , , , , , )f m f m f m fE I I E E E
The solution to Browning et al. (1994) model, which is shown in page 1078, yields 
the household demand for private good j  which is given by (1.40), and the demands 
for private good j  for the mother and father which are given by equations (1.41)  and 
(1.42)27. 
(1.40) , ( , , , , , ) , 1 ( , , , , , )j j m m f m f m f j f m f m f m fx x E I I E E x E I I E E
 
(1.41) , ( , , , , , )mj j m m f m f m fx x E I I E E
(1.42) , 1 ( , , , , , )fj j f m f m f m fx x E I I E E
The economic literature in the area of collective models of household behavior then 
turns its attention to the incorporation of household production and addressing the 
different types of market structures.  Chiappori (1997) undertakes these two tasks.    
Chiappori (1997) not only incorporates household production into the collective setting 
but he also examines two different types of market structures: complete and incomplete 
markets.  Chiappori (1997) devises a two-step maximization problem that accounts for 
different types of preference structures, altruistic and egoistic, and different types of 
household commodity markets, complete and incomplete markets. 
The first stage is the same for both preference structures and markets.  In the first 
stage, the household maximizes household production subject to the cost of their 
household production.  The first stage maximization problem is given by: 
                                                          
27
 This is the case for private goods when either j  or j  equal to zero.  If good j is not a private 
good, we only observe the response of jq  to changes in ( , , , , , )m f m f m fI I E E . 
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(1.43) 
,
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im if
z im if m im f ifT T
Max p h T T w T w T
 
The solution to the first stage yields the amount of time used by household member 
m and f, imT and ifT , in the production of each household commodity, ( , )ci im ifz h T T .   
(1.44) ( , , , )im i j i jT f w w N N
(1.45) ( , , , )if i j i jT f w w N N
These allocations of time by m and f are given by (1.44) and (1.45), respectively.   
In the second stage for the complete market case, the household commodity, ciz , can 
be bought or sold in the market at a price of p.  The quantity bought or sold is denoted 
by Bz .  There are two plausible preference structures altruistic or egoistic.  The second 
stage maximization problem for the complete market case with altruistic preferences is 
given by: 
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The second stage maximization problem for the complete market case with egoistic 
preferences is given by: 
(1.47) , ,
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Chiappori’s (1997) income sharing rule summarizes the household decision process 
when household production is incorporated into the collective setting and is given by: 
f m m wm f wf zS s s w T w T p Z .   
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Chiappori (1997) finds three results in the case of the complete market case.  First, 
he finds that the sharing rule can be identified up to an additive constant.  Second, the 
Marshallian demands for leisure can be recovered.  Third, he finds that testable 
restrictions on market and labor supply functions can be generated.  In this model, Li 
denotes the demand for leisure time for individual i 28, i  denotes the Marshallian 
demand derived from iU 29.  The Marshallian demands for leisure must have the 
following form in the case of egotistic preferences. 
(1.48) ( , , , ) ( , )i i j i j i i iL w w N N w s
Similarly, Chiappori (1997) finds that in the incomplete market case there are four 
results.  First, the sharing rule can be identified up to an additive constant of ,m fw w .  
Second, the endogeneity of domestic price p, has a cost in terms of identification 
because p is not only a function of mw ,  fw , mN  and fN but also a function of 
preferences and the decision process.  Third, the parametric estimation of the income 
sharing rule can be misleading since it is a reduce form representation that can be 
derived from multiple models.  Fourth, the welfare implications derived from the 
parametric model may be incorrect.  The Marshallian demands for leisure must have 
the following form in the case of egotistic preferences30. 
(1.49) ( , , , ) , ,i i j i j i i m f iL w w N N w p w w s
                                                          
28
 Li is described in Chiappori (1997) page 192 and defined in terms of iw  and is  in page 197. 
29
 This definition is found in Chiappori (1997) page 203. 
30
 This definition is found in Chiappori (1997) page 207. 
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The economic literature on collective models of household behavior then turns its 
attention to the derivation of testable implications for the collective models.  Browning 
and Chiappori (1998) derive testable implications of the Nash-bargaining and collective 
models of household behavior that can be viewed as generalizations of Slutsky 
symmetry and negative semi-definiteness in the unitary models.    
Their maximization problem is given by: 
(1.50) , ,
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The maximization problem yields not only the demands for private consumption, 
, , , , .i mm mf px f p p p E , but also the income sharing rule, , , ,p mf mmE p p p , which 
represents the distribution function that summarizes the decision process and 
determines the location of the demand in the Pareto frontier.   The income sharing rule 
can be thought of as welfare weights that are attached to both household members.  An 
interpretation of these welfare weights is that they represent the bargaining power of 
the household members in the intrahousehold allocation process.  Under this setting, 
changes in wages, nonlabor incomes or prices, may then shift bargaining power from 
one spouse to the other.  When we have , , , 1p mf mmE p p p  this implies that 
individual m always gets his or her way and , , , 0p mf mmE p p p  implies that 
individual f always gets his or her way.  The variables pp , mfp , mmp   and E enter 
thorough the income sharing rule and the budget constraint.  Variables such as extra 
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environmental parameters and family financial structure enter the decision process but 
not the preferences.  
The resulting collective model counterpart to the Marshallian demand functions for 
private consumption is a function of : 
(1.51) , , , , .i mm mf px f p p p E
From duality theory, Browning and Chiappori (1998) derive the following 
expenditure function, , , , , .mm mf pe p p p E .  For collective rationality, it must be the 
case that ( , , , )T mm mf px p p p E is such that there exists a  ( , , , )m mm mf px p p p E , 
( , , , )f mm mf px p p p E  and ( , , , )p mm mf px p p p E  that is the solution to the maximization problem 
such that T f m px x x x .   
The Marshallian demand is given by: 
(1.52) , , , , , , , .mm mf p mm mf pp p p E f p p p E
The pseudo Slutsky matrix is 'p XS .  The unitary model implies that S is 
symmetric and negative semi-definite.  The collective model implies that 's UV
where  is a symmetric semi-definite matrix, /i iu f  and / /i jv p X .  
Browning and Chiappori (1998) developed a testing procedure named SR1.  The first 
step is to define an anti-symmetric matrix, M , such that 'M S S .  The test is based on 
the rank of M .  There are three possible outcomes for households with one and two 
individuals.  In the one and two household cases, if the rank(M )=0 then the unitary 
models is the correct model.  In the two household case, if the rank(M )>2 then the 
collective model is rejected.  While in the one person household case, we reject the 
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collective model when the rank(M )>1.  In the two person household case, if the 
rank(M )=2 then the collective model is the correct model.  While in the one person 
household case, the collective model is the correct model when the rank(M )=1.  The 
addition of distributional factors that enter  means that in addition to testing SR1 we 
must also test whether distributional factors are collinear, 
1iy y i .  
3.  Noncooperative Bargaining Models 
Noncooperative bargaining models provide an alternative formulation to Collective 
and Nash bargaining models.  Unlike cooperative collective models, the solution to 
noncooperative bargaining models need not be Pareto efficient intrahousehold 
allocations.  Noncooperative bargaining models use a noncooperative Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium within marriage that is suboptimal. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) introduce a noncooperative model called the separate 
spheres which has a threat point that reflects a noncooperative suboptimal outcome 
within marriage that reflects traditional gender roles.  This model may result in 
different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages from child allowances made to 
the spouses. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) discuss two separate spheres models.   The first model 
has a Cournot threat point.  In this specification, the spouses play a simultaneous move 
game.  This model starts with a Cournot equilibrium that arises from the voluntary 
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provision of public goods by the spouses in accordance with societally prescribed 
gender roles31. 
The utility functions of the parents are Von Newman-Morgensten.   In this model, iI
denotes the total income of household member  i  which is equal to the sum of his 
earned income, i wiw T , and unearned income, iN , ix  denotes the private good 
consumed by individual  i  with price ip , pix   pjx denotes the public goods consumed 
by the household that are part of 'i s 'j s  sphere with price pp .  This simultaneous 
move game is given by:  
(1.53) ,
( , , )
. .
i pi
i
i pi pj
x x
i i pi pi i
Max U x x x
s t p x p x I
 
In the case of a noncooperative equilibrium, the level of the public good is 
determined by the spouses.  The resulting demand (reaction) function for the private 
good consumed by the thi  household member and the public good that he provides are 
given by (1.54) and (1.55), respectively where pip is the price of the public good 
provided by individual ,i m f .  
(1.54) , ,i i i pjx h p I x
(1.55) , ,pi pi i pjx h p I x
When we have a noncooperative marriage, each spouse simultaneously decides the 
provision of pix  and pjx  and are assumed to reject societal sanctioned allocation of the 
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 Corner solutions and non-neutrality in the provision of public goods are a possibility but can be 
mitigated when we allow for cash transfers or binding premarital contracts between spouses. 
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responsibilities.  The levels of pix  and pjx that are chosen are independent of 
preferences and productivity differences between spouses.   
In Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) model, the noncooperative equilibrium has been  
shown to depend on the individual resources of each spouse.  The control of the 
resources, child allowance payments, is important in determining the allocation of 
resources within the household.  The distribution within two-parent families can be 
affected by policy changes that have no effect on the relative well-being of divorced 
men and women. 
In the second type of separate spheres model, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) incorporate 
transfers from the father to the mother.  The husband plays the role of the Stackelberg 
leader and moves first.  He maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint that 
accounts for his transfer to his wife and her reaction function.  The wife, as the follower, 
moves second as to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint.  The wife is 
assumed to specialize in the provision of the public good, px child services, while the 
husband specializes in the provision of money income, mI .  There is a transfer from 
husband to wife, s, and it can be augmented by an amount, t.  Therefore, he maximizes 
his utility by choosing his private goods and the transfer he gives to his wife.   
This maximization process takes two periods.  In the first period, the marriage 
contract takes place.  At this point, the parties do not know the actual values of 
incomes, mI and fI , but they know the distribution from which the incomes of spouses 
will be drawn.  It is also assumed that costless enforceable and binding prenuptial 
contracts can be made by prospective spouses.  The prenuptial contracts stipulate that a 
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minimum transfer, t, will be paid from the husband to the wife in the second period 32.  
The transfer, t, can be voluntarily augmented by the husband in the second period by a  
positive amount, s, or it can be substituted by cooperative bargaining outcome after his 
and his wife’s income are realized in order to increase his consumption of her public 
good, mx .   The Cournot equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the public 
goods demand functions.   
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) conclude that in the separate spheres model with 
positive transfers the effect of the alternative child allowance scheme is identical 
regardless of which parent gets the child allowance payment.  However, if there is no 
positive transfer made to the mother the threat point is affected by which parent 
receives the payment.  
D. Applications  
1.   The Analysis of Time with Unitary Models 
The majority of researchers in the area of intrahousehold allocation of resources and 
economics of the family agree that the incorporation of time into the analysis of 
intrahousehold allocation with the use of time surveys would allow us not only to 
measure the value of unpaid but productive activities, but also leisure and non-leisure 
non-productive activities.  However, there is no clear consensus on which non-market 
work should be measured and how the activities should be evaluated.  Joyce and 
Stewart (1999) believe that we should use the third person criterion, which states that an 
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 It is important to note that this amount is not contingent on future earnings. 
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activity is productive and should be measured if it can be done by someone else and 
still reach the desired result.  They also believe that we can use one of two approaches 
to assign value to different activities.  The first approach is the output approach, which 
states that we must first identify the output and assign a price to that output.  The 
second approach is the input approach, which states that we must estimate the amount 
of time spent on the activity and then we must multiply by the wage rate.  There are 
some problems with both of these approaches.  What price should be assigned to the 
output from the output approach?  Some argue that we must value it according to the 
market price.  In the case of the input approach, it is not clear which wage rate should 
be used.  Should we use the individuals wage rate, a specialists wage rate or a 
generalist wage rate33?  There is a serious problem with using the time spent on an 
activity as an appropriate indicator of the output from an activity.  From McConnell 
(1992), we know that time spent on a non-working productive activity may not only be 
a cost but also enhance the activity and yield utility.   
There have also been other concerns with the implementation of the use of the 
HPM.  There is an argument of whether the variables being investigated are utilities 
rather than commodities.  The proponents of this argument believe that these 
misapplications confounded preferences and technology by interpreting specific utility 
functions as production functions.  This argument was first proposed by Pollak and 
Wachter (1975).  There is little attention paid to the problem of identification of 
household commodities and activities because while goods are limited by the 
definitions used in market transactions, activities and commodities are constructed by 
                                                          
33
 If we think of building a deck a specialist would be a carpenter and a generalist would be a handy man. 
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researchers (Pollak 1999).  Multitasking is also believed to pose a problem in the 
collection and analysis of time use data.  A solution to the multitasking problem 
proposed by Pollak (1999) involves the use of two new definitions for simultaneous 
activities.  Simultaneous activities such as driving a car and listening to the radio are 
defined as parallel activities.   While simultaneous activities that involve the 
responsibility for the care of another in a situation in which time constraints are 
stochastic are defined as on-call activities.   
Even though there are a number of concerns with the use of the household 
production model, many uses of the household production model have attempted to 
examine the allocation of time to different household production activities.  The 
following review provides some empirical implications of the household production 
model in the economic literature. 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987), like Pollak and Wachter (1975), believe that due to 
non-constant returns to scale and joint production it is not possible to disentangle the 
effects preferences and technology have on observed behavior.  They also argue that, 
due to the lack of data on household commodities, previous literature has 
disaggregated non-working time into time spent on house work and pure leisure. This 
division of time does not allow for the large number of allocations of time that take 
place in the household to produce household commodities.  In addition, they also 
believe that the categorization of household commodities into aggregate goods and 
total consumption is too limited.  The authors state that the exclusion of households 
with non-working members from the previous literature leads to a bias that has not 
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properly been addressed.  The authors propose a model of allocation of time within the 
household with data that allows us to distinguish between nine different categories of 
time: household activities, childcare, obtaining goods and services, personal needs and 
care, organizational activities, hobbies and sports, entertainment and social activities, 
radio television and reading and total leisure.  The model is given by: 
(1.56)   
,
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0
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In this model, miT and fiT denote the time spent by the male and female spouses on 
the ith activity respectively, Tx denotes total consumption, p denotes the price of total 
consumption, mw and fw denote the wage rate of males and females respectively,  
0mT and 0 fT denotes total number of hours per time period available to household 
member m and f and V  represents unearned family income.  Optimization results in the 
allocation of time by each household member on the eight available activities if the last  
five constraints are not binding.  The resulting demands for time allocated to the 
different activities are given by34:   
(1.57) 0 0( , , , , , , )ji T i j m fT h p x w w N T T
                                                          
34
 When only one spouse works, the share equations can be derived with the use of the shadow price wage 
concept (i.e., one constraint is binding).   
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  Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) use a Heckman like procedure to correct for 
selection bias that arises from the exclusion of households with non-working spouses.   
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) find that their results are consistent with three of 
Gronau’s (1977) findings.  First, they find that in two-earner households the amount of 
household work is a function of the partners wage rate.  Second, they find that an 
increase on household income does not change the wage rate.  Third, they find that in 
the case of the female partner an increase in the real wage of the male partner would 
lead to a decrease in the partners’ profitability of household work.  However, 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) disagree with Gronau’s (1977) findings with regard to 
male partners.  They believe that the correct test of Gronau (1977) should be to ascertain 
whether weak separability between consumption and leisure activities exists. 
Researchers agree that there are differences in time allocation between different 
countries, time and ages.  Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) try to explain how time 
allocation patterns are affected by Japanese culture and the economic reality of the 
household members.  First, they compare patterns of time allocation between two 
different age groups, 25-39 and 65 and over.  Second, they compare time allocation 
patterns between the employed and unemployed.  Third, they compare time allocation 
patterns between male and female Japanese households. 
Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) use a HPM much like Becker (1965) but there are 
three differences.  First, the household production technology is not only a function of 
market goods, male and female time used in the production of the household 
commodities, but also a function of exogenous stock of health capital, Ho.  Second, the 
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stock of health capital only enhances non-market productivity.  Third, the wages of 
male and female partners are allowed to be different, that is, f mW W .  The 
maximization problem is given by: 
(1.58) 
1
0
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. .
, , :
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nZ
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i i f i m i f i m i
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i i i i i
Max U Z Z
s t P X W T W T W T W T N
Z F X T T H
In this model, iX denotes market good i, 
f
iT and 
m
iT denote male and female time 
used in the production of household commodity, iZ , and V  denotes unearned income.  
The resulting demand functions for market goods and non-market time are given by 
(1.59) and (1.60).  As with Pollak and Wachter (1975), this model uses demand functions 
as functions of market good prices and wages but then includes functions of health 
stock, 0H .35 
(1.59) 1 ,..., , , :i i n m f oX X P P W W H
(1.60) 1 ,..., , , :j ji i n m f oT T P P W W H
The authors assume that there are constant returns to scale and non-joint 
production associated with the production of household commodities.  This 
assumption is made to follow Pollak and Wachter’s (1975) argument for the usefulness 
of household commodity shadow prices.  This assumption renders the shadow prices 
exogenous.  The authors find like Gronau (1973) that the wage of the male partner is 
                                                          
35
 Here we have i=1,…,n and j=m,f. 
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greater than that of the female partner, m fW W .  Therefore, men are found to allocate 
less time to household production than women.   
Unlike previous time allocation studies, Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) find 
both an increase in the number of market and non-market working hours for male and 
female Japanese between the ages of 25 and 39 for the period from 1976 to 1986.  They 
find that the labor supply elasticity of females is much greater than of males.  They 
attribute the large difference to the fact that Japanese women have more alternative 
allocations of time than men in Japanese society because married Japanese women 
generally specialize in household production and, therefore, are less likely to enter the 
labor market than their husbands.  They also find a low elasticity of male labor supply 
which they attribute to the role of men in Japanese culture as full-time workers.   
Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) find that the gender gap in non-market activities 
remains constant in the period from 1976 to 1986 for the young and the elderly, and the 
employed and unemployed, which they believe can be explained by Japanese culture, 
which emphasizes gender specific social roles.  They find positive relations between the 
cost of raising children and size of family and between household income and childcare 
provided by the parents.   
Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) explore the relationship between the market 
wage rate and time used for healthcare, which is defined as the time spent sleeping and 
in medical care.  Unlike past studies of elderly males in the United States, the 
researchers not only find a negative relationship between the wage rate and time spent 
on healthcare but also find that the effect of sleeping for young males and females is 
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positive, which is believed to be the case because the indirect effect of sleeping time on 
market and non-market productivity is large enough to offset the substitution effect of 
rising wages for young males and females.  Yamada, Yamada and Kang (1999) also find 
that the life time cycle of time allocation to health care appears to be U-shaped. 
Due to the lack of a direct measure of household commodities, the trend in the 
household production literature has been to study the allocation of time and goods 
between household activities as proposed by Pollak and Wachter (1975).  Previous to 
Lecocq (2001) no one had studied the restrictions implied by a model such as that of 
Pollak and Wachter (1975).  In other words, previous to Lecocq (2001) no one had 
tested: (1) the weak separability of time and resources used in the production of every 
household commodity, and (2) whether the production of some household 
commodities are consistent with the HPM while at the same time the production of 
other household commodities are not.  Lecocq (2001) and Smith, Devougues and 
McGivney (1983) believe that the timing of time is important and explore its effect by 
studying weekday time versus weekend time. 
Lecocq (2001) obtains the derived utility function by introducing household 
production technology into the budget constraint.  The derived utility function is given 
in terms of market goods, time and environmental variables.  The estimation of the 
demand for household commodities rests on the identification of goods and time used 
to produce a given household commodity.  This implies that weak separability of goods 
and time used in the production of a given household commodity is possible.  Lecocq’s 
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2001 model concentrates on ascertaining whether the production of meals is consistent 
with the HPM.   
When weak separability in the production of meals is supported by the available 
data, the resulting model is given by:   
(1.61) 
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In Lecocq’s (2001) model, ( , , )FH FH FHm FHfz f x T T denotes meals prepared and 
( , , )OH OH OHm OHfz f x T T  denotes other household commodities.  In this case, Lecocq 
(2001) substitutes the household production functions for these two household 
commodities into the objective function.  We also have FAHx  , FAx  and OHx which denote 
food consumed away from home, food consumed at home and other household 
commodities, respectively, and d denotes demographic variables.  The first constraint is 
the full income constraint.  The last two constraints show how the total time for the 
mother and father are allocated. 
The resulting demands for meals prepared and other household commodities are 
given by: 
(1.62)                           , , , , , , ,i i m f FAH cf cmx h p w w N x T T i FA OH
 
When weak separability in the production of meals is not supported by the 
available data, we can not substitute the household production function into the utility 
function and get the derived utility function.  The resulting model is given by: 
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(1.63)
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The resulting demands for meals prepared and other household commodities are 
given by: 
(1.64) 0 0, , , , , , , , , ,i i m f FAH cf cm j Hm Hfx h p w w N x T T x T T i FA OH and i j
The test of weak separability consist of testing that the coefficients of, 0,j Hmx T  and 
0HfT  are jointly equal to zero.   
There are three important results from Lecocq (2001).  First, household commodities 
that are weakly separable in goods may not be weakly separable in time.  This is the 
case for meals prepared and other household commodities produced during weekends.  
This is believed to be the case because individual household members are not strongly 
time constrained on weekends.  This argument is similar to Smith, Devougues and 
McGivney’s (1983) timing of time argument.  The HPM is supported by weak separability 
of meals prepared on weekends, however, weak separability is rejected in the case of 
male and female time inputs devoted to other household commodities.   
E. Tests of Unitary Models  
The unitary model has been used widely in the stud ies of welfare of household 
members and of the impact of government programs on the welfare of women and 
child ren.  However, the valid ity of unitary models has come into question.  The test of 
unitary models is based on the test of the income pooling hypothesis, which is an 
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implication of the unitary models on the demand functions.  The income pooling 
hypothesis states that income from d ifferent household members is spent in the same 
manner.  When this hypothesis is true, one policy implication is that no welfare gains 
are made by switching an assistance program that provides resources to the husband to 
an assistance program that provides the resources to the mother.  We will now examine 
the most important tests of the unitary models.   
Two significant tests of unitary models are found in the literature in Thomas (1990), 
and Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997).  Thomas (1990) tests the validity of unitary 
models by testing the income pooling hypothesis.  The restriction placed by the income 
pooling hypothesis is that the income from each spouse should have the same effect on 
demand functions and should be spent in the same manner.  Thus, demand functions 
should be based only on total household income and not on income from each spouse.  
Thomas (1990) examines the unitary model and the Nash bargaining model of McElroy and 
Horney (1981).   
The unitary model analyzed by Thomas is given by: 
(1.65) 
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In this model, the variable ,iU X Z  represents the 
thi  individuals utility which is a 
function of the vector of commodity demands, X , and a vector of non-market goods, Z .  
The variable p denotes a vector of prices of all of the commodity demands and also 
includes, iw .  As in previous models, we have that iw is the price of time for the ith 
household member, T is individual i’s total available time and N i is the unearned 
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income of the ith individual.  In most of the economic literature, we only observe 
household consumption of good i , 
1
n
i ii
X x , rather than the individual 
consumption for that good, ix . 
When the unitary model is the correct model, Thomas (1990) states that the demand 
functions are given by:   
(1.66) *
1 1
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i
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X x g p N T
However, when the unitary model is not the correct model then the demand 
functions are given by:  
(1.67) * 11 , ,..., ,i
n
i ni
X x g p N N T
The Nash bargaining model of McElroy and Horney (1981) which was analyzed by 
Thomas is given by:  
(1.68) 
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There are two new variables in this model: 0
iV denotes the maximum attainable 
utility outside of marriage, and mA  denotes characteristics of the environment 
individual i  would face if he/she exited the household. 
When the Nash bargaining model is the correct specification, the demand functions 
are given by:   
(1.69) * 11 , ,..., , ,i
n
i n ii
X x g p N N T A
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Therefore, the test of the unitary model is whether the coefficients of all household 
individual incomes are the same.  If these coefficients are different we reject the income 
pooling hypothesis and, therefore, the unitary model. 
Thomas (1990) tests the effect of unearned income in the hands of the mother and 
father on the health and welfare of women and children as measured by nutrient intake, 
children’s health (height by age and weight by height), child survival rate, women’s 
fertility and clothing expenditures.  His research shows that unearned income in the 
hands of the mother has a greater effect on children’s and women’s welfare.  His 
research also shows evidence of gender bias in the provision of resources by parents.  
Mothers (fathers) are found to devote more resources to improve the nutritional status 
of their daughters (sons). 
Thomas (1990) disagrees with Chiappori’s (1988) assertion that the use of a 
bargaining concept such as Nash is too restrictive.  Chiappori (1988) states that if 
preferences are not purely egoistical only the use of revealed preferences or non-
parametric techniques will allow for the distinction of the collective model from the 
unitary model.  Thomas (1990) believes that this argument is too strong, because even if 
income pooling fails a change in non-wage income under the control of different 
household members will have the same effect on demands when the dictatorial model 
is correct.  Thomas states that if parents have different preferences, even if household 
allocations are Pareto efficient, the demand equations will not only depend on prices 
but also on individual components of unearned income.  Therefore, Thomas (1990) 
concludes that rejection of the income pooling hypothesis is not a constructive test.  He 
 68
points out that, theoretically, the correct measure of income needed to test the income 
pooling hypothesis is the present discounted value of lifetime nonlabor income.  He 
explains that this is necessary to insure that the measure of nonlabor income is 
independent of prices, wages and preferences.  When the income measure used is not 
independent of prices, wages and preferences, it would be measured with error.  His 
research fails to reject the hypothesis that unearned income is measured with error.  
Thomas’s use of anthropometric variables is important because it bridges the 
nutritional literature and the intra-household allocation literature in economics.  
However, the variables used for the comparison leave a lot to be desired.  He compares 
average height by age of U.S. and Brazilian children which were mostly from rural 
areas.  He also compares Brazilian boys and girls without accounting for differences in 
sexual maturity of children of different genders. 
Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) test the unitary model by testing the income 
pooling hypothesis.  Unlike previous tests of the income pooling hypothesis using 
differences in earned or unearned income of husbands and wives which are likely to be 
correlated with differences in prices, wage rates and preferences and, therefore, are not 
truly exogenous, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales’ test is based on a natural experiment in 
the form of a policy change in the United Kingdom that transferred a substantial child 
allowance to wives from husbands in the late 1970’s.  The authors reject the income 
pooling hypothesis and state that this rejection provides significant new evidence 
against the unitary models.  The authors found that there were increases in relative 
expenditures on children’s and women’s clothing relative to men’s clothing that 
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followed the policy change in the U.K.  Therefore, the authors conclude that the welfare 
of children increases when mothers are given control or are targeted as the beneficiaries 
of child allowance programs instead of fathers.  The empirical model is only loosely 
connected to the underlying economic theory.  The most significant problem with their 
model is that the change in policy could have led to a change in relative prices of 
children’s to men’s and women’s to men’s clothing, which in term led to the change in 
the consumption pattern.  
F.  A Possible Theoretical and Empirical Extension  
Chiappori (1988a) states that in the absence of sociological data about the decision process 
within the household, the latter has to be considered as a “black box”.  The literature of family 
financial structure provides us with sociological information that may shed light on the 
decision process within the household.  In the following section we will explore this 
literature.  
1.   Family Financial Structure 
The sociological literature concerning power within the family and inequality 
within the household was pioneered by Blood and Wolfe (1960).  Blood and Wolfe’s 
(1960) research attempts to explain how the balance of power within the household is 
determined.  They define power as the potential ability of one partner to influence the 
others behavior.  Authority is defined as power held by one spouse because both 
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spouses feel it is right.  They state that there are two competing theories of what 
determines the balance of power.  The first theory states that the balance of power is 
determined mostly by the culture under which the household members live.  The 
second theory states that the balance of power is determined mostly by the economic 
resources provided by each spouse to the household.  Blood and Wolfe (1960) find that 
the source of power is determined by the comparative resources that each spouse brings 
to the marriage.  Blood and Wolfe (1960) argue that the balance of power leans toward 
the spouse who brings the greatest financial contribution of resources to the marriage 
since this individual is strategically positioned to influence the distribution of resources.   
Recent sociological literature has focused on studying the relationships among 
financial organization, administration of finances and financial decision-making within 
the family.  The economic literature has developed models that study the impact of 
incomes from different spouses on the purchase of different commodities.  One major 
implication is that assistance projects targeting different household members can result 
in different outcomes in the standard of living of women and children.  However, 
economic theory has not fully considered the ways in which different family financial 
structures not only account for who earns the income but under what structure 
financial decisions are made within the household.  The following chronological 
literature review explores the most significant studies in the area of family financial 
structure.   
The sociological literature on family financial structure starts with Pahl (1989) who 
believes that the treatment of the household by economists as if it was a single 
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individual, unitary models, led to the creation of a black box between earnings and 
spending. Pahl (1989) examines how household income is managed within the 
marriage, the sources of income and control over household income and studies the 
implications of these areas on the patterns of spending. She believes that the use of the 
unitary models has led to three important effects. First, she believes that it has blurred 
the distinction between controlling, managing, spending and consuming. Second, she 
contends that these models fail to make distinctions between different kinds of 
expenditures. It is her contention that income used for different expenditures may come 
from different sources: own income, partner’s income or common resources. She also 
believes that spending can have different claims on the sources of income depending 
upon the item being bought. Therefore, the distinction between personal and household 
spending is important. Third, she wants to examine the effect that unitary models have 
had on the study of how household members share resources. 
Pahl’s (1989) analysis consists of sorting couples by joint or separate accounts and 
then by who controls the pooled income. The results are four categories of household 
financial organization: wife controlled pooling, husband controlled pooling, husband 
controlled non-joint account and wife-controlled non-joint account. Her analysis shows 
that the amount of money spent on housekeeping is not only related to the level of 
household income but also to the amount contributed by each partner and his/her 
control over the resource.  She also finds that resources in the hands of the mother lead 
to greater expenditures on food than in the hands of the father. The proportion of 
resources spent on housekeeping was found to be greater if the wife controlled the 
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finances.  She also finds that women hold less money back in absolute and relative 
terms in times of need. Therefore, she concludes that in order to raise the living 
standards of women and children, economic aid should be directed to women.  
Wife-controlled finances are found to be more common in low-income working 
class households. Wife controlled finance are found to go hand-in-hand with wife 
management. Husband controlled finances were found to be associated with higher 
income, an allowances system for housekeeping and husband control of large 
expenditures. Pahl finds that pooled income under wife control is associated with 
middle income levels and two-income households, while husband controlled pooling is 
more typical of higher income levels. 
She also finds that expenditure patterns are different according to gender. Wives 
were found to be more likely to pay for food at home, clothing for themselves and 
children, presents and school expenses. These expenditures can be categorized as 
expenditures from running the household and, therefore, belong to the wife’s sphere of 
responsibilities.  Husbands were found to be more likely to pay for their clothing, car, 
household repairs and decorations, food away from home and alcohol. These 
expenditures can be seen as belonging to the husband’s sphere of responsibilities. 
Therefore, Pahl’s (1989) findings seem to supports Lundberg, Pollak and Wales separate 
spheres model. She also finds that joint expenditures include consumer durables, 
donations and Christmas expenditures. This result seems to indicate that, for large 
expenditures, the household may be pooling income while at the same time we may 
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observe separate spheres of expenditures for husbands and wives.  Pahl’s (1989) 
analysis lacks a rigorous formal theoretical model and a robust empirical model. 
Burgoyne (1990) examines the perception of money within the household paying 
particular attention to control and ownership of income. She studies control of income 
not only as a function of the source of income, as did Pahl (1989), but also as a function 
of the life cycle.  She observes that the majority of the changes in the way families 
organize their finances take place in response to changes in the level and source of the 
income, with the spouse with the greater financial contribution having a larger role in 
decision making and control of the household income. She found that the life cycle was 
an important determining factor and explanatory variable in the shift of power.  She 
argues that, for example, the beginning of a family involves the exit of the mother from 
the labor market, a decrease of her contribution to household income and a resulting 
loss of power.  She also found that the rights of ownership associated with earning the 
income remains and leads to overall control, while the financial structure of pooling 
household income may lead to the erroneous conclusion that resources are equally 
shared. 
Burgoyne (1990) and Edwards (1981) believe that management is more of a matter 
of fact, and control is more of a matter of perception.  Burgoyne believes that perception 
determines an individual’s subjective reality, which then determines the individual’s 
economic behavior. Burgoyne (1990), like Wilson (1987), believes that the existence of a 
shared bank account does not necessarily signify that sharing exists but may conceal 
inequality. She argues that when income is pooled issues of control, such as the right to 
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access the money and decisions to spend, can be observed to lead to a traditional 
distribution of power within the family but is perceived as equality. It is also her belief 
that increased contribution by the wife to household income may not to lead to a more 
equitable distribution of power, but may, in fact, lead to a greater asymmetry in her 
financial status if her contribution only serves to augment the housekeeping and allows 
her partner to keep more of his own money.  
Burgoyne (1990) finds that the psychological sense of ownership of income is not 
removed by pooling income. She argues that while pooling resources within marriage 
might remove the overt label of ownership, the earner of income is found to retain a 
powerful influence upon the psyche of both spouses and is reflected in the way both 
spouses treat the joint account. Therefore, perceived ownership of resources legitimizes 
a pattern of control, while disadvantaging a spouse whose contribution is in the 
production of household commodities. She also finds that the life cycle affects and 
changes the financial organization of households over time. It is her belief that life cycle 
can be used to track and explain major shifts in balance of economic power within a 
household. 
Burgoyne’s (1990) analysis is based on a non-representative sample. Her research 
could be improved by using a larger sample that is random and representative of the 
desired population.  A new classification that incorporates details of the sources and 
levels of income would be useful in accounting for the way money ownership is 
viewed. 
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Vogler and Pahl (1994) explore the relationships among control of financial 
resources, allocation system and general power within the household by examining the 
relationship between money, power and inequality within marriage while paying 
special attention to gender inequality and welfare implications to women and children. 
Volger and Pahl’s (1994) research differs from Pahl’s (1989) in that their analysis of 
household financial organization examines inequalities in financial decision-making 
and access to money rather than expenditure patterns. Vogler and Pahl (1994) utilize 
Pahl’s (1989) typology of household financial allocation systems. There are four 
management systems in Pahl's (1990) typology that represent separate spheres of 
responsibility for household income: female whole wage, male whole wage, 
housekeeping allowance and the independent management system. The remaining 
management system is the pooling system which represents joint sphere of 
responsibility. Vogler and Pahl’s (1994) findings validate Pahl’s (1989) typology but also 
find that the pooling system is very heterogeneous in terms of management practices. 
Therefore, their findings indicate that the general pooling category contains three 
distinct forms of pooling: the male pool, the female pool and joint pool. Therefore, 
Vogler and Pahl (1994) propose the use of seven types of management systems instead 
of Pahl’s (1989) five. 
Vogler and Pahl (1994) contend that inequalities in power over financial decision-
making may facilitate inequalities in access to money as a resource, which results in 
differences in living standards between spouses in household. Therefore, they believe 
that the distinction between strategic control over household finances and financial 
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management as an executive function must acknowledge that the person exercising 
strategic control may be different from the person responsible for the implementation of 
daily decisions. 
Vogler and Pahl (1994), unlike Pahl (1989) and Burgoyne (1990), construct a 
summary index of power with in the household36.  They characterize households in 
which husbands (wives) exercise control in both spheres as strong male (female) power 
and those in which both partners exercise equal control in both spheres as strong 
equality. In the case of households in which wives (husbands) exercised control in one 
sphere and where joint decisions were made in the other sphere, they characterized 
them as weaker female (male) power. Their findings indicate that wife and joint 
management were subject to joint control, whereas male control is exercised through 
male management. Therefore, Volger and Pahl (1994) conclude that financial allocation 
systems are found to be associated with inequalities in power over decision-making. 
The inequalities are smaller in households that use joint or female managed systems 
and greater in households using male managed systems. 
Vogler and Pahl (1994) believe that individuals in the same household can 
experience two different types of inequalities in access to money as a resource. First, 
they may experience different levels of financial deprivation. Second, they may 
experience inequalities in access to personal spending money. Their research concludes 
that wives are much more likely than husbands to experience cuts in spending on 
means and clothing. This, they argue, is the case because the categories of expenditures 
                                                          
36
 The index is created by combing the subjects’ answers to financial control questions and combining them 
with couples’ answers to general decision making questions. 
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reflect gendered responsibilities and because wives tend to protect their husbands from 
the effect of reductions. This belief closely resembles the separate spheres model of 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993). 
Vogler and Pahl (1994) conclude that inequalities between spouses in personal 
spending and financial deprivation tend to move together. The two female managed 
systems and housekeeping allowance system were found to have the greatest 
inequalities between spouses both in terms of financial deprivations and personal 
spending money. They find that the joint and managed pools are associated with 
greater equality in both financial deprivation and in access to money. The smallest 
differences are observed in jointly managed pools. 
It is not clear how Volger and Pahl (1994) compute the independent indicator of 
financial management. How are their perceptions combined into a five-point scale and 
more importantly how does this yield their results? A multivariate analysis that 
considers not only sociological variables but also economic variables might lend more 
clarity to the analysis of intra-household allocation and control of resources as well as 
inequality within marriage.  
2. Empirical Economic Literature That Supports Family Financial Structure 
Phipps and Burton (1998) provide evidence that male and female incomes do not 
always have the same effect on household expenditures. The novelty of their approach 
is that they test whether income is pooled for different expenditure categories. They 
find that income pooling holds for expenditures in some categories but not in others. 
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They conclude that households pool their incomes for big-ticket items but not for 
personal goods or in gendered spheres. This result is not only consistent with Vogler 
and Pahl’s (1994) findings but also lends support to the separate spheres model of 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) which is an intrahousehold bargaining model.     
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                                                              CHAPTER II    
                          THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODELS    
A. Introduction  
Research on food consumption and expenditures usually employs the use of the 
unitary model (e.g. Becker, 1965), which implies the use of the income pooling 
hypothesis.  As we have previously discussed, there is overwhelming evidence against 
the income pooling hypothesis in economic literature (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 
1997; Thomas, 1990) and, therefore, against unitary models.  As a consequence of the 
rejection of unitary models, non-unitary models of household behavior have been 
developed.  The two main non-unitary models of household behavior are collective 
models of household behavior and intra-household bargaining models. One policy 
implication of these non-unitary models is that income or resources from an assistance 
program received by mothers or fathers have different effects with regard to 
expenditures on both food at home and food away from home. 
While economic theory has developed models that study the impact that incomes 
from different sources have on the purchases of different commodities (e.g. Lundberg 
and Pollak, 1993; Phipps and Burton, 1998), it has not fully considered the effect that 
different family financial structures may have on expenditures on food at home and 
food away from home, and therefore, living standards of different household members.  
Sociological studies have shown that family financial structure is an important 
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determinant of household expenditures and, therefore, the standard of living of 
different household members.  In sociology, the most important research in the area of 
family financial structures comes from Pahl (1990) in which she develops her family 
financial structure typology.   Pahl studies the effect that earning income and types of 
bank accounts have on household expenditures as well as the effect that managing, and 
more importantly, control of income have on household expenditures.  The inclusion of 
management and control of income in Pahl’s (1990) typology is an important 
development in the literature because there are differences between earning, managing 
and controlling income as they relate to household expenditures.     
B. Model Specification  
There are many ways to model the intra-household allocation of resources.  In this 
study, two versions of a simple model are presented where there is no altruism in the 
utility function.  The outcome of the intrahousehold allocation process in both cases is 
assumed to result in a Pareto efficient outcome which means that chosen consumption 
bundles and allocations of time are such that an individual’s welfare cannot be 
increased without decreasing the welfare of his/her spouse.  The household in both 
versions is modeled as a two-person economy that faces fixed prices, and all the results 
of general equilibrium are available.  The individuals are denoted by m and f  where 
m f .  There are two types of goods: (1) private (non-public) consumption goods 
represented by the vectors, mq  and fq , for individual  m  and f respectively with a 
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corresponding price vector  mp  and fp ; and (2) a vector of public goods mx  and fx
whose price vector for both is xp .  In the first model, the conditional collective model of 
intrahousehold allocation, the utility functions of individuals m  and f are functions of 
non-private and private goods conditional of the family financial structure and only q 
and x are choice variables.  In the second model, the unconditional collective model of 
intrahousehold allocation, the utility functions of individuals, m  and f , are functions 
of non-private goods, private goods and the family financial structure, and q, x and nf
are all choice variables.   
The spouses, m  and f ,  jointly choose a financial structure that is optimal for the 
household given the particular characteristics of the household.  The families in our 
sample choose from Pahl’s (1989) typology which has six family financial structures.  
There are five that represent separate spheres of responsibility: (1) male whole wage; (2) 
female whole wage; (3) male housekeeping allowance; (4) female housekeeping 
allowance; and (5) independent management.  In the male and female whole wage 
systems, the male and female, respectively, make and manage all the money except 
their partner’s personal spending money.  In the male and female housekeeping 
allowance systems, the female and male, respectively, give their spouse an amount of 
money necessary to run the household plus their personal spending money and 
manage the rest of the money themselves.  In the independent management system, 
each spouse manages his/her own income and they split the living expenses.  The 
remaining management system is the pooling system which represents joint spheres of 
responsibility.  The model that is proposed in this research uses six distinct types of 
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family financial structures.  The family financial structures correspond to Pahl’s (1989) 
typology, where n=1 for male whole wage system, n=2 for female whole wage system, 
n=3 for husband allowance system, n=4 for wife’s allowance system, n=5 for pooling 
system, and n=6 for independent system.  Therefore, nf takes on the values that 
correspond to the chosen structure. 
In the following section, I will first introduce the conditional and unconditional 
collective models maximization problems and then discuss their components.  I will 
then discuss the solutions to both the conditional and unconditional collective 
household behavior models.  This section will end with a comparison and contrast 
between the two collective models. 
In both the conditional and unconditional models of household behavior, it is 
assumed that individuals have strictly quasi-concave and increasing, twice 
differentiable utilities.  The wage rates, mw  and fw ,  and non-wage incomes, mN and 
fN ,  are exogenously given.  The difference between the conditional and unconditional 
models is that the former assumes that the choice of family financial structure is 
predetermined or exogenous.   
The conditional collective model of household behavior is given by: 
(2.1) 
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This setup is intuitive because the husband/wife is not only maximizing his/her 
utility with respect to time allocated to work, time allocated to non-work activities, non-
public and public goods conditional on the family financial structure chosen subject to 
the budget constraint of the household, but also subject to utility of the spouse being 
greater than the reservation utility.   
On the other hand, the unconditional collective model of household behavior is 
given by: 
(2.2) 
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In the case of the unconditional collective model, the husband or wife maximizes 
his/her utility with respect to time allocated to work, time allocated to non-work 
activities, public goods, non-public and family financial structure subject not only to 
his/her spouse’s utility being greater than his/her reservation utility but also subject to 
the household budget constraint which states that total household expenditures on non-
private and private goods must be less than or equal to the households total earned and 
unearned income.   
In both versions of the collective model, iT denotes the total time available for 
individual i  where ,i m f , ciT  is the time spent not working, and wiT  is the market 
labor supply.  Each individual household member has a reservation utility denoted by 
mU and fU .  These reservation utilities must be weakly exceeded within the confines of 
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the household or individual household members will exit the household.  The 
reservation utility is defined as the minimum utility level that would keep individuals 
in the marriage.  Reservation utilities indicate that the constrained utility level of the 
model, 0
mu , must belong to some interval ,m mU V  where mV  is the maximum utility 
the husband can achieve when the utility attained by his wife is her reservation utility 
f
fu U .  The value of 0
iu  where ,i m f that generates an observed household 
allocation is a differentiable function of the individual wage rates, fw  and mw , 
unearned incomes, fN  and mN , prices of private goods, fp  and mp , prices of public 
goods, xp , family financial structure, nf , in the case of the unconditional model and 
conditional on family financial structure, nf , in the case of the conditional model.    
The conditional collective model of household behavior depicted in (2.1) results in 
conditional demands for public and non-public goods of the following form: 
(2.3) 
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
i i m f x m f m f f m n
i i m f x m f m f f m n
ij ij m f x m f m f f m n
q q p p p w w N N T T f i m f
x x p p p w w N N T T f i m f
T T p p p w w N N T T f i m f j m f
The endogenous variables: iq , ix  and ijT  are functions of the exogenous variables in 
the conditional maximization problem (2.2), iw , iN  and 0iu  which is not only a function 
of iw , iN   but also a function of ip  and xp  conditional on the family financial structure 
chosen, nf .   
On the other hand, the unconditional collective model of household behavior 
depicted by (2.2) not only results in demands for public and non-public goods, but also 
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in the type of family financial structure that is chosen.  These demands and choice of 
family financial structure are respectively given by37: 
(2.4) 
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , 1 1,...,6
, , , , , , , , , ,
i i m f x m f m f f m
i i m f x m f m f f m
n n m f x m f m f f m
ij ij m f x m f m f f m
q q p p p w w N N T T i m f
x x p p p w w N N T T i m f
f f p p p w w N N T T n or
T T p p p w w N N T T i m f j m f
The public goods demands, nonpublic goods demands, labor supply, demand for 
non-work time, and family financial structure are functions of the parameters in the 
unconditional maximization problem (2.2), mw , fw , fN , mN  and 0iu which is a 
function of mp , fp , xp , mw , fw , fN and mN . 
There are several differences between the conditional and unconditional collective 
models.  First, in the conditional version we assume that a family financial structure has 
been predetermined by the household.  This implies that family financial structure is 
considered to be an exogenous variable that must enter the equations of labor supply, 
leisure, non-private and private goods.  In the unconditional collective model, family 
financial structure is an endogenous variable that must be determined by the model as 
well as the demands for labor supply, leisure, non-private and private goods.   
In this chapter, I introduced the conditional and unconditional models of household 
behavior.  These models assumed that the choice of family financial structure is 
exogenous and endogenous, respectively.  In both models, it is obvious that if family 
                                                          
37
 In the case of the discrete family financial structure variable, we have six distinct family financial 
structures which means that n=1,…,6.  In the case of a continuous family financial structure variable, we 
would have only one family financial structure variable which implies that n=1.  The continuous and 
discrete cases will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 86
financial structure is an important variable that is not including it in the analysis then 
we would have misspecification in the model.  In the next chapter, we discuss two 
topics: misspecification if family financial structure is not included and the estimation 
procedures available.   
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                                                              CHAPTER III       
                                                             ESTIMATION  
A. Introduction  
In the economic literature of intra-household allocation of resources, family 
financial structure has not been used as an explanatory variable of household 
expenditures.  If family financial structure is a variable that should be included in the 
analysis of household expenditures but is not included, the resulting structural 
expenditure system suffers from specification error.  The parameter estimates would be 
reduced form not structural parameters.  The structural parameter estimates, therefore, 
will be biased and inconsistent.  The reduced form parameters of the husband’s and 
wife’s wages would not only contain the effects of wages on expenditures but also the 
effects of wages on family financial structure.   
The second part of this chapter deals with the estimation and identification of the 
variables from the conditional and unconditional models in the case of a discrete family 
financial structure variable.  We will outline an estimation procedure that can be used 
to estimate the parameters of the expenditure functions of the conditional and 
unconditional models when the family financial structure is discrete.      
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B. Analysis of Misspecification  
We will now examine the consequences for both the conditional and unconditional 
versions of the collective model of household behavior when family financial structure 
is an important determinant of household expenditures but is not included in the 
analysis.  We will first examine the simple case when family financial structure is a 
continuous variable and then examine the case when family financial structure is a 
discrete variable.   
For the most part, the economic literature of intra-household allocation has not 
examined time allocation.  This research will analyze the above mentioned theoretical 
models without the estimation of time allocation, because the inclusion of time 
allocation would not lead to efficiency gains since all of the independent variables are 
the same for all equations.    
1. A Simple Example with a Continuous Family Financial Structure Variable 
In this section for simplicity purposes, we will assume that the family financial 
structure is a continuous variable.  In the next section, we will explore what happens 
when family financial structure is a discrete variable as is our case in this study.   
The relationship between the conditional and unconditional models for a 
continuous family financial structure variable can be easily established with a linear 
specification of the expenditure function in (2.3) and a linear specification of the 
expenditure function in (2.4) and the family financial structure equation (2.4).  In the 
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conditional version of the collective model, the expenditure system that accounts for 
family financial structure when this variable is continuous is: 
(3.1) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
kc
i i i m i f i n i m i f ij ij ijE w w f N N X
where ciE  are expenditures in the conditional model on the ith  expenditure category, 
mw denotes the total earned income of the mother, fw denotes the total earned income 
of the father, mN denotes the total unearned income of the mother, fN  denotes the 
total earned income of the father, nf  denotes the family financial structure, ijX denotes 
a matrix of demographic characteristics of the mother, father and household, 's are 
the parameters and iv  denotes the error term. 
In the unconditional version of the collective model, the expenditure system that 
accounts for family financial structure as an endogenous variable is given:   
(3.2) 0 1 2 3 4 5
ku
i i i m i f i m i f ij ij ijE w w N N X v
How are (3.1) and (3.2) related?  If family financial structure can be represented by: 
(3.3) 0 1 2 3 4 6
k
n i i m i f i m i f ij ijjf w w N N X
When we substitute (3.3) into (3.1) and we collect terms, we get the unconditional 
equations (3.2) which is given by:  
(3.4)
0 3 0 1 3 1 2 3 2 4 3 3 5 3 4 6
0 1 2 4 5 6
ku
i i i i i m i i f i i m i i f ij ij ij
k
i i m i f i m i f ij ij ij
E w w N N X e
w w N N X e
where 0 0 3 0i i i , 1 1 3 1i i i , 2 2 3 2i i i , 3 4 3 3i i i , 
4 5 3 4i i i , 3ij ij i j j=5,…,k, and 3i i i nv e . 
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The parameter of the expenditure equations from the unconditional model, 'ik s , 
are reduced form parameter estimates.  These reduced form parameters depict the total 
effect of wages and unearned income on expenditures which have two parts.   
If family financial structure is a choice variable then as shown in (3.4) the coefficients 
contain three effects.  For example, mother’s wages contain three distinct effects: the 
effects of mothers’ wages holding family financial structure constant ij , the effect 
that family financial structure has on expenditures 3i  and the effect that mothers’ 
wages have on the family financial structure im .   
More generally as can be observed, the coefficients of the reduced form model have 
two parts.  The first part is the corresponding coefficient of the conditional model, ih , 
where h=0,1,…,5,…,k.  The second part is 3i j .  This second part is the multiplication 
the family financial structure parameter from the conditional model, 3i , in (3.4), times 
the corresponding effects from the family financial structure equation, j , where 
j=0,1,…,k when nf is a continuous variable.   This second term is the difference between 
the structural and reduced form models.  When family financial structure is continuous, 
we are able to identify the parameters of the family financial equation by dividing by 
the family financial structure used for identification.   
From a public policy point of view, it is very important to discern the result of each  
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of these three effects since a priori we cannot determine their effects38.  For example, if 
some exogenous variable of interest gives us the following results 3il i k , 
the total effect would conclude that a change in the exogenous variable of interest has a 
positive effect on the given expenditure category.  From a policy perspective, the 
government may erroneously conclude that there is no need for intervention when 
there is a change in the exogenous variable of interest.  If each of the effects was known 
with respect to the exogenous variable of interest, the government could design a 
program that could mitigate the effects that a change in the exogenous variable of 
interest would have on the choice of family financial structure or the effect that the 
redistribution of power within the household has on given expenditure category.  
2. The Case of Discrete Family Financial Structure Variable 
When the family financial structure variable is discrete and not continuous, the 
coefficients of the expenditure equations are not the same as in the previous model.  
The relationship between the conditional and unconditional models for a discrete 
family financial structure variable can be easily established with a linear specification of 
the expenditure function in (2.3) and a linear specification of the expenditure function 
in (2.4) and the family financial structure equation (2.4).  In this section, the system of 
                                                          
38
 Assume nf  represents a continuum of family financial structures within the interval 0,1 , the wife has 
all of the control over finances when 0nf  and the husband has all of the control over finances 
when 1nf .  Also, assume that expenditure category i  represents expenditures on the category of interest.   
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linear expenditure functions for the conditional model with discrete family financial 
structure is estimated by: 
(3.5) 50 1 2 3 4 31 6
kc
i i i m i f i m i f i n n ij ij in jE w w N N f X
Equation (3.5) shows that family financial structure can take on one of six different 
types of family financial structures.  In (3.5), family financial structure is represented by 
five dichotomous variables since the base case is left out.   
In the unconditional version of the collective model, the expenditure system for the 
conditional model that accounts for family financial structure as an endogenous 
variable is given:   
(3.6) 0 1 2 4 5 6
ku
i i i m i f i m i f ij ij ijE w w N N X v
The equation for the discrete case of family financial structure is given by: 
(3.7) 0 1 2 3 4 5
k
n n n m n f n m n f nj ij njf w w N N X
where n=1,…,6. 
How are (3.5) and (3.6) related?  If family financial structure can be represented by a 
specification such as (3.7), when we substitute (3.7) into (3.5) and we collect terms, we 
get the unconditional equations (3.6) which is given by: 
(3.8) 
0 1 2 3 4
5
3 0 1 2 3 41 5
6
c
i i i m i f i m i f
k
i n n n m n f n m n f j ij nn j
k
ij ij ij
E w w N N
w w N N X
X
When like terms are gathered and we simplify, the following result emerges:   
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(3.9)
5 5 5
0 3 0 1 3 1 2 3 21 1 1
5 5
3 3 3 4 3 41 1
5 5
3 35 1 1
u
i i i n n i i n n m i i n n fn n n
i i n n m i i n n fn n
k
ij i n nj ij i i n nj n j
E w w
N N
X e
or in reduced form notation:  
(3.2) 0 1 2 3 4 5
ku
i i i m i f i m i f ij ij ijE w w N N X v
Where 60 0 3 01i i i n ni , 
6
1 1 3 11i i i n ni
, 
6
2 2 3 21i i i n ni
, 
6
3 3 3 31i i i n ni
, 
6
4 4 3 41i i i n ni
, 
6
31ij ij i n ji j=5,…,k, and 
6
31i i i n ni
v e . 
As can be observed, the coefficients of the second model again have two parts.  The 
first part is the corresponding coefficient of the conditional model as before, ih , where 
h=0,1,…,6,…,k.  The second part is now 6 31 i n nji .  This second part is the sum of the 
multiplication of the family financial structure parameter from the conditional model, 
3i n , in (3.4), times the corresponding effects from the family financial structure 
equation, nj , where j=0,1,…,k when nf  is a discrete variable.   This second term is the 
difference between the structural and reduced form models.  When family financial 
structure is discrete, we are unable to identify the parameters of the family financial 
equation.  The only parameter that can be identified is 31
k
i n nji  where j=0,1,…,k.  
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C. Estimation with Discrete Family Financial Structure  
We will now d iscuss the estimation procedures that would be used when a d iscrete 
family financial structure variable is observed , which is how family financial structure 
must be measured in this study.   
The estimation of the discrete case involves the joint estimation of equations (3.5) 
and (3.2)39.  Therefore, this model is given by: 
(3.10)
5
0 1 2 3 4 31 6
0 1 2 3 4 5
kc
i i i m i f i m i f i n n ij ij in j
ku
i i i m i f i m i f ij ij ij
E w w N N f X
E w w N N X v
In the discrete case, we can only identify the parameters of the conditional model 
and the reduce form parameters from the expenditure equations of the conditional 
model.  The identification of the parameters of the family financial structure equation 
are not possible.  We can only identify 31
k
i n njn   where j=0,1,…,k.  In this case, the 
reduced form parameters are such that 5 31ij ij i n njn .  When the family 
financial structure variable is not statistically significant, the second part of the reduced 
form parameters 5 31 0i n njn  and therefore the reduced form parameters are 
structural parameters.  This means that in the case of a discrete family financial 
structure variable the hypothesis tests are based on whether 5 31 i n njn  which implies 
that jointly all 3i n  where n=1,…,5.  
                                                          
39
 The results of the indirect method of estimation can be found in the appendix C. 
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1. Estimation of the Engle Curves 
This research estimates Engle curves and not demands functions since the data used 
consist of expenditures in a number of different categories and not quantities purchased 
of individual goods and services.  While the dataset used in this research contains 
information on household expenditures in eleven different categories, this research only 
deals with expenditures on food at home and food away from home.  This research 
derives a reduced form test of the hypothesis of income pooling for two expenditures 
categories.  The demand functions of the unitary models should only be dependent on 
prices and total household income, given demographic characteristics of the household 
when the income pooling hypothesis holds.  The restrictions of the income pooling 
hypothesis imply that mothers and fathers spend money in the same manner.  This 
research uses total earned and unearned income of fathers and mothers.  There is little 
time flexibility observed in the work schedule of the participating household members.  
For 97.35% of the fathers, the work schedule is the same every week.   For 95.42% of 
working mothers, the work schedule is fixed every week.  For 90% of the households, 
the source of earn income came from sources other than hourly wages.  We can 
therefore assume that the work schedule is inflexible and exogenously determined.  
However, total earn income which is used instead of  wages in the analysis of the Engle 
curves is endogenous to the analysis.     
2. Hypothesis Tests  
When prices are held constant, Engle curves indicate how expenditures by the 
household on category i , Ei, depend upon the mother’s  and father’s total earned and 
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unearned incomes which are denoted by  iw  and iN  respectively, where i=m and f, 
given a matrix of other demographic characteristics of the husband, wife and 
household, ijX .  In the case of unitary models, household income is assumed to be 
pooled which implies that income from both parents is spent in the same manner.  The 
conditional collective model has been discussed not only allows for the earned and 
unearned incomes of both spouses to be spent differently but also takes into account the 
effect of family financial structure.   
As can be observed, the unitary model implies that three restrictions must be placed 
on the more general Engle curves of the estimated systems (3.10) when we have a 
discrete family financial structure variable.  Since the unitary model is nested within 
conditional and unconditional collective models, the validity of the Engle curves 
prescribed by unitary models becomes a straight-forward empirical question.   
For implementation purposes, this research chose to use a linear specification of the 
Engle curves depicted by (3.10) where ciE  is such that  ,i FAH FAFH  represents 
expenditures on food at home and food away from home respectively, ijX ,  1,...,i m
are demographic variables including the difference between the ages of the father and 
mother, the difference between the fathers’ and mothers’ years of education, ethnicity of 
father and mother40, sociological factors such as job importance for the father and 
mother, nf represents the type of family financial structure n, and where iv denotes the 
random error term.   
                                                          
40
 Ethnicity is defined as a dichotomous variable which takes on the value of 1 for Anglo and 0 otherwise. 
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The unitary restrictions implied by equation (3.10), which denotes the conditional 
collective model, require that 1 2i i , 3 4i i , and that jointly all 3 0i n .  All of 
these restriction can be tested using the conditional model equation.  When either or 
both of the coefficients of total earned and unearned incomes of husband and wife are 
not equal to one another, 1 2i i and 3 4i i , this means that the income of the 
husband and wife are not pooled.  Therefore, the incomes of the husband and wife are 
spent differently.  The coefficients of family financial structure tell what effect family 
financial structure has on the given expenditure category.  When the unitary (reduced 
form) model is estimated and family financial structure is an important determinant of 
household expenditures, the omission of family financial structure as shown by (3.2) 
leads to the estimation of a reduced form model.  However, if jointly all 3 0i n , this 
would mean that family financial structure has no structural effect on expenditures in a 
given category and there is no bias in the coefficients of the estimated structural model.  
Table 5 summarizes the hypothesis of interest and the restrictions that they imply. 
In this section, this research has shown that only when the family financial structure 
variable is continuous can the parameters of the family financial structure equation be 
identified in the unconditional model.  However, the validity of the unitary model can 
still be tested via the income pooling hypothesis and the effect that family financial 
structure have on expenditures in different categories can still be determine since we 
only need to use the conditional model.  This research will now turn its attention to the 
data collection process and description of variables.  
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                                                       CHAPTER IV   
                     DATA COLLECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION    
A. Introduction   
This section deals with the data collection process and the description of the data 
used in the empirical analysis of this research.  The three main purposes of this section 
are (1) the examination of the demographic characteristics of the location in which the 
study took place;  (2) the examination of the data collection process; and (3) the 
description of the data used in the empirical estimation of this study. 
The data used in this research comes from the “Parental Time, Role Strain and 
Children’s Fat Intake and Obesity Related Outcomes”.  The goal of this project was to 
collect a dataset that would allow for the investigation of the effect of parental time 
constraints, role strains, coping mechanisms, and household resources on child nutrient 
intake and health outcomes.  This research also placed emphasis on the analysis of 
single female-headed households.  For this reason, this research project set out to over 
sample single female households.  The data were collected between July 2001 and June 
2002 in Harris County, Texas.  Data from both parents and children were collected with 
the use of five survey instruments: father’s telephone interview, mother’s telephone 
interview, father’s self-administered questionnaire, mother’s self-administered 
questionnaire, and children’s interview.   
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This research will use the data from the parent’s telephone interview along with the 
data from the parent’s self-administered questionnaire in order to study the 
intrahousehold allocation of resources.  The telephone interview of the parents contains 
sociological information about work commitment, work spillover, spouse’s work 
flexibility, spouse’s spillover of work to home, and socio-demographic information of 
the household and both spouses. The parent’s self-administered questionnaire provides 
a rich dataset on earned and unearned income of each spouse, household expenditures 
and the type of family financial structure of the household.    
B. Demographic Characteristics of Harris County, Texas  
Harris County, Texas served as the site of the study.  With a population of 3,400,578 
inhabitants which accounts for 16.23% of the Texas population41, Harris County is the 
most populated county in the state of Texas.  This county has the largest concentration 
of minority groups of all the counties in the state.  It has a minority population of over 
five and a half million people42.   It is an urban county but does include a number or 
rural communities.   
While the median household income in Harris County, Texas was $42,59843, the per 
capita income was $21,435.  The labor force in Harris County was divided in the 
following manner: 32% in managerial or professional positions, 27% in sales and office  
                                                          
41
 According to the 2000 census, the state of Texas has a population of 20,851,820. 
42
 The minority population of Harris county is 5, 537, 682. 
43
 The base year for the 2000 census median household income was 1999 dollars. 
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occupations, 15% in service occupations, 14% in production and transportation 
occupations, and 12% in production, extraction and maintenance occupations44.  The 
number of people that live below the poverty line in Harris County was 503,234 with 
192,871 individuals under the age of 18.  These statistics are all from the 2000 census. 
Harris County, according to the 2000 American Community Survey, had 113,211 
single female-headed households.  This means that 25.7% of the households with their 
own children under 18 years of age in Harris County were headed by single mothers.    
There were 43,512 single female-headed households that lived below the poverty level.  
This means that 42.79% of single female headed household found themselves below the 
poverty level.  Harris County had 299,502 married couple families with children under 
18 years of age.  Therefore, 54.06% of the total households (families) in Harris County 
were married couples.  
C. Data Collection Instruments  
1. The Telephone Center 
The telephone center was established in the fall of 2001.  The three purposes of the 
telephone center were first to establish initial contacts with families living in Harris 
County in order to recruit them to participate in the project, second, set the time and 
date of the child interview at home and of the parents’ interviews over the phone, and 
third to conduct telephone interviews of the parents.  
                                                          
44
 Information comes from the 2000 U.S.  census. 
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The initial contact with families was made via cold calls from the telephone center.  
Cold calls are random calls made by telephone operators in the telephone center with 
the purpose of obtaining mailing addresses from families interested in participating.  
Then, to these addresses would be mailed consent forms for the parents and assent 
forms for the children that described the purpose of the study, the requirements and 
compensation of each participating member.  From the random digit dialing (RDD) 
numbers purchased from Survey Sampling, Inc., there were six possible outcomes to a 
cold call: (1) the call can reach a household that agrees to receive information, (2) the 
call can reach a household that is ineligible to participate, (3) the call can reach a 
household that is eligible but refuses to participate, (4) the call can reach a number that 
is busy or does not answer, (5) the call can reach a number that is out of service, or (6) 
the call can reach a non-residential number such as a business or a fax.   
When we reached a household that agreed to receive information, their mailing 
information was recorded and we mailed them a packet containing two copies of the 
consent and assent forms, one copy was for their records in the event that they agree to 
participate and one copy which was to be signed and mailed back to the Department of 
Rural Sociology at Texas A&M University in the self-addressed envelop provided.   
When the telephone center reached the number of an ineligible household, a 
disconnected number, or a non-residential number, these numbers were taken out of 
use.  In the case of ineligible households, disconnected numbers, and non-residential 
numbers, the research team did not count them against the acceptance or participation 
rate.  When the telephone center reached an eligible household that did not desire to 
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participate, the caller not only took the number out of use but also counted the call as a 
refusal to participate and to receive information.  Finally, when the telephone center reached 
a number that was busy or did not answer, the caller made a note of it in the call log 
and called back later that night and/or the next day at a different time. 
Scheduling telephone interviews and child interviews was conducted by one 
individual in the telephone center.  When the telephone center received signed consent 
and assent forms from participating families, the administrative team of the research 
project working out of the Department of Rural Sociology created a folder for each 
family and assigned a household ID to the participating family.  The folders were given 
to the scheduler who contacted the family by phone and set up the day and time of the 
telephone interview of the parents or single mother and also set the day and time for 
the in-home child interview.   
The telephone center was in charge of conducting the parent’s telephone interviews.  
On the day and time of the scheduled interview, a caller from the telephone center 
would contact the participating household by phone.  Parent’s telephone interviews 
lasted about 45 minutes.  The parental telephone interviews were designed to gather 
information about the employment status of the parents, parenting styles, parental 
control over food and expenditures, parental feeding styles, parental concerns about 
children’s eating habits, parental self-reported health and health behavior, children’s 
health and family socio-demographics.   
The parents were asked a standard battery of questions regarding employment that 
followed those used by the General Social Survey (Davis and Smith 1995).  These 
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questions were used to determine whether or not the person works, the type of work 
they do, and the work schedule they have.  The telephone interview also asked 
questions regarding the importance the parents placed on their work and their work 
commitment.  There were questions about the degree of flexibility in the work schedule 
of the parents or flextime available to parents and the amount of overtime they work.  
Parents also were asked about whether they experience job stress and/or work-family 
role conflict.   
The parent telephone interview also included standard questions for obtaining 
information about who in the household was more responsible for household tasks 
such as grocery shopping, meal preparation and cleanup, childcare, and other 
household tasks.  The telephone questionnaire also included a 30-item scale developed 
by Devereux et al. (1962) to measure the dimensions of parental warmth and 
involvement in their children’s lives, the presence of clear behavioral standards and 
child involvement in decisions that affect him/her.  The questions employ a Likert 
response format. 
We now turn our attention to the discussion of the five data collection field 
instruments.   Four of these field instruments deals with the data that is collected from 
the children: the children’s interview, the twenty-four hour activity recall, the twenty-
four hour diet recall and the Tanner scale for sexual development.  One of the field 
instruments deals with data that is collected from the parents: self-administered 
questionnaire.     
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2. Self-Administered Questionnaire 
The self-administered questionnaire was designed to obtain both sociological and 
economic information from the household.  In addition, parents were asked to keep 
track of their time in the form of a time diary that corresponds to the same days their 
children kept an activity and diet record.  With regard to the sociological aspects of the 
self-administered questionnaire, the questionnaire asked the parents to indicate how 
they deal with the discipline of their children.  They were given specific violations or 
rules and were asked to circle which of the discipline methods provided came closest to 
the one they used for each of the cases mentioned.   
With regard to the economic aspect of the self-administered questionnaire, the 
questionnaire asked parents about the different sources of their income since different 
types of income have been shown to have an important impact on a child’s nutrition.  
Parents were asked to provide information about their sources of earned income such 
as wages, salaries, commissions, etc., as well as their sources of unearned income such 
as investment incomes, rental income, interest income, etc.  Information about earned 
and unearned income was collected because past research has found that earned and 
unearned income of individual parents in a given household are not spent in the same 
manner on children, food and clothing.  
The self-administered questionnaire also contained a section asking about the type 
of family financial structure of the household.  In both the sociological and economic 
literature, the type of family financial structure has been found to have different effects 
on household purchases.  Different financial structures have been found to lead to 
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different degrees of autonomy in purchasing decisions.  Because of the previously 
mentioned gender bias in purchases, the degree of autonomy could affect the degree of 
gender bias in purchases for children.   
The self-administered questionnaire also asked the parents about the household’s 
expenditure patterns.  Parents were not only questioned about the monthly 
expenditures in a variety of different categories but also who was in charge of making 
the monthly expenditure in each of the expenditure categories and whether or not these 
expenditures were average, above average, or below average.  
The last section of the self-administered questionnaire was the time diary.  The time 
diary was designed to measure how the individual parents allocated time in a given 
day.  One of the theses of the project was that as parent’s lives became more hectic they 
looked for ways to save time, especially for time consuming activities such as meal 
preparation and clean up and child care.  In general there were three ways in which a 
parent can save time.  First, there is multitasking whereby someone does more than one 
job at a time.  Second, in a household with many members, household members can 
work together to get a job done in less time.  Third, time can be effectively bought 
which means that resources can be used to purchase goods and services in the market 
to reduce the amount of time it takes to carryout household chores.  We asked each 
parent in a household to keep his/her own time diary because of the substitution 
possibilities of time between household members.  Parents were asked to keep track of 
all of their activities during a 48-hour period, which was suppose to correspond to their 
children’s dietary and activity recall.  They were provided with an example of how to 
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fill out the time diary.  They were asked to enter the first thing they did each day, 
whether or not they were doing something else at the same time, where the activity 
took place and whether or not someone helped them.  The parents were asked to repeat 
this process for all of their activities during a day until they completed their last activity 
of the day.   
The participating child in each family went through a personal interview, a twenty-
four hour food recall, a twenty-four hour activity recall, and anthropometric 
measurements such as: subscapular and triceps skinfold thickness, waist and hip 
circumference, height and weight and a self-assessment of the Tanner scale.  The 
children were also instructed on how to fill out food and activity diaries for two days.  
3. Children’s Interview 
The children’s interview took place at the child’s home or in rare cases at a public 
facility or private home of the parents choosing.  The child interview took anywhere 
from 45 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes.  The time depended on the child’s age, 
concentration and level of maturity.  The longest interviews were those of 9-year-old 
boys.  The child questionnaire included sections on relationships with parents, 
parenting styles, the child’s health behavior, perceptions of body satisfaction and self-
esteem, family meal rituals, parental criticism of child’s weight and exercise, child’s 
work for pay and expenditures, socio-demographics and child’s dietary behavior.   
Children’s d ietary behavior was an important area of concentration.  The child ren’s 
questionnaire included questions about the frequency that child ren/ adolescents 
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reported skipping meals, how often they ate d inner with at least one parent, and how 
often they ate in restaurants, fast food restaurants, at school, or in another child -care 
setting.  
4. Twenty-four Hour Activity Recall 
The purpose of the twenty-four hour activity record was to ascertain the amount of 
inactivity of children.  The 24-hour activity record provided information about the 
activities undertaken by a child in the previous 24-hour period.  The child first told the 
interviewer at what time he/she went to bed the previous day, where the child went to 
bed, if anyone was with the child when he/she went to bed, and for how long he/she 
slept.  The child was then asked at what time he/she woke up, where he/she was, if 
anyone was with him/her, and how long it took him/her to wake up.  The process then 
continued by asking the child at what time the next activity took place, what the next 
activity was, if anyone was with him/her while performing this activity, and how long 
the activity took place.  This process was repeated until the child reported going to 
sleep.  
5. Twenty-four Hour Diet Recall 
The purpose of the twenty-four hour diet recall is to ascertain the nutrient intake of 
the child in the previous 24-hour period.  The interviewer asked the child to tell 
him/her at what time the child first drank or ate food, then what was the first thing that 
the child drank or ate.  Then the child is asked, with the aid of a food model book, 
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measurement cups, and a ruler, to indicate the amount of food or drink he/she 
consumed, where he/she consumed the food or drink, whether anyone was with 
him/her when he/she consumed the food or drink, and, finally, whether he/she 
consider the food or drink consumed to be a meal or a snack.  This process was 
repeated for all of the food or drinks consumed during the 24-hour period.  
6. Tanner Scale for Sexual Development 
The purpose of the use of the Tanner scale was to determine the growth and sexual 
development of the child interviewed.  The amount of vitamins and minerals needed by 
children and adolescents depends, in part, on their stage of growth and sexual 
development or puberty.  The Tanner scale is composed of a series of drawings of 
children at various stages of puberty.  The female drawings show different degrees of 
breast development and pubic hair growth.  We will now examine the process used to 
recruit families for “Parental Time, Role Strain and Children’s Fat Intake and Obesity 
Related Outcomes”.    
D. Data Collection Process  
We will now discuss the steps that were taken in order to collect the data.  We will 
start by discussing how we obtained approval from Texas A&M University and then 
turn our attention to the way in which the sampling of households took place.  We will 
then explore the five different survey instruments that were used to collect the data.   
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The first step of the data collection process was to gain approval from the human 
subjects committee for the processes by which the families would be interviewed and 
the compensation they would receive.  This process was time consuming given that all 
documentation had to be reviewed by the human subjects committee and modified by 
the research team a couple of times.  This process took about four months.  The second 
step of the data collection process was the sampling of the households in the study site, 
Harris County, Texas.  A sample of 11,168 randomly generated phone numbers was 
obtained from Survey Sampling, Inc.  The total number of ineligible families contacted 
was 6,911.  The total number of eligible families contacted was 4,257.  The overall 
acceptance rate to receive information about the project was 60%45.   
In order to be able to detect bivariate relationships that were significant at the 5% 
level (one tail test) with a power of 90%, we needed 212 adolescents and their parents46.  
Therefore, our goal was to have 300 participating families with 60 coming from single 
female-headed families.  We finished with 325 families that participated at some level in 
the study.  From the participating families, we had 61 single female-headed families 
that fully participated in the study.   There were two sampling stages in the data 
collection process.  In the first sampling stage, which took eight months, we were 
interested not only in the participation of two parent households but also in the 
participation of single female-headed households.  During this time, we contacted 4,067 
eligible households.  There were 2,525 households that agreed to receive information 
                                                          
45
 The number of families that agreed to receive information was 2551 and the total number of eligible 
families was 4257.  Therefore, the overall acceptance rate was 2551/4257=0.60. 
46
 Kraemer, H. C. and Thiemann, S., 1987 How Many Subjects? Statistical Power Analysis in Research.  
Newbury Park: Sage. 
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from the project.  In the first sampling stage, this gave us an acceptance rate for receipt 
of information of 62%.  In order to be able to study single female-headed households, it 
was necessary in the last two months of the sampling stage to exclusively concentrate in 
the recruitment of single female-headed households.  During this second sampling 
stage, we contacted 190 eligible households.  There were 26 households that agreed to 
participate.  This gave us an acceptance rate of 14% for single female-headed 
households in the second sampling stage.  We will now look at the analysis of the data 
from “Parental Time, Role Strain and Children’s Fat Intake and Obesity Related 
Outcomes”.    
E. Analysis of the Data  
      1.   Introduction 
From the data collected from the parent’s telephone interviews and self-
administered questionnaires, the dependent variables of interest for this research are 
reported in Table 1.  Table 2 describes all of the independent variables, their units, and 
their descriptions.  The following section describes how the dependent and 
independent variables were constructed.  
2. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this research are household expenditures.  Table 1 gives 
the variable names, units of measurement and description of the dependent variables.  
The first two household expenditures deal with food expenditures.  Household 
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expenditures on food are divided into two categories: food at home (FAH) and food 
away from home (FAFH).  FAH is defined as food that is purchased to be prepared at 
home.  FAFH is defined as prepared food that is brought home for consumption, and 
food that is consumed away from home.  The next three household expenditures are:  
household living expenditures (HLE), expenditures on transportation, healthcare and 
education (THE), and total sum of household living expenditures, transportation health 
and education expenditures (SLTHE).  The last three household expenditures are: 
household expenditures on children’s clothing (CCE), expenditures on women’s 
clothing (WCE) and expenditures on men’s clothing (MCE).  
3.   Independent Variables 
i) Income Variables 
There are two representations of total household income: HHInc1 and HHInc2.  The 
first total household income variable is the sum of the total income of the husband (ftm) 
and wife (mtm) as it was reported by each spouse in his/her corresponding self-
administered questionnaire.  The second total household income variable is the sum of 
the father’s and mother’s total earned incomes, fem and mem, respectively, and 
unearned incomes, fum157 and mum157, respectively.  The unearned incomes, fum157 
and mum157, are defined as the difference between the reported total income and the 
earned income of each spouse.  
There are two representations of total household unearned income: HHUInc1 and 
HHUInc2.  The first total household unearned income variable is the difference between 
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the total household income, HHInc1, and the total household earned income, HHEInc.  
The second total unearned household income variable is the sum total of unearned 
income reported by mother and father, mum and fum, respectively.  
ii) Work/Home Role Strain Variables 
The effect that employment has on home life represents additional constraints for 
the household.  These are reflected in the degree to which parents find that their work 
demands spill over into family life, the degree to which they are committed to their 
work and the degree to which they have job control.  Household resources can be used 
to mitigate the effects that employment has on home life.  Therefore, household 
purchases can be affected by the work/home role strains of the spouses. 
Work spillover was measured in the parents’ telephone interview surveys by a 
series of questions which were based on earlier work by Simon (1992).  Employed 
spouses’ answers were subjected to a principal factor analysis.  For each spouse, a single 
factor resulted from this analysis.  Work commitment was measured using standard 
scales, Knoke and Woods (1986) and Porter et al. (1974).  The analysis of mothers’ and 
fathers’ questions that reflected job commitment produced one factor for mothers and 
one factor for fathers.  Finally, individuals may be able to have additional time to deal 
with household issues if there is some level of work flexibility.  In the parental 
telephone interview, parents were asked if they had flexibility in their work hours.  
Those parents that indicated that they had available some level of work flexibility were 
coded with a 1 and 0 otherwise. 
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iii. Control Variables  
The parents control variables were constructed from the telephone interview 
data: (1) mothers’ race (mrace) differentiated between Anglo and other races, (2) fathers 
race (frace) differentiated between Anglo and other races, (3) father’s less mother’s age 
(dage), and (4) father’s less mother’s education (dedu).  The larger the age or 
educational difference between the father (mother) and mother (father) the larger the 
influence of the father (mother) is expected to be.  
F. Descriptive Statistics  
1.  Introduction 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables which are the 
household expenditure categories or independent variables given by: (1) household 
income, (2) individual incomes’ (3) sociological variables, and (4) control variables.  This 
research presents means, medians, standard deviations, minimum, maximums and 
sample size for each relevant variable.  The difference in sample sizes for different 
variables is reflected in different response rates.    
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2.  Independent Variables 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are given in Table 3.  The 
analysis of dependent variables will be divided in three different sections. In the first 
section, we will examine expenditures on food.  In the second section, we will examine 
housing, transportation, healthcare and educational expenses.  In the third section, we 
will examine the analysis of expenditures on children’s, women’s and men’s clothing.   
Household expenditures on food are divided into two categories: food at home and 
food away from home.  Household expenditures on food at home had a mean of 
$559.99 and a median of $540.00 with a standard deviation of $242.84.  The minimum 
expenditure on food at home was $200.00 while the maximum was $1,700.00.  In 
comparison, household expenditures on food away from home had a mean of $155.51 
and a median of $125.00 with a standard deviation of $116.60.  The minimum 
household expenditures on food away home is $0.00 and the maximum is $600.00.  
There were four households that reported no expenditures on food away from home.  
The expenditures on food at home and away from home seem reasonable given the size 
and income of the participating households.  It is important to note that the sample had 
a large percentage of affluent households as can be seen by the average household 
income. 
Living expenses were divided into two groups: household housing expenses and 
total household expenditures on transportation, health and education.  Household 
housing expenses had a mean of $2,039.51 and a median of $1,900.00 with a standard 
deviation of $1,213.98.  The minimum expenditure on household housing expenses was 
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$310.00 with maximum of $9,500.00.  Total household expenditures on transportation, 
health and education had a mean of $1,130.08 and a median of $842.25 with a standard 
deviation of $939.24.  The minimum expenditure on total household expenditures on 
transportation, health and education was $90.00 with a maximum of $5,220.00.  When 
we add together household housing expenses and total expenditures on transportation, 
health and education, we get a new expenditure category: total household 
expenditures.  Total household expenditures had a mean of $3,132.46 and a median of 
$2,837.00 with a standard deviation of $1,833.00.  The minimum expenditure in total 
household expenditure category was $609.00 with a maximum of $9,842.50.  Household 
housing expenditures showed a large variation with extreme values at the tails of the 
distribution.  Total household expenditures on transportation, health and education 
had a wide range of variation in relation to its mean.  Likewise, total household 
expenditures had a large variation in relation to its mean and extreme values at the tails 
especially at the higher ranges. 
Household expenditures on clothing were grouped into three categories: children’s, 
women’s and men’s clothing.  Household expenditures on children’s clothing had a 
mean of $101.67 and a median of $61.00 with a standard deviation of $131.81.  The 
minimum expenditure on household expenditures on children’s clothing was $5.00 
with a maximum of $1,200.00.  Household expenditures on women’s clothing had a 
mean of $72.27 and a median of $50.00 with a standard deviation of $84.65.  The 
minimum expenditure on household expenditures on women’s clothing was $3.00 with 
a maximum of $600.00.  Household expenditures on men’s clothing had a mean of 
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$56.99 and a median of $50.00 with a standard deviation of $56.58.  The minimum 
expenditure on household expenditures on men’s clothing was $5.00 with a maximum 
of $400.00.  The largest expenditure on clothing came in the children’s category 
followed by the women’s and men’s, respectively.  The largest variation in expenditures 
by group followed the same pattern.    
3.  Independent Variables 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables.  The analysis 
of independent variables will be divided into three sections. In the first section we will 
examine individual incomes, in the second section we will examine household income, 
and in the third section we will examine the control variables.   
In the case of individual incomes, we have mother and father earned, unearned and 
total incomes.  Father’s earned income had a mean of $78,408.98 and a median of 
$67,200.00 with a standard deviation of $48,479.38.  Father’s earned income had a 
minimum of $0 and a maximum of $208,992.00.  There are two definitions of unearned 
incomes for fathers and mothers.  The first definition of father’s unearned income 
(fum1) is defined as equal to the sum of a number of different unearned income 
categories.  The variable fum1 has a mean of $4,106.12 and a median of $0 with a 
standard deviation of $21,355.46. Fum1 has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of 
$240,000.00.  There are 152 fathers in the study with 111 fathers have zero values for 
fum1, which explains why the median is zero.  The second definition of father’s 
unearned income (fum2) is defined as the difference between total and earned income 
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categories.  Fum2 has a mean of $9,132.57 and a median $300.02 with a standard 
deviation of $24,539.29.  Father’s unearned income has a minimum of $0 and a 
maximum of $250,000.00.  In the case of fum2, there are 100 fathers with non-zero 
values for unearned income.  Father’s total income has a mean of $87,541.54 and a 
median of $74,000.00 with a standard deviation of $57,303.32.  Father’s total income has 
a minimum of $8,400 and a maximum of $370,000.00.    
Mother’s earned income has a mean of $23,810.11 and a median of $8,730.00 with a 
standard deviation of $38,628.99.  Mother’s earned income has a minimum of $0 and a 
maximum of $264,000.00.  There are two definitions of unearned incomes for mothers.  
The first definition of mother’s unearned income (mum1) is defined as equal to the sum 
of a number of different unearned income categories.  Mum1 has a mean of $1,313.70 
and a median of $0 with a standard deviation of $5,593.19.  Mother’s unearned income 
has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $48,000.00.  There are 152 mothers in the study 
with 132 mothers having non-zero values for mum1, which explains why the median is 
zero.  The second definition of mother’s unearned income (mum2) is defined as the 
difference between total and earned income categories.  Mum2 has a mean of $2,433.17 
and a median of $0 with a standard deviation of $6,577.28.  Mother’s unearned income 
has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $50,000.00.  There are 81 cases in which the 
variable mum2 has a zero value.  As a result the median is zero.  Mother’s total income 
has a mean of $26,243.28 and a median of $12,952.20, and a standard deviation of 
$39,088.81.  Mother’s total income has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $264,000.00.   
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As has been previously discussed, the sample of participating two-parent 
households has a large percentage of affluent families.  The main wage earners in the 
households are the fathers who have an average total income that is more than three 
times that of the mothers.   While there is only one father with no total income, there are 
thirty-one mothers with no total income.  The majority of each individual income comes 
from earned income.  The average earned income of the fathers is more than three times 
that of the mothers.  The average unearned income of the fathers is almost four times 
that of the mothers. 
Household income is divided into two categories: household earned and unearned 
income.  The two different types of household earned income, HHInc1 and HHInc2, 
have previously been defined.  HHInc1 has a mean of $113,784.83 and a median of 
$94,577.00 with a standard deviation of $66,861.48.  The minimum household earned 
income as defined by HHInc1 is $16,800 with a maximum of $376,300.00.  HHInc2 has a 
mean of $107,638.92 and a median of $86,599.96 with a standard deviation of $67,262.06.  
The minimum household earned income as defined by HHInc2 is $12,200 with a 
maximum of $366,300.00. 
The sample of households contains a large number of affluent households.  There 
are four households with incomes above $300,000.00, three households with incomes 
greater than $250,000.00 and less than $300,000.00, eleven households between $200,000 
and $250,000, seventeen between $150,000 and $200,000, and thirty seven between 
$100,000 and $150,000.  This means that almost half of all of the households surveyed 
have household incomes above $100,000. 
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There are two definitions of household unearned income.  In the first definition of 
household unearned income, HHUInc1, unearned income is defined as the sum of fum1 
and mum1. The variable HHUInc1 has a mean of $ 5,419.83 and a median of $0 with a 
standard deviation of $ 23,076.14.  HHUInc1 has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of 
$240,000.  In the sample of 152 households, there are only 52 with non-zero 
observations.   In the second definition of household unearned income, HHUInc2, 
unearned income is defined as the sum of fum2 and mum2. The variable HHUInc has a 
mean of $11,565.74 and a median of $ 2,987.00 with a standard deviation of $ 25,831.64.  
HHUInc has a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $250,000.  From the 152 households, 
123 have non-zero observations. 
The control variables used in this study are: the difference between the ages of the 
father and mother, the difference in the years of education of the father and mother, 
ethnicity of the mother and ethnicity of father.  The self-reported difference between the 
ages of the father and mother is denoted by Dage.   The variable Dage has a mean of 
2.3377 and a median of 2 with a standard deviation of 4.1018490.  The variable Dage has 
a minimum of -6 and a maximum of 18.  The mean ages of the fathers and mothers are 
44.2185430 and 41.9473684, respectively.  The minimum ages of the fathers and mothers 
are quite similar at 29 and 31, respectively.  The maximum ages of the fathers and 
mothers are also quiet close at 65 and 61, respectively.  From the 151 households, there 
are no missing observations. 
The differences in educational attainment of the fathers and mothers are denoted by 
educational categories.  The educational categories are assigned a numerical value 
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corresponding to  ascending educational attainment.  The categories are as follows: 
1=some grammar school, 2=completed grammar school, 3=some high school, 
4=graduated high school, 5=some college, 6=college graduate, 7=some graduate school, 
and 8=completed graduate school.  The self-reported difference between the education 
of the fathers and mothers is denoted by Dedu.   The variable Dedu has a mean of 
0.0662252 and a standard deviation of 1.5173173.  The variable Dedu has a minimum of 
-3 and a maximum of 3.  The educational distribution of the fathers is as follows: 2.65% 
had some high school, 10.60% graduated high school, 18.54% had some college, 41.72% 
were college graduates, 3.97% had some graduate school and 22.52% completed 
graduate school.   The educational distribution of the mothers is as follows: 1.32% had 
some high school, 5.92% graduated high school, 29.61% had some college, 42.11% were 
college graduates, 3.29% had some graduate school and 17.76% completed graduate 
school.  From the above information on educational attainment, it is clear that a greater 
percentage of mothers had at least some college education.  Fathers and mothers have 
about the same percentage of college graduates with mothers having a slight 
advantage.  However, the data shows that a greater percentage of fathers have some 
graduate school or completed graduate school.    
The ethnic background of the parents is divided into three groups: white, Hispanic 
and other.  These variables are coded as dummy variables.  The category that is 
excluded is other.  The ethnic background of the fathers is as follows: 82.89% white, 
11.18% Hispanic, and 5.92% other.  In the case of the mothers, the ethnic background is 
as follows: 85.53% white, 9.87% Hispanic, and 4.61% other.  As we can see, the ethnic 
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backgrounds of the fathers and mothers are very similar.  After some analysis of the 
statistical significance of the demographic categories, the three demographic groups 
were collapsed into two; white and non-white, for both mothers and fathers.                       
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                                                               CHAPTER V  
                                                                 RESULTS  
A. Introduction  
This section is dedicated to the presentation of the estimated results and conclusions 
of this research.   The results come from the joint estimation of the expenditure 
functions for food at and away from home from the conditional and unconditional 
models.  This research utilizes the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the 
estimation of the system of expenditures on food at and away from home.  In this 
section, we will also discuss the result of the test of the three hypotheses of interest.  
First, we will analyze the validity of the income pooling hypothesis and therefore the 
validity of the unitary model.  Second, we will analyze the effect of family financial 
structure as a determinant of intrahousehold allocation of resources.  We will do this by 
analyzing the role of family financial structure as an explanatory variable for household 
expenditures on food at and away from home.  Third, we will explore the reduced form 
nature of demand and/or expenditure models that do not include family financial 
structure as an explanatory variable.  In order to do this, we must examine the three 
parts of the reduced form parameters.  We will discuss the effect that earned income, 
unearned income and sociological variables have on household expenditures holding 
constant family financial structures.  We will also discuss how household expenditures  
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on food at and away from home change as family’s financial structure changes.  We will 
conclude this discussion by examining the change in the type of family financial 
structure that comes about from a change in the variables of interest.  Before beginning 
the discussion of these three hypotheses we will discuss the choice of estimation 
technique employed and report the parameter estimates of the conditional and 
unconditional models of household behavior.  
B. Estimation Methodology  
The estimation of (3.10) with the use of ordinary least squares or seemingly 
unrelated regressions would be inefficient since there is unknown heteroscedasticity.   
From table 5, we can see that there is heteroscedasticity, according to White’s test for 
heteroscedasticity at the 10% level, for the food at home equation in both the 
conditional and unconditional representation, cHFAH  and uHFAH , respectively.  The 
generalized method of moments (GMM) is able to deal with unknown 
heteroscedasticity and achieve asymptotic efficiency.   
We also have the endogeneity of the earned income of the fathers and mothers.  The 
GMM estimators have the advantage that they do not require the strict assumption that 
the independent variables be strictly exogenous but that instead they be predetermined 
or allowed to be endogenous.  In our research, the choice of work is assumed to be 
endogenous given that earned income of parents and household expenditures are 
jointly determined.  The system of GMM equations that we employed had as 
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instrumental variables not only job importance to the parent and a variable that 
indicated the type of employment but also the independent variables that are not 
endogenous to the system:  fathers’ and mothers’ unearned income, father’s and 
mother’s ethnicity, difference in the years of education of the spouses, difference in the 
age of the spouses, total number of children under 18 years of age and father’s and 
mother’s job stress.   
When the system of expenditures of food at home and food away from home is 
estimated as a GMM system of equations then we get consistency and asymptotic 
efficiency as N .   Therefore, the GMM estimator is more appropriate in this case 
given that it can handle both the endogeneity of earned income of the parents and 
unknown heteroscedasticity.  
C. Results  
The system of estimated equations is not invariant to the family financial structure 
that is left out as the base case.  In other words, the parameter estimates may be slightly 
different depending on which family financial structure is not included as an 
independent variable in the analysis.  However, we only estimate one model.  
Therefore, there is only one base case.  The base case is the independent family financial 
structure.  The use of the independent family financial structure allows for an intuitive 
interpretation.  We can think of the independent system as acting as if individuals were 
not married within a marriage.  This model is denoted as M1 1245.  It includes family 
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financial structures: 1, 2, 4 and 5 leaving out family financial structure number six 
which is the independent system47.  
This research estimates the system of equations given by (3.10).  From the 
estimation of (3.10), we can recover the parameters of the two expenditure equations of 
the conditional model and the parameters of the two expenditure equations of the 
unconditional model.  The parameters of the conditional model are given by the 'ij s  in 
the conditional and the unconditional equations parameters are given by 'ij s .  The 
parameters of the first unconditional equation, the expenditure function, are in 
parentheses in the second equation of the system given by (3.10).  These variables can 
also be denoted by ij .  The parameters of the second equation of the unconditional 
model, the family financial structure equation, are given by the in , which are found in 
the unconditional equation of the above system.  We are not able to identify each of 
these parameters.  The estimated system yields the 'ij s  and 'ij s  not the 'in s .  We 
will now report the parameter estimates of the conditional and unconditional models. 
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates and p-values for the food at home equation 
for the conditional model, unconditional model and the difference between the 
unconditional and conditional models, 5 31 i n ji , which is the second term of the 
reduced form parameters.  The first column of Table 6 shows the results for the food at 
home equation in the conditional model with endogenous earned income of the father  
                                                          
47
 The family financial structures correspond to Pahl’s (1989) typology, where n=1 for male whole wage 
system, n=2 for female whole wage system, n=3 for male allowance system, n=4 for female allowance 
system, n=5 for pooling system , and n=6 for independent system. 
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and mother.  We will discuss the variables that are significant at the 15% level given the 
small sample.  In this model there are four variables that are significant at the 15% level 
of significance.  The conditional specification of the food at home equation explains 
19.09% of the variation in the model.  We find that the intercept has a value of 278.53 
and is significant at the 1% level.  The fathers’ earn income is found to be positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that 
expenditures on food at home increase by $9.68.  The coefficient of the family financial 
structure 1, which is the male whole wage system, is found to be positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  It is important to note that the base case is the independent 
system.  Since the male whole wage system has a coefficient of 45.19, the male whole 
wage system shows an increase of $45.19 over the independent system.  This means that 
a move from the independent system to the male whole wage system increases 
household expenditures on food at home by $45.19.  The coefficient of the family 
financial structure 4, which is the female allowance system, is found to be positive and 
significant at the 12% level.  Since the coefficient of the female allowance system was 
found to be 138.87, the female allowance system shows an increase of $138.87 over the 
independent system.  This means that a move from the independent system to the 
female allowance system increases household expenditures on food at home by $138.87. 
The second column of Table 6 shows that in the case of the unconditional model 
with endogenous earned income of the father and mother, we find that there are four 
variables that are significant at the 15% level of significance.  The unconditional 
specification of the food at home equation explains 14.30% of the variation in the model. 
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We find that the intercept has a value of 289.70 and is found to be significant at the 1% 
level.  The fathers’ earned income is found to be positive and significant at the 2% level.  
For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that expenditures on food at 
home increase by $8.66.  The mothers’ earned income is found to be positive and 
significant at the 15% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that 
expenditures on food at home increase by $8.04.  We also find that when the mother is 
Caucasian there is an increase of $71.77, which is significant at the 11% level, when 
compared to non-Caucasian mothers. 
The third column of Table 6 shows that in the case of the difference between the 
unconditional and conditional models with endogenous earned income of the father 
and mother, we find that there are six variables that are significant at the 15% level.    
The difference in fathers’ earned incomes is found to be positive and significant at the 
14% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that there is a 
difference in expenditures on food at home between the unconditional and conditional 
models of $-1.02.  This means that the coefficient of the unconditional model 
underestimates the effect of earn income.  We also find that the difference between the 
two models when the father is Caucasian is significant at the 1% level and equal to $-
18.98 when compared to non-Caucasian fathers.  Likewise, we find that the difference 
between the two models when the mother is Caucasian is significant at the 1% level and 
equal to $24.94 when compared to non-Caucasian mothers.  From the difference column 
in table 6, we can also see that the difference between the two models for the difference 
in years of education of the spouses (father – mother) is significant at the 8% level and 
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equal to $3.83.  We can also see that the difference between the two models for the 
difference in age of the spouses (father – mother) is significant at the 2% level and equal 
to $-1.54.  The difference for the sociological variable mothers’ job stress between the 
two models is -6.76 and is found to be significant at the 3% level.   
The coefficients of the unconditional model are reduced form parameters, 'in s .  
These reduced form parameters depict the total effect that the variable of interest has on 
expenditure on the expenditure category of interest which in our case is either food at 
home or food away from home.  If family financial structure is an explanatory variable 
when the expenditure function estimated is that of the unconditional model, the 
coefficient of the variable of interest would contain three effects: the effect that the 
variable of interest has on the expenditure category of interest holding constant family 
financial structure, ij , the effect that family financial structure has on the expenditure 
category of interest, 3i n  and the effect that the variable of interest has on family 
financial structure, in .  The relationship between the total effect of a change in the 
expenditure category of interest and its two components with three effects is as we have 
seen before given by: 
(5.1) 
5
31
n
ni i
ij j n jf
ij i n inn
fE E
x f x
where jx  denotes the variable of interest, the subscript i  denotes the expenditure 
category and the subscript j is used to denote the variable of interest.   
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The differences between the unconditional and conditional models hinges on the 
reduced form nature of the unconditional parameters.  The difference between the 
unconditional and conditional models is given by: 5 31 i n inn .  The difference 
between the models is the second term of the reduced form parameters which has two 
parts that capture two distinct effects.  From a public policy point of view, it is 
important to understand the nature of each of these three effects since a priori we can 
not determine their effect.  In the case of fathers’ earned income, Caucasian fathers, 
difference in age of spouses and job stress, the coefficient of the difference, 5 31 i n inn , 
is found to be negative.  This implies that the sum from n=1,…,5 of 3i n  times in  is 
negative. We do not know if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , 
or if some 3 0i n  and some 0in such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
, or if some 3 0i l
and some 0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
.  The only thing we know for sure is 
that ij ij  which implies that ij  under estimates the value of ij since 
5
31
0i n inn .  In other words, the total effect perceived by the reduced form 
parameter is larger than the change on expenditures on food at home that comes about 
from a change in the variable of interest in our case fathers’ earned income, Caucasian 
fathers, difference in age of spouses and job stress holding family financial structure 
constant. 
In the case of Caucasian mothers and difference in years of education between the 
spouses, the coefficient of the difference, 5 31 i n inn , is found to be positive.   We do 
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not know if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if some 
3 0i l  and some  0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
, or if some 3 0i l  and some  
0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
.  The only thing we know for sure is that ij ij
which implies that ij  overestimates the value of ij  since 
5
31
0i n inn .  In other 
words, the total effect perceived by the reduced form parameter is smaller than the 
change on expenditures on food at home that comes about from a change in the 
variable of interest in our case Caucasian mothers and difference in years of education 
between the spouses, holding family financial structure constant.  From a policy 
perspective in the case of fathers’ earned income, the government may erroneously 
conclude that a policy that reduces fathers’ earned income may have a smaller decrease 
on expenditures on food at home than in reality if the unconditional model (i.e. reduced 
form model) is used in the estimation. 
Table 7 shows the parameter estimates and p-values for the food away from home 
equation for the conditional model, unconditional model and the difference between 
the unconditional and conditional models. We will discuss the variables that are 
significant at the 15% level given the small sample.  The first column of Table 7 shows 
the case of the conditional model with endogenous earned income of the father and 
mother.  For this case, we find that there are ten variables that are significant at the 15% 
level of significance.  This model explains 39.77% of the variation in the model.  We find 
that the intercept has a value of 60.18 is found to be significant at the 2% level of 
significance.  The fathers’ earned income is found to be positive and significant at the 
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1% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that expenditures on 
food away from home increase by $12.07.  The mothers’ earned income is found to be 
positive and significant at the 1% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, 
we find that expenditures on food away from home increase by $8.45.  The coefficient of 
mothers’ unearned income is found to be positive and significant at the 14% level.  For 
an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that expenditures on food away 
from home increase by $31.17.  The coefficient of the family financial structure 1 which 
is the male whole wage system is found to be positive and significant at the 1% level.  It 
is important to note that the base case is given by the independent system.  Since the 
male whole wage system has a coefficient of 17.14, the male whole wage system 
showed an increase of $17.14 over the independent system.  This means that a move 
from the independent system to the male whole wage system increases household 
expenditures on food away from home by $17.14.  The coefficient of family financial 
structure number 2, the female whole wage system, has a coefficient of 9.34 which is 
significant at the 1% level.  The female whole wage system showed an increase of $9.34 
over the independent system.  This means that a move from the independent system to 
the female whole wage system increases household expenditures on food away from 
home by $9.34.  The coefficient of the family financial structure 4 which is the female 
allowance system is found to be -28.32 and significant at the 6% level.  Therefore, the 
female allowance system shows a decrease of $28.32 over the independent system.  This 
means that a move from the independent system to the female allowance system 
decreases household expenditures on food away from home by $28.32.  The coefficient 
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of the family financial structure 5, which is the joint system, is found to be -14.93 and 
significant at the 2% level.  Therefore, the joint system shows a decrease of $14.93 over 
the independent system.  This means that a move from the independent system to the 
female allowance system decreases household expenditures on food away from home 
by $14.93.  We also find that when the father is Caucasian there is a decrease of $45.68 
on expenditures on food away from home, which is significant at the 15% level, when 
compared to non-Caucasian fathers.  Finally, we find that the coefficient for the 
difference in the years of education of the spouses is significant at the 5% level and has 
a value of -9.47.  This implies that for every year of education that the father has over 
the mother the expenditures on food away from home decrease by $9.47. 
The second column of Table 7 shows the case of the conditional model with 
endogenous earned income of the father and mother.  We find that there are five 
variables that are significant at the 15% level of significance.  This model explains 
37.38% of the variation in the model.  We find that the intercept has a value of 68.51 is 
found to be significant at the 1% level of significance.  The fathers’ earned income is 
found to be positive and significant at the 1% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in 
earned income, we find that expenditures on food away from home increase by $11.59.  
The mothers’ earned income is found to be positive and significant at the 1% level.  For 
an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that expenditures on food away 
from home increase by $8.01.  We also find that when the father is Caucasian there is a 
decrease of $53.01, which is significant at the 10% level, when compared to non-
Caucasian fathers.  Finally, we find that the coefficient for the difference in the years of 
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education of the spouses is significant at the 5% level and has a value of -9.38.  This 
implies that for every year of education that the father has over the mother the 
expenditures on food away from home decrease by $9.38. 
The third column of Table 7 shows the results of the difference between the 
unconditional and conditional models with endogenous earned income of the father 
and mother.  We find that there are six variables that are significant at the 15% level.  
We find that the difference in intercepts has a value of 8.32 and is found to be 
significant at the 3% level of significance.  The difference in fathers’ earned incomes is 
found to be negative and significant at the 5% level.  For an increase of $10,000.00 in 
earned income, we find that there is a difference in expenditures on food away from 
home between the conditional and unconditional models of $-0.48.  The difference in 
mothers’ unearned incomes is found to be negative and significant at the 15% level.  For 
an increase of $10,000.00 in earned income, we find that there is a difference in 
expenditures on food away from home between the conditional and unconditional 
models of $-0.02.  We also find that the difference in expenditures on food away from 
home between the two models when the father is Caucasian is significant at the 3% 
level and equal to $-7.33 when compared to non-Caucasian fathers.  Likewise, we find 
that the difference in expenditures on food away from home between the two models 
when the mother is Caucasian is significant at the 2% level and equal to $9.84 when 
compared to non-Caucasian mothers.  Finally, we find that the difference in 
expenditures on food away from home between the two models for fathers’ job stress is 
significant at the 14% level and has a coefficient of 1.33. 
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In the case of fathers’ earned income and Caucasian fathers, the coefficient of the 
difference, 5 31 i n inn , is found to be negative.  This implies that the sum from 
n=1,…,5 of 3i n  times in  is negative. We do not know if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if 
all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if some 3 0i l  and some  0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
, or if some 3 0i l  and some  0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
.  The only thing we know for sure is that ij ij  which implies 
that ij  under estimates the value of ij  since 
1
31
0n i m imm .  In other words, the 
total effect perceived by the reduced form parameter is larger than the change on 
expenditures on food away from home that comes about from a change in the variable 
of interest in our case fathers’ earned income and Caucasian fathers holding family 
financial structure constant. 
In the case of Caucasian mothers and fathers’ job stress, the coefficient of the 
difference, 5 31 i n inn , is found to be positive.   As we previously discussed, we do 
not know if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if all 3 0i n  and all 0in , or if some 
3 0i l  and some  0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
, or if some 3 0i l  and some  
0il  such that 
1
3 31
n
i l il i m imm
.  The only thing we know for sure is that ij ij
which implies that ij  overestimates the value of ij  since 
5
31
0i n inn .  In other 
words, the total effect perceived by the reduced form parameter is smaller than the 
change on expenditures on food at home that comes about from a change in the 
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variable of interest in our case Caucasian mothers and fathers’ job stress, holding family 
financial structure constant.  From a policy perspective in the case of fathers’ earned 
income, the government may erroneously conclude that a policy that reduces fathers’ 
earned income may have a smaller decrease on expenditures on food away from home 
than in reality if the unconditional model (i.e. reduced form model) is used in the 
estimation. 
Table 8 shows the results of the hypothesis test for the food at home equation for the 
conditional and unconditional models.  The restrictions implied by the unitary model in 
the case of the conditional model for the food at home equation are: 11 12 , 13 14
and 13 0j j .  The test statistic has a p-value of <0.0001.  The restrictions implied by 
the unitary model in the case of the unconditional model for the food at home equation 
are: 11 12 , 13 14 .  The test statistic has a p-value of 0.9376.  Therefore in the case 
of food at home, we reject the unitary conditional model at the 1% level of significance, 
while we fail to reject the unitary unconditional model.  The restrictions for equality of 
earned income in the case of food at home for the conditional and unconditional model 
are: 11 12  and 11 12 , respectively.  The p-values for the test statistics are: 0.7655 
and 0.9333, respectively.  In the case of unearned income for the food at home equation, 
the restrictions for the conditional and unconditional models are given by: 13 14  and 
13 14 , respectively.  The p-values for the test statistics are: 0.8024 and 0.7314, 
respectively.  Therefore, in both the conditional and unconditional models, we find that 
the earned and unearned income is spent in the same manner on expenditures on food 
at home.  The joint significance restrictions placed on the conditional model by family 
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financial structure are: 13 0j j .  The p-value of the test statistic for this test is: 
<0.0001.  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that family financial structure has no 
effect on expenditures on food at home.  It is important to note that the restriction that 
drives the rejection of the unitary model is the joint significance of the family financial 
structure in the case of the conditional model.  The results for earned and unearned 
income of the father and mother are the same for both the conditional and 
unconditional models. 
Table 9 shows the results of the hypothesis test for the food away from home 
equation for the conditional and unconditional models.  The results are similar to those 
found in Table 8.   
The restrictions implied by the unitary model in the case of the conditional model 
are: : 21 22 , 23 24  and 23 0j j .  The test statistic has a p-value of <0.0001.  
The restrictions implied by the unitary model in the case of the unconditional model 
are: 21 22 , 23 24 .  The test statistic has a p-value of 0.1597.  Therefore for the food 
away from home equation in the case of the conditional model, we reject the unitary 
model at the 1% level of significance, while the unconditional model fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of the unitary model.  The restrictions for equality of earned income in 
the case of food at home for the conditional and unconditional model are: 21 22  and 
21 22 , respectively.  The p-values for the test statistics are: 0.2887 and 0.3156, 
respectively.  In the case of unearned income for the food at home equation, the 
restrictions for the conditional and unconditional models are given by: 23 24  and 
23 24 , respectively.  The p-values for the test statistics are: 0.1177 and 0.1704, 
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respectively.  In both the conditional and unconditional models, we find that the earned 
income is spent in the same manner on expenditures on food at home since we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the mother and father earned incomes 
are equal.  In the case of unearned income, we find that we reject that null that the 
fathers and mothers spend income in the same manner in the case of the conditional 
model.  However, in the case of the unconditional model, we fail to reject the null that 
the mothers and fathers spend unearned income in the same manner at the 15% level of 
significance.  The joint significance restrictions placed on the conditional model by 
family financial structure are:  13 0j j .  The p-value of the test statistic for this test is: 
<0.0001.  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that family financial structure has no 
effect on expenditures on food away from home.  It is important to note that the 
restrictions that drive the rejection of the unitary model are the joint significance of the 
family financial structure and unearned income of the spouses in the case of the 
conditional model.  The results for earned income of the father and mother are the same 
for both the conditional and unconditional models. 
The test of the joint significance of the family financial structure parameters is a 
sufficient condition that can be used to determine whether the reduced form 
parameters are equal to the structural parameters.  The test of equality between 
structural and reduced form parameters is given by: 
(5.2) 5 31: 0o ij ij ij ij i n ninH
The test of joint significance of the family financial structure parameters is given by: 
(5.3) 31 32 35: ... 0o i i iH
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Therefore, the rejection of (5.3) is sufficient to reject (5.2) but not necessary.  The more 
direct testing procedure would be as shown in (5.2) would be to test 5 31 0i n nin .  
From Table 8, we find that family financial structure in the conditional model for the 
food at home and food away from home has a significant effect on expenditures on 
food at and away from home.  In the case of food at home, the test statistic for the 
hypothesis of joint significance of family financial structure has a p-value of <0.0001.  
Therefore in the case of food at home, we reject (5.3) which in turn means that we can 
reject (5.2).  Similarly in the case of food away from home, we find from Table 9 that the 
test statistic for the hypothesis of joint significance of family financial structure has a p-
value of <0.0001.  Therefore in the case of food away from home, we reject (5.3) which 
in turn means that we can reject (5.2).  Therefore, the omission of family financial 
structure in the analysis of expenditures of food at and away from home will lead us to 
the wrong conclusion that the unitary model is the correct specification.  In addition to 
the test of hypothesis test of joint significance of the family financial structure, we also 
tested the joint significance of the difference between the unconditional and conditional 
models.  Table 10 shows these hypothesis test the restrictions that are implied and the 
p-values for the test statistics of the test for expenditures on food at and away from 
home.  In the case of food at home, we find that for the null hypothesis given by: 
(5.4) 5 131: 0o n jnH j
In the case of food at home, we find that the test statistic for the hypothesis of joint 
significance of the difference between the parameters of the unconditional and 
conditional model has a p-value of 0.1189.  Therefore in the case of food at home, we 
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reject (5.4) at the 12% level of significance.  Likewise in the case of food away from 
home, we find that the test statistic for the hypothesis test of joint significance of the 
difference between the parameters of the unconditional and conditional model has a p-
value of 0.0447.  Therefore in the case of food away from home, we reject  (5.4) at the 5% 
level of significance.  The results of Table 10 confirm the results from Tables 8 and 9.  
The conclusion is that the omission of family financial structure from the analysis of 
expenditures on food at and away from home would lead us to conclude that the 
unitary model is the correct framework from which to analyze intrahousehold 
allocation of resources.  The collective models that were proposed in this research are 
found to be preferred to the unitary models.  These two models, conditional and 
unconditional, not only allow for the effect of earned and unearned incomes of father’s 
and mother’s to be different but also incorporate family financial structure into the 
analysis of expenditures on food at and away from home. 
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                                                              CHAPTER VI  
                                                           CONCLUSIONS  
A. Introduction  
Research on expenditures on food at home and food away from home usually 
employ the use of the unitary model, Becker (1965), which has as one of its implications 
the income pooling hypothesis.  The income pooling hypothesis states that income from 
different sources is spent in the same manner.  One policy implication of models based 
on the income pooling hypothesis is that regardless of which parent receives the 
sources from an assistance program, the outcome on household expenditures is the 
same. 
There is, however, overwhelming evidence against the income pooling hypothesis 
such as: Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997), and Thomas (1990).  As a consequence of 
the rejection of unitary models, non-unitary models of household behavior were 
developed in the economic literature.  There are two main classifications of non-unitary 
models.  The first set of non-unitary models are the collective models of household 
behavior, which is based on the assumption that the household decision process results 
in a Pareto efficient outcome (e.g. Chiappori (1988), Browning et. al (1994) and 
Chiappori (1997)).  The second set of non-unitary models are the intra-household 
bargaining models (e.g. McElroy and Horney (1981), McElroy and Horney (1990) and 
McElroy (1990)) where the control of resources is essential because the outcome 
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depends on the threat point and on the feasible consumption set.  One policy 
implication of the collective models of household behavior and intra-household 
bargaining models is that income or resources from an assistance program received by 
mothers or fathers have different effects with regard to expenditures on both food at 
home and food away from home. 
While economic theory has developed models that study the impact that incomes 
from different sources have on the purchases of different commodities (e.g. Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993), Phipps and Burton (1998)), it has not fully considered the effect that 
different family financial structures may have on expenditures on food at home and 
food away from home, and therefore, living standards of different household members.  
Sociological studies have shown that family financial structure is an important 
determinant of household expenditures and, therefore, standard of living of different 
household members.  In sociology, the most important research in the area of family 
financial structures comes from Pahl (1990) in which she develops her family financial 
structure typology.   Pahl studies the effect that earning income and type of bank 
accounts have on household expenditures as well as the effect that managing, and more 
importantly, control of income has on household expenditures.  The inclusion of 
management and control of income in Pahl’s (1990) typology is an important 
development in the literature because there are differences between earning, managing 
and controlling income as they relate to household expenditures.    
In the economic literature of intra-household allocation of resources, family financial 
structure has not been used as an explanatory variable of household expenditures.  If 
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family financial structure is a variable that should be included in the analysis of 
household expenditures and is not included, the resulting expenditure system suffers 
from specification error in the form of omitted variable bias.  The parameter estimates 
would therefore be rendered inconsistent.  The parameter estimates of husband and 
wife’s wages would be reduced form parameters that contain not only the effects of 
wages on expenditures but also the effects of wages on family financial structure.  
Therefore, these reduced form parameters show the total effect of wages, not only the 
effect of wages on expenditures but also the effect of wages on family financial structure 
of the household.   
There are many ways to model the intra-household allocation of resources.  This 
research showed two versions of a simple model where there is no altruism in the 
utility function.  The outcome of the intrahousehold allocation process in both cases is 
assumed to result in a Pareto efficient outcome which means that chosen consumption 
bundles and allocations of time are such that an individual’s welfare cannot be 
increased without decreasing the welfare of his/her spouse.  The household in both 
versions is modeled as a two-person economy that faces fixed prices, and all the results 
of general equilibrium are available.  The father and mother bargain over the household 
expenditure decisions.    In both the conditional and unconditional models of household 
behavior, it is assumed that individuals have strictly quasi-concave and increasing, 
twice differentiable utilities.  The wage rates, mw and fw ,  and non-wage incomes, mN   
and fN ,  are exogenously given.  The difference between the conditional and 
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unconditional models is that the former assumes that the choice of family financial 
structure is predetermined or exogenous.   
The conditional collective model of household behavior is given by: 
(6.1) 
, ,
0
, ,
, ;
. . , ; , , , , , ;
m m wm
m
m m mq x T
f f
f f n f m f m f m n
i i x i i wi ii m f i m f
wm cm m
wf cf f
Max u q x f
s t u q x f u p p w w N N f
p q p x N T w
T T T
T T T
                                             
The setup of this model is intuitive because the husband/wife is not only 
maximizing his/her utility with respect to time allocated to work, non-work activities, 
non-public goods and public goods conditional on the family financial structure chosen 
subject to the budget constraint of the household, but also subject to utility of the 
spouse being greater than the reservation utility.   
The conditional collective model of household behavior results in conditional 
demands for public goods, non-public goods and time allocations given by: 
(6.2) 
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
i i m f x m f m f f m n
i i m f x m f m f f m n
ij ij m f x m f m f f m n
q q p p p w w N N T T f i m f
x x p p p w w N N T T f i m f
T T p p p w w N N T T f i m f j m f
The endogenous variables: iq , ix  and ijT  are functions of the exogenous variables in 
the conditional model iw , iN  and 0
iu  which is not only a function of iw , iN   but also a 
function of ip  and xp  conditional on the family financial structure chosen, nf .   
On the other hand, the unconditional collective model of household behavior is 
given by: 
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(6.3) 
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wm cm m
wf cf f
Max u q x f
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T T T
T T T
 
In the case of the unconditional collective model, the husband or wife maximizes 
his/her utility with respect to time allocated to work, non-work activities, public goods, 
non-public goods and family financial structure subject not only to his/her spouse’s 
utility being greater than his/her reservation utility but also subject to the household 
budget constraint which states that total household expenditures on non-private and 
private goods must be less than or equal to the households total earned and unearned 
income.   
  On the other hand, the unconditional collective model of household behavior 
results in demands for public, non-public goods and demands for family financial 
structure.  These demands and choice of family financial structure are respectively 
given by: 
(6.4) 
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , 1 1,...,6
, , , , , , , , , ,
i i m f x m f m f f m
i i m f x m f m f f m
n n m f x m f m f f m
ij ij m f x m f m f f m
q q p p p w w N N T T i m f
x x p p p w w N N T T i m f
f f p p p w w N N T T n or
T T p p p w w N N T T i m f j m f
The public goods demands, nonpublic goods demands, labor supply, demand for 
non-work time, and family financial structure are functions of the parameters in the 
 145
unconditional model, mw , fw ,  mN , fN  and 
i
ou  which is a function of  mp , fp , xp , mw , 
fw , fN  and mN . 
As we previously discuss, the estimation of the unitary model when family financial 
structures is a variable that should be included in the model makes the coefficients of 
the unitary model and those of the unconditional model expenditure functions reduced 
form parameters which show the total effect of the variables of interest which are 
denoted by: ij .  The total effect is composed of two distinct effects.  The first effect 
represents how a change in the variable of interest affects expenditures in a given 
household expenditure category holding family financial structure constant, ij .  The 
second effect has two parts.  The first part shows how a change in family financial 
structure affects expenditures on a given expenditure category, 3i n .  The second part 
shows how a change in the variable of interest affects family financial structure, in . 
The estimation procedures used when we have a discrete family financial structure 
variable, as in this study, involves the joint estimation of the conditional and 
unconditional expenditure functions.  Therefore, this model estimated was: 
(6.5) 
5
0 1 2 3 4 31 6
0 1 2 3 4 6
kc
i i i m i f i m i f i n n ij ij in j
ku
i i i m i f i m i f ij ij ij
E w w N N f X
E w w N N X v
In the case of a discrete family financial structure, we can identify the parameters of 
the conditional model and the reduce form parameters from the expenditure equations 
of the conditional model.  The identification of the parameters of the family financial 
structure equation is not possible because we can only identify 31
k
i n inn
.  The 
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reduced form parameters are such that 5 31ij ij i n inn .  When the family 
financial structure variable is not statistically significant, the second part of the reduced 
form parameters 5 31 0i n inn   and therefore the reduced form parameters are 
structural parameters.  This means that in the case of a discrete family financial 
structure variable the hypothesis tests are based on whether 5 31 0i n inn  which 
implies that jointly all 3 0i n  where n=1,…,5.  
B. Conclusions  
This research estimated the system described above for expenditures on food at 
home and food away from home.  The findings of this research can be summarized in 
the following five results: (i) For both food at home and food away from home, we fail 
to reject the income pooling hypothesis (equality of earn and unearned income 
parameter estimates for the spouses).  (ii) However, family financial structure is found 
to be an important explanatory variable not used by the unitary models.  (iii) Therefore, 
the omission of family financial structure and not the income pooling hypothesis would 
lead us to the incorrect assertion that the unitary model is the correct model for the 
analysis of intrahousehold allocation.  (iv) The misspecification created when we use 
the unitary model instead of the conditional and unconditional models that we 
discussed in this research would render the parameters of the unitary model to be 
reduced form parameters.  These reduced form parameters show the total effect which 
 147
is composed of three parts.  First, the change in the expenditure category of interest that 
comes about from a change in the variable of interest when we holding family financial 
structure constant.  Second, the change in the expenditure category of interest that 
comes about from a change in the family financial structure.   Third, the change in 
family financial structure that comes about from a change in the variable of interest.  (v) 
The total effect of the reduced form parameters is not equal to the desired effect that a 
change in the variable of interest has on the expenditure category being studied.  In our 
research, we find that the reduced form parameters of fathers’ earned income for both 
food at home and food away from home are larger than the desired change in 
expenditures on food at home and food away from home that come about from a 
change in fathers’ earned income holding family financial structure constant. 
There are several areas of future research that are worth while noting.  The use of 
the minimum distance estimator (MDE) in the estimation of the conditional and 
unconditional models would allow us not only to recover the parameter estimates of 
the expenditure function for both the conditional and unconditional models but it will 
also allow us to recover the parameters of the family financial structure from the 
unconditional model .  This would further our knowledge of how earned income of 
fathers and mothers, and socio-demographic variables affect the type of family financial 
structure chosen by the families.  We could therefore explore the effect that policies 
designed to change the kind of family financial structure of families have on different 
household expenditure categories and therefore the wellbeing of women and children.  
The use of the conditional and unconditional models in the analysis of other household 
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expenditures would broaden the understanding of intrahousehold allocations of 
resources in expenditure categories such as: children’s clothing, women’s clothing, 
men’s clothing, educational expenses and health expenses.        
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APPENDIX A   
TABLES  
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TABLE 1  DEPENDENT VARIABLES, UNITS AND DESCRIPTION  
Dependent 
Variables Units Description 
HFAH Dollars Money spent by household on food at home. 
HFAFH Dollars Money spent by the household on food away from home. 
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TABLE 2  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, UNITS AND DESCRIPTION  
Independent 
Variables 
Units Description 
Household Income 
HHInc1 Dollars This is the first definition of total household income.  It is the sum 
of the total income reported by the mother and the father. 
HHUInc Dollars This is the first definition of household unearned income.  It 
defines total household unearned income as the sum of the 
difference between the mothers and fathers total income and the 
mothers and fathers earned income. 
HHEInc   Dollars Household earned income is defined as the sum of the fathers, 
fem, and mothers earned income, mem. 
Individual Incomes 
mtm Dollars Total income reported by the mother. 
ftm Dollars Total income reported by the father. 
mem Dollars Total earned income reported by the mother. 
fem Dollars Total earned income reported by the father. 
fum2 Dollars Total unearned income of the father which is measured as the 
difference between total and earned income that he reports. 
mum2 Dollars Total unearned income of the mother which is measured as the 
difference between total and earned income that she reports. 
Work/Home Role Strain Variables 
fwf 0 or 1 Father’s work flexibility – 1 for some flexibility; 0 otherwise. 
mwf 0 or 1 Mother’s work flexibility – 1 for some flexibility; 0 otherwise. 
fjs factor Father’s job stress. 
mjs factor Mother’s job stress. 
Control Variables 
mwhite 0 or 1 Race of the mother-is 1 for Anglo; 0 otherwise. 
fwhite 0 or 1 Race of the father–is 1 for Anglo; 0 otherwise. 
Dage Years Father’s less mother’s age. 
dedu Years Father’s less mother’s years of education. 
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TABLE 3  SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable* N Mean Median Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Independent Variables 
Household Income 
HHInc1 152 113,784.83  94,577.00  66,861.48  16,800.00  376,300.00  
HHInc2 152 107,638.92  86,599.96  67,262.06  12,200.00  366,300.00  
HHUInc 152 11,565.74  2,987.00  25,831.64  0.00  250,000.00  
HHUInc2 152 5,419.83  0.00  23,076.14  0.00  240,000.00  
HHEInc   152 102,219.09  85,700.00  59,884.54  4,200.00  342,396.00  
Individual Incomes 
mtm 152 26,243.28 12,952.20 39,088.81 0.00 264,000.00 
ftm 152 87,541.54 74,000.00 57,303.32 8,400.00 370,000.00 
mem 152 23,810.11 8,730.00 38,628.99 0.00 264,000.00 
fem 152 78,408.98 67,200.00 48,479.38 0.00 208,992.00 
mum1 152 1,313.70 0.00 5,593.19 0 48,000.00 
fum1 152 4106.12 400 21,355.46                      0 240,000.00 
mum2 152 2,433.17 0.00 6,577.28 0.00 50,000.00 
fum2 152 9,132.57 300.02 24,539.29 0.00 250,000.00 
Dependent Variables  
HFAH 143 559.99 540.00 242.84 200.00 1,700.00 
HFAFH 146 155.51 125.00 116.60 0.00 600.00 
HHOUSE 145 2,039.51 1,900.00 1,213.98 310.00 9,500.00 
HTHE 136 1,130.08 842.25 939.24 90.00 5,220.00 
HHTHE 132 3,132.46 2,837.50 1,833.00 609.00 9,842.50 
HCC 150 101.67 61.00 131.81 5.00 1,200.00 
HWC 150 72.27 50.00 84.65 3.00 600.00 
HMC 145 56.99 50.00 56.58 5.00 400.00 
* Variables defined in Table 2  
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TABLE 4  SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS TEST AND THEIR RESTRICTIONS 
Hypothesis Restrictions 
Unitary Model FAH  11 12
13 14
13
,
,
0j j
Unitary Model FAFH  21 22
23 24
23
,
,
0j j
Equality of Earned Incomes FAH 11 12
Equality of Unearned Incomes 
FAH 
13 14
Joint Significance of Family 
Financial Structure FAH 
13 0j j
Equality of Earned Incomes FAFH 21 22
Equality of Unearned Incomes 
FAFH 
23 24
Joint Significance of Family 
Financial Structure FAFH 
23 0j j
Joint Significance of the Difference 
between the Unconditional and 
Conditional Model for FAH 
5
131 n njn j
Joint Significance of the Difference 
between the Unconditional and 
Conditional Model for FAFH 
5
231 n njn j
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TABLE 5   RESULTS OF WHITE’S TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
Equation Statistic DF Pr > ChiSq 
cHFAH 132.9 113 0.0978 
cHFAFH 115.6 113 0.4156 
uHFAH 96 75 0.0516 
uHFAFH 73.73 75 0.5198 
The superscript c and u stand for conditional and unconditional 
models.  
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TABLE 6  PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL MODELS 
AND THEIR P-VALUES FOR THE FOOD AT HOME EQUATION FOR THE FIVE MODELS OF THE 
CONDITIONAL MODEL (GMM ENDOGENOUS EARN INCOMES OF MOTHER AND FATHER) 
Parameter Conditional 
Model 
Uncondition
al Model 
Difference 
Intercept 278.5256 
(<0.0001) 
289.7041 
(<0.0001) 
11.1785000 
(0.1964) 
Fathers’ Earned Income 0.000968 
(0.0091) 
0.000866 
(0.0167) 
-0.0001020 
(0.1343) 
Mothers’ Earned Income 0.000742 
(0.1923) 
0.000804 
(0.1436) 
0.0000620 
(0.3860) 
Fathers’ Unearned Income 0.000339 
(0.5582) 
0.000337 
(0.5738) 
-0.0000020 
(0.9771) 
Mothers’ Unearned Income 0.000786 
(0.6420) 
0.000964 
(0.5711) 
0.0001780 
(0.5022) 
1f 45.18559 (<0.0001)   
2f -16.0919 (0.1683)   
4f 138.872 (0.1170)   
5f -4.30764 (0.5528)   
Caucasian Father 16.33369 
(0.7231) 
-2.64997 
(0.9557) 
-
18.9836600 
(0.0092) 
Caucasian Mother 46.83098 
(0.2619) 
71.77048 
(0.1061) 
24.9395000 
(0.0033) 
Difference in Years of 
Education of Spouses 
-13.3491 
(0.1532) 
-9.51486 
(0.3269) 
3.8342400 
(0.0737) 
Difference in age of Spouses 4.56274 
(0.2826) 
3.018618 
(0.4830) 
-1.5441180 
(0.0155) 
Total Number of Child ren 
Under 18 in the Household 
3.82526 
(0.6252) 
5.270318 
(0.5091) 
1.4450630 
(0.3199) 
Fathers’ Job Stress 12.48596 
(0.3857) 
14.94986 
(0.3121) 
2.4639000 
(0.2455) 
Mothers’ Job Stress 
-2.11676 
(0.8957) 
-8.88142 
(0.5815) 
-6.7646600 
(0.0237) 
2R 0.1909 0.1430  
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TABLE 7  PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL MODELS 
AND THEIR P-VALUES FOR THE FOOD AWAY FROM HOME EQUATION FOR THE FIVE MODELS 
OF THE CONDITIONAL MODEL  
(GMM ENDOGENOUS EARN INCOMES OF MOTHER AND FATHER) 
Parameter Conditional 
Model 
Uncondition
al Model 
Difference 
Intercept 60.1848 
(0.0148) 
68.50688 
(0.0060) 
8.3220800 
(0.0223) 
Fathers’ Earned Income 0.001207 
(<0.0001) 
0.001159 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0000480 
(0.0401) 
Mothers’ Earned Income 0.000845 
(0.0014) 
0.000801 
(0.0013) 
-0.0000440 
(0.3691) 
Fathers’ Unearned Income 0.000201 
(0.3763) 
0.000142 
(0.4833) 
-0.0000590 
(0.1556) 
Mothers’ Unearned Income 0.003117 
(0.1340) 
0.00292 
(0.1654) 
-0.0001970 
(0.1452) 
1f 17.13664 (<0.0001)   
2f 9.340541  (0.0001)   
4f -28.3227  (0.0575)   
5f -14.9298  (0.0199)   
Caucasian Father 
-45.6893  
(0.1428) 
-53.0144 
(0.0932) 
-7.3251000 
(0.0286) 
Caucasian Mother 3.422318  
(0.9010) 
13.26697 
(0.6303) 
9.8446520 
(0.0111) 
Difference in Years of 
Education of Spouses 
-9.47367 
(0.0451) 
-9.38049 
(0.0492) 
0.0931800 
(0.8999) 
Difference in age of Spouses 2.041676 
(0.2606) 
1.890604 
(0.3031) 
-0.1510720 
(0.5254) 
Total Number of Child ren 
Under 18 in the Household 
-1.11234 
(0.7445) 
-1.18474  
(0.7306) 
-0.0724000 
(0.8916) 
Fathers’ Job Stress 3.375445  
(0.6616) 
4.704651 
(0.5425) 
1.3292060 
(0.1312) 
Mothers’ Job Stress 
-6.55521  
(0.4380) 
-7.78539 
(0.3551) 
-1.2301800 
(0.2616) 
2R 0.3977 0.3738  
 
 161
TABLE 8  HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR THE FOOD AT HOME EQUATION FOR THE CONDITIONAL 
AND UNCODITIONAL MODELS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE RESTRICTIONS AND P-VALUES 
(GMM ENDOGENOUS EARN INCOME OF THE MOTHER AND FATHER) 
Hypothesis Restrictions for the 
Conditional Model 
p-
values 
Restrictions for the 
Unconditional Model
p-values 
Unitary Model FAH 11 12
13 14
13
,
,
0j j
<0.0001 11 12
13 14
,
0.9376 
Equality of Earned 
Incomes FAH 
11 12 0.7655 11 12 0.9333 
Equality of 
Unearned Incomes 
FAH 
13 14 0.8024 13 14 0.7314 
Joint Significance of 
Family Financial 
Structure FAH 
13 0j j <0.0001 N/A N/A 
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TABLE 9  HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR THE FOOD AWAY FROM HOME EQUATION FOR THE 
CONDITIONAL AND UNCODITIONAL MODELS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE RESTRICTIONS AND 
P-VALUES (GMM ENDOGENOUS EARN INCOME OF THE MOTHER AND FATHER) 
Hypothesis Restrictions for the 
Conditional Model 
p-
values 
Restrictions for the 
Unconditional Model
p-values 
Unitary Model 
FAFH  
21 22
23 24
23
,
,
0j j
<0.0001 21 22
23 24
,
0.1597 
Equality of Earned 
Incomes FAFH 
21 22 0.2887 21 22 0.3156 
Equality of 
Unearned Incomes 
FAFH 
23 24 0.1177 23 24 0.1704 
Joint Significance of 
Family Financial 
Structure FAFH 
23 0j j <0.0001 N/A N/A 
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TABLE 10  HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR THE JOINT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
THE UNCONDITONAL AND CONDITONAL MODELS IN THE CASE OF FOOD AT HOME AND 
FOOD AWAY FROM HOME WITH  THEIR RESPECTIVE RESTRICTIONS AND 
P-VALUES (GMM ENDOGENOUS EARN INCOME OF THE MOTHER AND FATHER) 
Hypothesis Restrictions for the 
Conditional Model 
p-values 
Joint Significance of the 
Difference between the 
Unconditional and 
Conditional Model for 
FAH 
5
131 n njn j
0.1189 
Joint Significance of the 
Difference between the 
Unconditional and 
Conditional Model for 
FAFH 
5
231 n njn j
0.0447 
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APPENDIX B    
PROGRAMS                       
 165     
/******************************************************************************** 
** SAS Program used to compute the conditional and unconditional     ** 
** collective models of household behavior                                                 **       
** By Ernesto Perusquia Corres                                                                     **                                             
** May 8, 2006                                                                                                   ** 
********************************************************************************/  
/*This program is designed to check the continuous measures of income for the fathers. 
Opening the data set and saving new dataset*/  
data final.FinalData050205;  
set Income.FinalData050805;  
if safath_subject_number=. then delete;  
if safath_Subject_Number=5202 then delete;  
if safath_Subject_Number=4302 then delete;  
if safath_Subject_Number=25702 then delete;  
/*Conditions salaries, wages and commission income   */  
/* If the individual answer yes to whether or not he or she earns that type of income 
and they have entered a positive income for the given item and a positive number of 
months they earned that income then we compute the yearly income from salaries 
wages, tips and other income and commissions for the individuals meeting the 
aforementioned requirements.  If they did not enter a positive amount earned from that 
source of income or a positive*/  
nsafq7a1=nmiss(safath_q7_a1); 
nsafq7a2=nmiss(safath_q7_a2); 
nsafq7a3=nmiss(safath_q7_a3); 
nsafq7b1=nmiss(safath_q7_b1); 
nsafq7b2=nmiss(safath_q7_b2); 
nsafq7b3=nmiss(safath_q7_b3); 
nsafq7b4=nmiss(safath_q7_b4); 
nsafq7b5=nmiss(safath_q7_b5); 
nsafq7c1=nmiss(safath_q7_c1); 
nsafq7c2=nmiss(safath_q7_c2); 
nsafq7c3=nmiss(safath_q7_c3); 
nsafq8=nmiss(safath_q8); 
nsafq131b=nmiss(safath_q13_1b); 
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nsafq132b=nmiss(safath_q13_2b); 
nsafq133b=nmiss(safath_q13_3b); 
nsafq134b=nmiss(safath_q13_4b); 
nsafq135b=nmiss(safath_q13_5b); 
nsafq136b=nmiss(safath_q13_6b); 
nsafq137b=nmiss(safath_q13_7b); 
nsafq138b=nmiss(safath_q13_8b); 
nsafq139b=nmiss(safath_q13_9b); 
nsafq1310b=nmiss(safath_q13_10b); 
nsafq1311b=nmiss(safath_q13_11b); 
nsafq1312b=nmiss(safath_q13_12b); 
nsafq1313b=nmiss(safath_q13_13b); 
nsafq1314b=nmiss(safath_q13_14b); 
nsafq131c=nmiss(safath_q13_1c); 
nsafq132c=nmiss(safath_q13_2c); 
nsafq133c=nmiss(safath_q13_3c); 
nsafq134c=nmiss(safath_q13_4c); 
nsafq135c=nmiss(safath_q13_5c); 
nsafq136c=nmiss(safath_q13_6c); 
nsafq137c=nmiss(safath_q13_7c); 
nsafq138c=nmiss(safath_q13_8c); 
nsafq139c=nmiss(safath_q13_9c); 
nsafq1310c=nmiss(safath_q13_10c);  
nsafq1311c=nmiss(safath_q13_11c); 
nsafq1312c=nmiss(safath_q13_12c); 
nsafq1313c=nmiss(safath_q13_13c); 
nsafq1314c=nmiss(safath_q13_14c); 
nsafq14a=nmiss(safath_q14_you); 
nsafq14b=nmiss(safath_q14_your_spouse); 
nsafq14c=nmiss(safath_q14_child); 
nsafq14d=nmiss(safath_q14_other); 
nsafq15a1=nmiss(safath_q15_you_amount); 
nsafq15b1=nmiss(safath_q15_your_amount); 
nsafq15c1=nmiss(safath_q15_child_amount); 
nsafq15d1=nmiss(safath_q15_other_amount); 
nsafq15a2=nmiss(safath_q15_you_months); 
nsafq15b2=nmiss(safath_q15_your_months); 
nsafq15c2=nmiss(safath_q15_child_months); 
nsafq15d2=nmiss(safath_q15_other_months); 
nsafq16=nmiss(safathq_16);  
/*if earn income is earned and not reported (missing value -999) then this statement 
will report missing earn income */ 
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if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q7_a1=1 and safath_q7_a2<0 then mssgsal=1;  
if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q7_b1=1 and safath_q7_b2<0 then mssgwage=1;  
if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q7_c1=1 and safath_q7_c2<0 then 
mssgcomm=1;   
/* no individual income category reported*/  
if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q8<1 then mssgincat=1;  
/*initializing variables for fathers total salaries, total wages, total tip and other income, 
and total commision*/  
If safath_subject_number>0 then totsal=0; 
If safath_subject_number>0 then totwag=0; 
If safath_subject_number>0 then tottipoc=0; 
If safath_subject_number>0 then totcomm=0;  
/*these statements compute total salaries, total wages, total tip and other income, and 
total commision for fathers*/  
If safath_Q7_A2>0 and safath_Q7_A3>0 then totsal=safath_Q7_A2*safath_Q7_A3;  
If safath_q7_a1=1 and safath_Q7_A2>0 and safath_Q7_A3>0 then 
totsal1=safath_Q7_A2*safath_Q7_A3;  
If safath_Q7_B2>0 and safath_Q7_B3>0 then totwag=safath_Q7_B2*safath_Q7_B3;  
If safath_Q7_B1=1 and safath_Q7_B2>0 and safath_Q7_B3>0 then 
totwag1=safath_Q7_B2*safath_Q7_B3;  
If safath_Q7_B4=1 and safath_Q7_B5>0 and safath_Q7_B3>0 then 
totTipOc1=safath_Q7_B5*safath_Q7_B3;  
If safath_Q7_B5>0 and safath_Q7_B3>0 then totTipOc=safath_Q7_B5*safath_Q7_B3;  
If safath_Q7_C2>0 and safath_Q7_C3>0 then totcomm=safath_Q7_C2*safath_Q7_C3;  
If safath_Q7_C1=1 and safath_Q7_C2>0 and safath_Q7_C3>0 then 
totcomm1=safath_Q7_C2*safath_Q7_C3;  
 168
/*computing total earn income for fathers which are the sum of total salaries, total 
wages, total tips and other income and total commissions*/  
/*fathers total earn income*/   
FEM=totsal+totwag+totTipOc+totcomm;  
/*INITIALIZING VARIABLES FOR FATHERS UNEARNED INCOME 
COMPUTATION*/   
if safath_subject_number>0 then q131=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q132=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q133=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q134=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q135=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q136=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q137=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q138=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q139=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q1310=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q1311=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q1312=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q1313=0; 
if safath_subject_number>0 then q1314=0;  
/*COMPUTING TOTAL UNEARNED INCOME FOR FATHERS*/  
/*The ones commented out are joint unearned*/   
If safath_q13_1b>0 and safath_q13_1c>0 then q131=safath_q13_1b*safath_q13_1c;  
If safath_q13_1b>0 and safath_q13_1c>0 then cq131=safath_q13_1b*safath_q13_1c;  
else cq131=.;  
If safath_q13_2b>0 and safath_q13_2c>0 then q132=safath_q13_2b*safath_q13_2c;  
If safath_q13_2b>0 and safath_q13_2c>0 then cq132=safath_q13_2b*safath_q13_2c;  
else cq132=.;  
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If safath_q13_3b>0 and safath_q13_3c>0 then q133=safath_q13_3b*safath_q13_3c;  
If safath_q13_3b>0 and safath_q13_3c>0 then cq133=safath_q13_3b*safath_q13_3c;  
else cq133=.;  
If safath_q13_4b>0 and safath_q13_4c>0 then q134=safath_q13_4b*safath_q13_4c;  
If safath_q13_4b>0 and safath_q13_4c>0 then cq134=safath_q13_4b*safath_q13_4c;  
else cq134=.;  
If safath_q13_5b>0 and safath_q13_5c>0 then q135=safath_q13_5b*safath_q13_5c;  
If safath_q13_5b>0 and safath_q13_5c>0 then cq135=safath_q13_5b*safath_q13_5c;  
else cq135=.;  
If safath_q13_6b>0 and safath_q13_6c>0 then q136=safath_q13_6b*safath_q13_6c;  
If safath_q13_6b>0 and safath_q13_6c>0 then cq136=safath_q13_6b*safath_q13_6c;  
else cq136=.;  
If safath_q13_7b>0 and safath_q13_7c>0 then q137=safath_q13_7b*safath_q13_7c;  
If safath_q13_7b>0 and safath_q13_7c>0 then cq137=safath_q13_7b*safath_q13_7c;  
else cq137=.;  
If safath_q13_8b>0 and safath_q13_8c>0 then q138=safath_q13_8b*safath_q13_8c; 
If safath_q13_8b>0 and safath_q13_8c>0 then cq138=safath_q13_8b*safath_q13_8c; 
else cq138=.;  
If safath_q13_9b>0 and safath_q13_9c>0 then q139=safath_q13_9b*safath_q13_9c; 
If safath_q13_9b>0 and safath_q13_9c>0 then cq139=safath_q13_9b*safath_q13_9c; 
else cq139=.;  
If safath_q13_10b>0 and safath_q13_10c>0 then q1310=safath_q13_10b*safath_q13_10c; 
If safath_q13_10b>0 and safath_q13_10c>0 then cq1310=safath_q13_10b*safath_q13_10c; 
else cq1310=.;  
If safath_q13_11b>0 and safath_q13_11c>0 then q1311=safath_q13_11b*safath_q13_11c; 
If safath_q13_11b>0 and safath_q13_11c>0 then cq1311=safath_q13_11b*safath_q13_11c; 
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else cq1311=.;  
If safath_q13_12b>0 and safath_q13_12c>0 then q1312=safath_q13_12b*safath_q13_12c; 
If safath_q13_12b>0 and safath_q13_12c>0 then cq1312=safath_q13_12b*safath_q13_12c; 
else cq1312=.;  
If  safath_q13_13b>0 and safath_q13_13c>0 then q1313=safath_q13_13b*safath_q13_13c; 
If  safath_q13_13b>0 and safath_q13_13c>0 then 
cq1313=safath_q13_13b*safath_q13_13c; 
else cq1313=.;  
If  safath_q13_14b>0 and safath_q13_14c>0 then q1314=safath_q13_14b*safath_q13_14c; 
If  safath_q13_14b>0 and safath_q13_14c>0 then 
cq1314=safath_q13_14b*safath_q13_14c; 
else cq1314=.;    
/*Adding all of the sources of total unearned income*/   
/*FATHERS UNEARNED INCOME Associated only with Father*/   
FUM=q1314+q1313+q1312+q1311+q1310+q138+q136+q134+q133+q132; 
Ftmsum=Fem+fum;    
/*FATHERS REPORTED CHILD SURVEYED INCOME*/  
if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q15_you_amount>0 then 
FTM=safath_q15_you_amount; 
else FTM=0;   
/*CHECK 1 FOR FATHERS*/   
check1=FTM-ftmsum; 
if check1>0 then chk1dum=1; 
if check1=0 then chk1dum=0; 
if check1<0 then chk1dum=-1; 
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/*CHECK 2 FOR FATHERS*/   
check2=FTM-fem; 
if check2>0 then chk2dum=1; 
if check2=0 then chk2dum=0; 
if check2<0 then chk2dum=-1;  
/*Assigning income categories to total earned income of the FATHERS*/   
iF fem=. THEN CKQ7=.; 
If fem<5000 and fem>=0 then CKQ7=1; 
If fem>=5000 and fem<9999 then CKQ7=2; 
If fem>=10000 and fem<14999 then CKQ7=3; 
If fem>=15000 and fem<19999 then CKQ7=4; 
If fem>=20000 and fem<29999 then CKQ7=5; 
If fem>=30000 and fem<39999 then CKQ7=6; 
If fem>=40000 and fem<49999 then CKQ7=7; 
If fem>=50000 and fem<69999 then CKQ7=8; 
If fem>=70000 and fem<79999 then CKQ7=9; 
If fem>=80000 and fem<89999 then CKQ7=10; 
If fem>=90000 and fem<99999 then CKQ7=11; 
If fem>=100000 and fem<109999 then CKQ7=12; 
If fem>=110000 and fem<119999 then CKQ7=13; 
If fem>=120000 and fem<129999 then CKQ7=14; 
If fem>=130000 and fem<139999 then CKQ7=15; 
If fem>=140000 and fem<149999 then CKQ7=16; 
If fem>=150000 then CKQ7=17;   
/*CHECK 3 FOR FATHERS*/   
If safath_subject_number>0 and fem>=0 and safath_Q8>0 
then CHECK3=safath_Q8-CKQ7; 
if check3>0 then chk3dum=1; 
if check3=0 then chk3dum=0; 
if check3<0 then chk3dum=-1;  
/*check 3 for fathers. Comparing sum of fem and fum to categories*/ 
/*Assigning income categories to total income of the FATHERS*/ 
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iF ftmsum=. THEN ckq13=.; 
If ftmsum<5000 and ftmsum>=0 then ckq13=1; 
If ftmsum>=5000 and ftmsum<9999 then ckq13=2; 
If ftmsum>=10000 and ftmsum<14999 then ckq13=3; 
If ftmsum>=15000 and ftmsum<19999 then ckq13=4; 
If ftmsum>=20000 and ftmsum<29999 then ckq13=5; 
If ftmsum>=30000 and ftmsum<39999 then ckq13=6; 
If ftmsum>=40000 and ftmsum<49999 then ckq13=7; 
If ftmsum>=50000 and ftmsum<69999 then ckq13=8; 
If ftmsum>=70000 and ftmsum<79999 then ckq13=9; 
If ftmsum>=80000 and ftmsum<89999 then ckq13=10; 
If ftmsum>=90000 and ftmsum<99999 then ckq13=11; 
If ftmsum>=100000 and ftmsum<109999 then ckq13=12; 
If ftmsum>=110000 and ftmsum<119999 then ckq13=13; 
If ftmsum>=120000 and ftmsum<129999 then ckq13=14; 
If ftmsum>=130000 and ftmsum<139999 then ckq13=15; 
If ftmsum>=140000 and ftmsum<149999 then ckq13=16; 
If ftmsum>=150000 then ckq13=17;   
/*CHECK 4 FOR FATHERS*/  
If safath_subject_number>0 and ftmsum>=0 and safath_Q8>0 
then CHECK4=safath_Q8-ckq13; 
if check4>0 then chk4dum=1; 
if check4=0 then chk4dum=0; 
if check4<0 then chk4dum=-1;  
/*computing reported total income by fathers in question 15 part a*/  
If safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q14_you=1 and safath_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT>0 
then ftm=safath_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT; 
Else if safath_subject_number>0 and safath_q14_you=1 and 
safath_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT<=0 then ftm=. AND mftm=1;  
/*Assigning income categories to total REPORTED FATHERS INCOME*/  
iF ftm=. THEN CKQ15A=.; 
If ftm<5000 and ftm>=0 then CKQ15A=1; 
If ftm>=5000 and ftm<9999 then CKQ15A=2; 
If ftm>=10000 and ftm<14999 then CKQ15A=3; 
If ftm>=15000 and ftm<19999 then CKQ15A=4; 
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If ftm>=20000 and ftm<29999 then CKQ15A=5; 
If ftm>=30000 and ftm<39999 then CKQ15A=6; 
If ftm>=40000 and ftm<49999 then CKQ15A=7; 
If ftm>=50000 and ftm<69999 then CKQ15A=8; 
If ftm>=70000 and ftm<79999 then CKQ15A=9; 
If ftm>=80000 and ftm<89999 then CKQ15A=10; 
If ftm>=90000 and ftm<99999 then CKQ15A=11; 
If ftm>=100000 and ftm<109999 then CKQ15A=12; 
If ftm>=110000 and ftm<119999 then CKQ15A=13; 
If ftm>=120000 and ftm<129999 then CKQ15A=14; 
If ftm>=130000 and ftm<139999 then CKQ15A=15; 
If ftm>=140000 and ftm<149999 then CKQ15A=16; 
If ftm>=150000 then CKQ15A=17;  
/*CHECK 5 FOR FATHERS*/  
If safath_subject_number>0 and ftm>=0 and safath_Q8>0 
then CHECK5=safath_Q8-CKQ15a; 
if check5>0 then chk5dum=1; 
if check5=0 then chk5dum=0; 
if check5<0 then chk5dum=-1;  
if saMoth_subject_number=. then delete; 
if samoth_Subject_Number=5201 then delete; 
if samoth_Subject_Number=4301 then delete; 
if samoth_Subject_Number=25701 then delete;         
/*Conditions salaries, wages and commission income   */  
/* If the individual answer yes to whether or not he or she earns that type of income 
and they have entered a positive income for the given item and a positive number of 
months they earned that income then we compute the yearly income from salaries 
wages, tips and other 
income and commissions for the individuals meeting the aforementioned requirements.  
If they did not enter a positive amount earned from that source of income or a 
positive*/  
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nsamq7a1=nmiss(saMoth_q7_a1); 
nsamq7a2=nmiss(saMoth_q7_a2); 
nsamq7a3=nmiss(saMoth_q7_a3); 
nsamq7b1=nmiss(saMoth_q7_b1); 
nsamq7b2=nmiss(saMoth_q7_b2); 
nsamq7b3=nmiss(saMoth_q7_b3); 
nsamq7b4=nmiss(saMoth_q7_b4); 
nsamq7b5=nmiss(saMoth_q7_b5); 
nsamq7c1=nmiss(saMoth_q7_c1); 
nsamq7c2=nmiss(saMoth_q7_c2); 
nsamq7c3=nmiss(saMoth_q7_c3); 
nsamq8=nmiss(saMoth_q8); 
nsamq131b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_1b); 
nsamq132b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_2b); 
nsamq133b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_3b); 
nsamq134b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_4b); 
nsamq135b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_5b); 
nsamq136b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_6b); 
nsamq137b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_7b); 
nsamq138b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_8b); 
nsamq139b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_9b); 
nsamq1310b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_10b); 
nsamq1311b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_11b); 
nsamq1312b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_12b); 
nsamq1313b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_13b); 
nsamq1314b=nmiss(saMoth_q13_14b); 
nsamq131c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_1c); 
nsamq132c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_2c); 
nsamq133c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_3c); 
nsamq134c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_4c); 
nsamq135c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_5c); 
nsamq136c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_6c); 
nsamq137c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_7c); 
nsamq138c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_8c); 
nsamq139c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_9c); 
nsamq1310c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_10c); 
nsamq1311c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_11c); 
nsamq1312c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_12c); 
nsamq1313c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_13c); 
nsamq1314c=nmiss(saMoth_q13_14c); 
nsamq14a=nmiss(saMoth_q14_you); 
nsamq14b=nmiss(saMoth_q14_your_spouse); 
nsamq14c=nmiss(saMoth_q14_child); 
nsamq14d=nmiss(saMoth_q14_other); 
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nsamq15a1=nmiss(saMoth_q15_you_amount); 
nsamq15b1=nmiss(saMoth_q15_your_amount); 
nsamq15c1=nmiss(saMoth_q15_child_amount); 
nsamq15d1=nmiss(saMoth_q15_other_amount); 
nsamq15a2=nmiss(saMoth_q15_you_months); 
nsamq15b2=nmiss(saMoth_q15_your_months); 
nsamq15c2=nmiss(saMoth_q15_child_months); 
nsamq15d2=nmiss(saMoth_q15_other_months); 
nsamq16=nmiss(saMothq_16);  
/*if earn income is earned and not reported (missing value -999) then this statement 
will report missing earn income */  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q7_a1=1 and saMoth_q7_a2<0 then 
mssgsal=1;  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q7_b1=1 and saMoth_q7_b2<0 then 
mssgwage=1;  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q7_c1=1 and saMoth_q7_c2<0 then 
mssgcomm=1;   
/* no individual income category reported*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q8<1 then mssgincat=1;  
/*initializing variables for Mothers total salaries, total wages, total tip and other 
income, and total commision*/  
If saMoth_subject_number>0 then totsal=0; 
If saMoth_subject_number>0 then totwag=0; 
If saMoth_subject_number>0 then tottipoc=0; 
If saMoth_subject_number>0 then totcomm=0;  
/*these statements compute total salaries, total wages, total tip and other income, and 
total commision for Mothers*/  
If saMoth_Q7_A2>0 and saMoth_Q7_A3>0 then 
totsal=saMoth_Q7_A2*saMoth_Q7_A3;  
If saMoth_q7_a1=1 and saMoth_Q7_A2>0 and saMoth_Q7_A3>0 then 
totsal1=saMoth_Q7_A2*saMoth_Q7_A3;  
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If saMoth_Q7_B2>0 and saMoth_Q7_B3>0 then 
totwag=saMoth_Q7_B2*saMoth_Q7_B3; 
If saMoth_Q7_B1=1 and saMoth_Q7_B2>0 and saMoth_Q7_B3>0 then 
totwag1=saMoth_Q7_B2*saMoth_Q7_B3;  
If saMoth_Q7_B4=1 and saMoth_Q7_B5>0 and saMoth_Q7_B3>0 then 
totTipOc1=saMoth_Q7_B5*saMoth_Q7_B3;  
If saMoth_Q7_B5>0 and saMoth_Q7_B3>0 then 
totTipOc=saMoth_Q7_B5*saMoth_Q7_B3;  
If saMoth_Q7_C2>0 and saMoth_Q7_C3>0 then 
totcomm=saMoth_Q7_C2*saMoth_Q7_C3;  
If saMoth_Q7_C1=1 and saMoth_Q7_C2>0 and saMoth_Q7_C3>0 then 
totcomm1=saMoth_Q7_C2*saMoth_Q7_C3;  
/*computing total earn income for Mothers which are the sum of total salaries, total 
wages, total tips and other income and total commissions*/  
/*Mothers total earn income*/  
MEM=totsal+totwag+totTipOc+totcomm;  
/*INITIALIZING VARIABLES FOR MothERS UNEARNED INCOME 
COMPUTATION*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q131=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q132=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q133=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q134=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q135=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q136=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q137=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q138=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q139=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q1310=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q1311=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q1312=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q1313=0; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 then q1314=0;  
/*COMPUTING TOTAL UNEARNED Individual INCOME FOR Mothers*/  
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/*The ones commented out are joint unearned*/  
If saMoth_q13_1b>0 and saMoth_q13_1c>0 then q131=saMoth_q13_1b*saMoth_q13_1c; 
If saMoth_q13_1b>0 and saMoth_q13_1c>0 then 
cq131=saMoth_q13_1b*saMoth_q13_1c; 
else cq131=.;  
If saMoth_q13_2b>0 and saMoth_q13_2c>0 then q132=saMoth_q13_2b*saMoth_q13_2c; 
If saMoth_q13_2b>0 and saMoth_q13_2c>0 then 
cq132=saMoth_q13_2b*saMoth_q13_2c; 
else cq132=.;  
If saMoth_q13_3b>0 and saMoth_q13_3c>0 then q133=saMoth_q13_3b*saMoth_q13_3c; 
If saMoth_q13_3b>0 and saMoth_q13_3c>0 then 
cq133=saMoth_q13_3b*saMoth_q13_3c; 
else cq133=.;  
If saMoth_q13_4b>0 and saMoth_q13_4c>0 then q134=saMoth_q13_4b*saMoth_q13_4c; 
If saMoth_q13_4b>0 and saMoth_q13_4c>0 then 
cq134=saMoth_q13_4b*saMoth_q13_4c; 
else cq134=.;  
If saMoth_q13_5b>0 and saMoth_q13_5c>0 then q135=saMoth_q13_5b*saMoth_q13_5c; 
If saMoth_q13_5b>0 and saMoth_q13_5c>0 then 
cq135=saMoth_q13_5b*saMoth_q13_5c; 
else cq135=.;  
If saMoth_q13_6b>0 and saMoth_q13_6c>0 then q136=saMoth_q13_6b*saMoth_q13_6c; 
If saMoth_q13_6b>0 and saMoth_q13_6c>0 then 
cq136=saMoth_q13_6b*saMoth_q13_6c; 
else cq136=.;  
If saMoth_q13_7b>0 and saMoth_q13_7c>0 then q137=saMoth_q13_7b*saMoth_q13_7c; 
If saMoth_q13_7b>0 and saMoth_q13_7c>0 then 
cq137=saMoth_q13_7b*saMoth_q13_7c; 
else cq137=.;  
If saMoth_q13_8b>0 and saMoth_q13_8c>0 then q138=saMoth_q13_8b*saMoth_q13_8c; 
If saMoth_q13_8b>0 and saMoth_q13_8c>0 then 
cq138=saMoth_q13_8b*saMoth_q13_8c; 
else cq138=.;  
If saMoth_q13_9b>0 and saMoth_q13_9c>0 then q139=saMoth_q13_9b*saMoth_q13_9c; 
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If saMoth_q13_9b>0 and saMoth_q13_9c>0 then 
cq139=saMoth_q13_9b*saMoth_q13_9c; 
else cq139=.;  
If saMoth_q13_10b>0 and saMoth_q13_10c>0 then 
q1310=saMoth_q13_10b*saMoth_q13_10c; 
If saMoth_q13_10b>0 and saMoth_q13_10c>0 then 
cq1310=saMoth_q13_10b*saMoth_q13_10c; 
else cq1310=.;  
If saMoth_q13_11b>0 and saMoth_q13_11c>0 then 
q1311=saMoth_q13_11b*saMoth_q13_11c; 
If saMoth_q13_11b>0 and saMoth_q13_11c>0 then 
cq1311=saMoth_q13_11b*saMoth_q13_11c; 
else cq1311=.;  
If saMoth_q13_12b>0 and saMoth_q13_12c>0 then 
q1312=saMoth_q13_12b*saMoth_q13_12c; 
If saMoth_q13_12b>0 and saMoth_q13_12c>0 then 
cq1312=saMoth_q13_12b*saMoth_q13_12c; 
else cq1312=.;  
If  saMoth_q13_13b>0 and saMoth_q13_13c>0 then 
q1313=saMoth_q13_13b*saMoth_q13_13c; 
If  saMoth_q13_13b>0 and saMoth_q13_13c>0 then 
cq1313=saMoth_q13_13b*saMoth_q13_13c; 
else cq1313=.;  
If  saMoth_q13_14b>0 and saMoth_q13_14c>0 then 
q1314=saMoth_q13_14b*saMoth_q13_14c; 
If  saMoth_q13_14b>0 and saMoth_q13_14c>0 then 
cq1314=saMoth_q13_14b*saMoth_q13_14c; 
else cq1314=.;  
/*Adding all of the sources of total unearned income*/  
/*MothERS UNEARNED INCOME*/  
MUM=q1314+q1313+q1312+q1311+q1310+q138+q136+q134+q133+q132; 
Mtmsum=Mem+Mum;  
/*Mothers REPORTED CHILD SURVEYED INCOME*/  
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if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q15_you_amount>0 then 
mtm=saMoth_q15_you_amount; 
else MTM=0;  
/*CHECK 1 FOR Mothers*/  
check1=MTM-Mtmsum; 
if check1>0 then chk1dum=1; 
if check1=0 then chk1dum=0; 
if check1<0 then chk1dum=-1;  
/*CHECK 2 FOR Mothers*/  
check2=MTM-Mem; 
if check2>0 then chk2dum=1; 
if check2=0 then chk2dum=0; 
if check2<0 then chk2dum=-1;  
/*Assigning income categories to total earned income of the Mothers*/  
iF mem=. THEN CKQ7=.; 
If mem<5000 and mem>=0 then CKQ7=1; 
If mem>=5000 and mem<9999 then CKQ7=2; 
If mem>=10000 and mem<14999 then CKQ7=3; 
If mem>=15000 and mem<19999 then CKQ7=4; 
If mem>=20000 and mem<29999 then CKQ7=5; 
If mem>=30000 and mem<39999 then CKQ7=6; 
If mem>=40000 and mem<49999 then CKQ7=7; 
If mem>=50000 and mem<69999 then CKQ7=8; 
If mem>=70000 and mem<79999 then CKQ7=9; 
If mem>=80000 and mem<89999 then CKQ7=10; 
If mem>=90000 and mem<99999 then CKQ7=11; 
If mem>=100000 and mem<109999 then CKQ7=12; 
If mem>=110000 and mem<119999 then CKQ7=13; 
If mem>=120000 and mem<129999 then CKQ7=14; 
If mem>=130000 and mem<139999 then CKQ7=15; 
If mem>=140000 and mem<149999 then CKQ7=16; 
If mem>=150000 then CKQ7=17;  
/*CHECK 3 FOR Mothers*/  
If saMoth_subject_number>0 and mem>=0 and saMoth_Q8>0 
then CHECK3=saMoth_Q8-CKQ7; 
if check3>0 then chk3dum=1; 
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if check3=0 then chk3dum=0; 
if check3<0 then chk3dum=-1;  
/*check 3 for Mothers. Comparing sum of fem and mum to categories*/  
/*Assigning income categories to total income of the Mothers*/  
iF mtmsum=. THEN ckq13=.; 
If mtmsum<5000 and mtmsum>=0 then ckq13=1; 
If mtmsum>=5000 and mtmsum<9999 then ckq13=2; 
If mtmsum>=10000 and mtmsum<14999 then ckq13=3; 
If mtmsum>=15000 and mtmsum<19999 then ckq13=4; 
If mtmsum>=20000 and mtmsum<29999 then ckq13=5; 
If mtmsum>=30000 and mtmsum<39999 then ckq13=6; 
If mtmsum>=40000 and mtmsum<49999 then ckq13=7; 
If mtmsum>=50000 and mtmsum<69999 then ckq13=8; 
If mtmsum>=70000 and mtmsum<79999 then ckq13=9; 
If mtmsum>=80000 and mtmsum<89999 then ckq13=10; 
If mtmsum>=90000 and mtmsum<99999 then ckq13=11; 
If mtmsum>=100000 and mtmsum<109999 then ckq13=12; 
If mtmsum>=110000 and mtmsum<119999 then ckq13=13; 
If mtmsum>=120000 and mtmsum<129999 then ckq13=14; 
If mtmsum>=130000 and mtmsum<139999 then ckq13=15; 
If mtmsum>=140000 and mtmsum<149999 then ckq13=16; 
If mtmsum>=150000 then ckq13=17;  
/*CHECK 4 FOR Mothers*/  
If saMoth_subject_number>0 and mtmsum>=0 and saMoth_Q8>0 
then CHECK4=saMoth_Q8-ckq13; 
if check4>0 then chk4dum=1; 
if check4=0 then chk4dum=0; 
if check4<0 then chk4dum=-1;  
/*computing reported total income by Mothers in question 15 part a*/ 
If saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q14_you=1 and 
saMoth_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT>0 then mtm=saMoth_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT; 
Else if saMoth_subject_number>0 and saMoth_q14_you=1 and 
saMoth_Q15_YOU_AMOUNT<=0 then mtm=. AND mmtm=1;  
/*Assigning income categories to total REPORTED Mothers INCOME*/  
iF mtm=. THEN CKQ15A=.; 
If mtm<5000 and mtm>=0 then CKQ15A=1; 
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If mtm>=5000 and mtm<9999 then CKQ15A=2; 
If mtm>=10000 and mtm<14999 then CKQ15A=3; 
If mtm>=15000 and mtm<19999 then CKQ15A=4; 
If mtm>=20000 and mtm<29999 then CKQ15A=5; 
If mtm>=30000 and mtm<39999 then CKQ15A=6; 
If mtm>=40000 and mtm<49999 then CKQ15A=7; 
If mtm>=50000 and mtm<69999 then CKQ15A=8; 
If mtm>=70000 and mtm<79999 then CKQ15A=9; 
If mtm>=80000 and mtm<89999 then CKQ15A=10; 
If mtm>=90000 and mtm<99999 then CKQ15A=11; 
If mtm>=100000 and mtm<109999 then CKQ15A=12; 
If mtm>=110000 and mtm<119999 then CKQ15A=13; 
If mtm>=120000 and mtm<129999 then CKQ15A=14; 
If mtm>=130000 and mtm<139999 then CKQ15A=15; 
If mtm>=140000 and mtm<149999 then CKQ15A=16; 
If mtm>=150000 then CKQ15A=17;  
/*CHECK 5 FOR MothERS*/  
If saMoth_subject_number>0 and mtm>=0 and saMoth_Q8>0 
then CHECK5=saMoth_Q8-CKQ15a; 
if check5>0 then chk5dum=1; 
if check5=0 then chk5dum=0; 
if check5<0 then chk5dum=-1;  
if MTI_Q1=1 then momwork2=1;else momwork2=0; 
if MTI_Q1=2 then momwork=0;if MTI_Q3=1 then momwork=1;else if MTI_Q3=2 then 
momwork=2; 
else if MTI_Q3=3 then momwork=3; 
if FTI_Q1=2 then dadwork=0;if FTI_Q3=1 then dadwork=1;else if FTI_Q3=2 then 
dadwork=3; 
else if FTI_Q3=3 then dadwork=3; 
if FTI_Q3=2 and MTI_Q3=2 then bothfull=1;else bothfull=0;if FTI_Q3=2 and MTI_Q3=1 
then dfmp=1; 
else dfmp=0; 
if bothfull=1 then pwork=3;else if dfmp=1 then pwork=2;else if dadwork=2 or 
dadwork=3 and momwork=0  
then pwork=1; 
array allb (I) MTI_Q3 -- MTI_Q16i FTI_Q3 -- FTI_Q16i FTI_Q19A -- FTI_Q19D 
FTI_Q20A -- FTI_Q20F ;  
do over allb; 
if allb in ( -999) then allb = .; 
if allb in (-888) then allb =0;  
end; 
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if FTI_Q6 in(2 3 4 5) then fregschd1=1;else if FTI_Q6=1 then fregschd1=0;else if 
FTI_Q6=.  
then fregschd1=.; 
if FTI_Q7 in(2 3 4 5) then fregschd2=1;else if FTI_Q7=1 then fregschd2=0;else if  
FTI_Q7=. then fregschd2=.; 
if MTI_Q6 in(2 3 4 5) then mregschd1=1;else if MTI_Q6=1 then mregschd1=0;else if 
MTI_Q6=. 
then mregschd1=.; 
if MTI_Q7 in(2 3 4 5) then mregschd2=1;else if MTI_Q7=1 then mregschd2=0;else if  
MTI_Q7=. then mregschd2=.; 
if mregschd1=1 and fregschd1=1 then mfregs1=1;else mfregs1=0;if mregschd2=1 and 
fregschd2=1  
then mfregs2=1;else mfregs2=0;  
if FTI_Q6 in(1 2 3 4)then fnoset1=0;else if FTI_Q6=5 then fnoset1=1;else if FTI_Q6=. then 
fnoset1=.; 
if MTI_Q6 in(1 2 3 4) then mnoset1=0;else if MTI_Q6=5 then mnoset1=1;else if 
MTI_Q6=. then 
mnoset1=.; 
if FTI_Q7 in(1 2 3 5) then fnoset2=0;else if FTI_Q7=4 then fnoset2=1;else if FTI_Q7=. 
then fnoset2=.; 
if MTI_Q7 in(1 2 3 5) then mnoset2=0;else if MTI_Q7=4 then mnoset2=1;else if 
MTI_Q7=. 
then mnoset2=.; 
if fnoset1=1 and mnoset1=1 then noset1=1;else noset1=0;if fnoset2=1 and mnoset2=1 
then noset2=1; 
else noset2=0; 
if fnoset1=1 and mnoset1=0 then noset3=1;else noset3=0;if fnoset2=1 and mnoset2=0 
then noset4=1; 
else noset4=0; 
if FTI_Q8=. then inflexp1=.;else if FTI_Q8=3 or FTI_Q8=2 and MTI_Q8=1 then 
inflexp1=1; 
else inflexp1=0; 
if FTI_Q9=. or MTI_Q9=. then inflexp2=.;else if FTI_Q9=3 or FTI_Q9=2 and MTI_Q9=1 
then inflexp2=1; 
else inflexp2=0; 
if FTI_Q9=. or MTI_Q9=. then inflexp3=.;else if FTI_Q9=1 and MTI_Q9=1 then 
inflexp3=1;else inflexp3=0; 
if FTI_Q8=. or MTI_Q8=. then inflexp4=.;else if FTI_Q8=1 and MTI_Q8=1 then 
inflexp4=1; 
else inflexp4=0; 
if FTI_Q8=. or MTI_Q8=. then inflexp5=.;else if FTI_Q8=1 and MTI_Q8=2 or MTI_Q8=3 
then inflexp5=1; 
else inflexp5=0; 
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if FTI_Q9=. or MTI_Q9=. then inflexp6=.;else if FTI_Q9=1 and MTI_Q9=2 or MTI_Q9=3 
then inflexp6=1; 
else inflexp6=0;  
if MTI_Q64 in(1,6)then notmarried=0;else if MTI_Q64=. then notmarried=.;else 
notmarried=1; 
if FTI_Q8=. then inflexf=.;else if FTI_Q8=1 or FTI_Q8=2 then inflexf=1;else if FTI_Q8=3 
then inflexf=0; 
if MTI_Q8=. then inflexm=.;else if MTI_Q8=1 or MTI_Q8=2 then inflexm=1;else if 
MTI_Q8=3 then inflexm=0;  
if fti_q13b=5 then fti_q13bx=1; 
if fti_q13b=4 then fti_q13bx=2; 
if fti_q13b=3 then fti_q13bx=3; 
if fti_q13b=2 then fti_q13bx=4; 
if fti_q13b=1 then fti_q13bx=5; 
if fti_q13b=. then fti_q13bx=.; 
if mti_q13b=5 then mti_q13bx=1; 
if mti_q13b=4 then mti_q13bx=2; 
if mti_q13b=3 then mti_q13bx=3; 
if mti_q13b=2 then mti_q13bx=4; 
if mti_q13b=1 then mti_q13bx=5; 
if mti_q13b=. then mti_q13bx=.;  
array famstress mti_q16f mti_q16h mti_q16i  
 fti_q16f fti_q16h fti_q16i; 
 do over famstress; 
 if famstress=1 then famstress=5; 
 else if famstress=2 then famstress=4; 
 else if famstress=3 then famstress=3; 
 else if famstress=4 then famstress=2; 
 else if famstress=5 then famstress=1; 
 else if famstress=. then famstress=.; 
end;  
if fti_q17=1 then fti_q17=3; 
else if fti_q17=3 then fti_q17=1; 
if mti_q17=1 then mti_q17=3; 
else if mti_q17=3 then mti_q17=1;   
/* Factors */  
/* Jobstress father and mother */ 
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proc factor simple outstat=alex1 msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=final.FinalData050205; 
var fti_q13f fti_q13g; 
proc score score=alex1 data=final.FinalData050205 out=childnut1; 
data childnut2;set childnut1 (rename=(factor1=fjobstress)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex2 msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut2; 
var mti_q13f mti_q13g; 
proc score score=alex2 data=childnut2 out=childnut3; 
data childnut4;set childnut3 (rename=(factor1=mjobstress));  
proc factor simple outstat=alex3 priors=SMC msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut4; 
var fti_q13a fti_q13c -- fti_q13g fti_q13bx; 
proc score score=alex3 data=childnut4 out=childnut5; 
data childnut6;set childnut5 (rename=(factor1=fspillover1)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex4 priors=SMC msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut6; 
var mti_q13a mti_q13c -- mti_q13g mti_q13bx; 
proc score score=alex4 data=childnut6 out=childnut7; 
data childnut8;set childnut7 (rename=(factor1=mspillover1 factor2=mspillover2)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex5 priors=smc msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut8; 
var fti_q13a fti_q13c -- fti_q13e fti_q13bx; 
proc score score=alex5 data=childnut8 out=childnut9; 
data childnut10;set childnut9 (rename=(factor1=fspillover3)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex6 priors=smc msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut10; 
var mti_q13a mti_q13c -- mti_q13e mti_q13bx; 
proc score score=alex6 data=childnut10 out=childnut11; 
data childnut12;set childnut11 (rename=(factor1=mspillover3));  
proc factor simple outstat=alex7 priors=smc msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut12; 
var fti_q16d fti_q16e fti_q16g -- fti_q16i; 
proc score score=alex7 data=childnut12 out=childnut13; 
data childnut14;set childnut13 (rename=(factor1=fmaritals)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex8 priors=smc msa scree residuals rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut14; 
var mti_q16d mti_q16e mti_q16g -- mti_q16i; 
proc score score=alex8 data=childnut14 out=childnut15; 
data childnut16;set childnut15 (rename=(factor1=mmaritals)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex9 priors=smc msa rotate=varimax score data=childnut16; 
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var fti_q14a -- fti_q14d; 
proc score score=alex9 data=childnut16 out=childnut17; 
data childnut18;set childnut17 (rename=(factor1=fjobstress1)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex10 priors=smc msa rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut18; 
var mti_q14a -- mti_q14d; 
proc score score=alex10 data=childnut18 out=childnut19; 
data childnut20;set childnut19 (rename=(factor1=mjobstress1)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex11 priors=smc msa rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut20; 
var mti_q10a -- mti_q10e; 
proc score score=alex11 data=childnut20 out=childnut21; 
data childnut22;set childnut21 (rename=(factor1=mjobimp1)); 
proc factor simple outstat=alex12 priors=smc msa rotate=varimax score 
data=childnut22; 
var fti_q10a -- fti_q10e; 
proc score score=alex12 data=childnut22 out=childnut23; 
data childnut24;set childnut23(rename=(factor1=fjobimp1));      
/* mother in states that she is incharge of making expenditure and does not have an 
amount*/  
/* missing mothers expenditure */  
if samoth_q17_1a=0 and samoth_q17_1b=1 then mmq171a=1; 
if samoth_q17_2a=0 and samoth_q17_2b=1 then mmq172a=1; 
if samoth_q17_3a=0 and samoth_q17_3b=1 then mmq173a=1; 
if samoth_q17_4a=0 and samoth_q17_4b=1 then mmq174a=1; 
if samoth_q17_5a=0 and samoth_q17_5b=1 then mmq175a=1; 
if samoth_q17_6a=0 and samoth_q17_6b=1 then mmq176a=1; 
if samoth_q17_7a=0 and samoth_q17_7b=1 then mmq177a=1; 
if samoth_q17_8a=0 and samoth_q17_8b=1 then mmq178a=1; 
if samoth_q17_9a=0 and samoth_q17_9b=1 then mmq179a=1; 
if samoth_q17_10a=0 and samoth_q17_10b=1 then mmq1710a=1; 
if samoth_q17_11a=0 and samoth_q17_11b=1 then mmq1711a=1;  
/* mother states that she is in charge of making expenditure and she has a positive 
amount*/  
/* mothers expenditure */ 
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if samoth_q17_1a>0 and samoth_q17_1b=1 then mq171a=samoth_q17_1a; 
if samoth_q17_2a>0 and samoth_q17_2b=1 then mq172a=samoth_q17_2a; 
if samoth_q17_3a>0 and samoth_q17_3b=1 then mq173a=samoth_q17_3a; 
if samoth_q17_4a>0 and samoth_q17_4b=1 then mq174a=samoth_q17_4a; 
if samoth_q17_5a>0 and samoth_q17_5b=1 then mq175a=samoth_q17_5a; 
if samoth_q17_6a>0 and samoth_q17_6b=1 then mq176a=samoth_q17_6a; 
if samoth_q17_7a>0 and samoth_q17_7b=1 then mq177a=samoth_q17_7a; 
if samoth_q17_8a>0 and samoth_q17_8b=1 then mq178a=samoth_q17_8a; 
if samoth_q17_9a>0 and samoth_q17_9b=1 then mq179a=samoth_q17_9a; 
if samoth_q17_10a>0 and samoth_q17_10b=1 then mq1710a=samoth_q17_10a; 
if samoth_q17_11a>0 and samoth_q17_11b=1 then mq1711a=samoth_q17_11a;  
/* mother in states that her husband is in charge of making expenditure and she does 
not have an amount*/  
/* mother does not know amount of husband expenditure */  
if samoth_q17_1a=0 and samoth_q17_1b=0 then mmq171a=2; 
if samoth_q17_2a=0 and samoth_q17_2b=0 then mmq172a=2; 
if samoth_q17_3a=0 and samoth_q17_3b=0 then mmq173a=2; 
if samoth_q17_4a=0 and samoth_q17_4b=0 then mmq174a=2; 
if samoth_q17_5a=0 and samoth_q17_5b=0 then mmq175a=2; 
if samoth_q17_6a=0 and samoth_q17_6b=0 then mmq176a=2; 
if samoth_q17_7a=0 and samoth_q17_7b=0 then mmq177a=2; 
if samoth_q17_8a=0 and samoth_q17_8b=0 then mmq178a=2; 
if samoth_q17_9a=0 and samoth_q17_9b=0 then mmq179a=2; 
if samoth_q17_10a=0 and samoth_q17_10b=0 then mmq1710a=2; 
if samoth_q17_11a=0 and samoth_q17_11b=0 then mmq1711a=2;  
/* father in states that she is in charge of making expenditure and does not have an 
amount*/  
/* missing fathers expenditure */  
if safath_q17_1a=0 and safath_q17_1b=1 then mfq171a=1; 
if safath_q17_2a=0 and safath_q17_2b=1 then mfq172a=1; 
if safath_q17_3a=0 and safath_q17_3b=1 then mfq173a=1; 
if safath_q17_4a=0 and safath_q17_4b=1 then mfq174a=1; 
if safath_q17_5a=0 and safath_q17_5b=1 then mfq175a=1; 
if safath_q17_6a=0 and safath_q17_6b=1 then mfq176a=1; 
if safath_q17_7a=0 and safath_q17_7b=1 then mfq177a=1; 
if safath_q17_8a=0 and safath_q17_8b=1 then mfq178a=1; 
if safath_q17_9a=0 and safath_q17_9b=1 then mfq179a=1; 
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if safath_q17_10a=0 and safath_q17_10b=1 then mfq1710a=1; 
if safath_q17_11a=0 and safath_q17_11b=1 then mfq1711a=1;  
/*father states that he is in charge of making expenditure and he has a positive 
amount*/  
/* fathers expenditure */  
if safath_q17_1a>0 and safath_q17_1b=1 then fq171a=safath_q17_1a; 
if safath_q17_2a>0 and safath_q17_2b=1 then fq172a=safath_q17_2a; 
if safath_q17_3a>0 and safath_q17_3b=1 then fq173a=safath_q17_3a; 
if safath_q17_4a>0 and safath_q17_4b=1 then fq174a=safath_q17_4a; 
if safath_q17_5a>0 and safath_q17_5b=1 then fq175a=safath_q17_5a; 
if safath_q17_6a>0 and safath_q17_6b=1 then fq176a=safath_q17_6a; 
if safath_q17_7a>0 and safath_q17_7b=1 then fq177a=safath_q17_7a; 
if safath_q17_8a>0 and safath_q17_8b=1 then fq178a=safath_q17_8a; 
if safath_q17_9a>0 and safath_q17_9b=1 then fq179a=safath_q17_9a; 
if safath_q17_10a>0 and safath_q17_10b=1 then fq1710a=safath_q17_10a; 
if safath_q17_11a>0 and safath_q17_11b=1 then fq1711a=safath_q17_11a;  
/* father states that his wife is incharge of making expenditure and he does not know 
the amount*/  
/* father does not know amount of his wife's expenditure */  
if safath_q17_1a=0 and safath_q17_1b=0 then mfq171a=2; 
if safath_q17_2a=0 and safath_q17_2b=0 then mfq172a=2; 
if safath_q17_3a=0 and safath_q17_3b=0 then mfq173a=2; 
if safath_q17_4a=0 and safath_q17_4b=0 then mfq174a=2; 
if safath_q17_5a=0 and safath_q17_5b=0 then mfq175a=2; 
if safath_q17_6a=0 and safath_q17_6b=0 then mfq176a=2; 
if safath_q17_7a=0 and safath_q17_7b=0 then mfq177a=2; 
if safath_q17_8a=0 and safath_q17_8b=0 then mfq178a=2; 
if safath_q17_9a=0 and safath_q17_9b=0 then mfq179a=2; 
if safath_q17_10a=0 and safath_q17_10b=0 then mfq1710a=2; 
if safath_q17_11a=0 and safath_q17_11b=0 then mfq1711a=2;  
/* mother and father agree that mother makes the expenditure but the  
amount is missing */  
if mmq171a=1 and mfq171a=2 then mHH171a=1; 
if mmq172a=1 and mfq172a=2 then mHH172a=1; 
if mmq173a=1 and mfq173a=2 then mHH173a=1; 
if mmq174a=1 and mfq174a=2 then mHH174a=1; 
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if mmq175a=1 and mfq175a=2 then mHH175a=1; 
if mmq176a=1 and mfq176a=2 then mHH176a=1; 
if mmq177a=1 and mfq177a=2 then mHH177a=1; 
if mmq178a=1 and mfq178a=2 then mHH178a=1; 
if mmq179a=1 and mfq179a=2 then mHH179a=1; 
if mmq1710a=1 and mfq1710a=2 then mHH1710a=1; 
if mmq1711a=1 and mfq1711a=2 then mHH1711a=1;  
/* mother and father agree that father makes the expenditure but the 
amount is missing */  
if mmq171a=2 and mfq171a=1 then mHH171a=1; 
if mmq172a=2 and mfq172a=1 then mHH172a=1; 
if mmq173a=2 and mfq173a=1 then mHH173a=1; 
if mmq174a=2 and mfq174a=1 then mHH174a=1; 
if mmq175a=2 and mfq175a=1 then mHH175a=1; 
if mmq176a=2 and mfq176a=1 then mHH176a=1; 
if mmq177a=2 and mfq177a=1 then mHH177a=1; 
if mmq178a=2 and mfq178a=1 then mHH178a=1; 
if mmq179a=2 and mfq179a=1 then mHH179a=1; 
if mmq1710a=2 and mfq1710a=1 then mHH1710a=1; 
if mmq1711a=2 and mfq1711a=1 then mHH1711a=1;  
/* both mother and father say the other is in charge of the expenditure but the amount 
is missing */  
if mmq171a=2 and mfq171a=2 then mHH171a=1; 
if mmq172a=2 and mfq172a=2 then mHH172a=1; 
if mmq173a=2 and mfq173a=2 then mHH173a=1; 
if mmq174a=2 and mfq174a=2 then mHH174a=1; 
if mmq175a=2 and mfq175a=2 then mHH175a=1; 
if mmq176a=2 and mfq176a=2 then mHH176a=1; 
if mmq177a=2 and mfq177a=2 then mHH177a=1; 
if mmq178a=2 and mfq178a=2 then mHH178a=1; 
if mmq179a=2 and mfq179a=2 then mHH179a=1; 
if mmq1710a=2 and mfq1710a=2 then mHH1710a=1; 
if mmq1711a=2 and mfq1711a=2 then mHH1711a=1;  
 /* both mother and father say that they are in charge of the expenditure but the 
amount is missing */  
if mmq171a=1 and mfq171a=1 then mHH171a=1; 
if mmq172a=1 and mfq172a=1 then mHH172a=1; 
if mmq173a=1 and mfq173a=1 then mHH173a=1; 
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if mmq174a=1 and mfq174a=1 then mHH174a=1; 
if mmq175a=1 and mfq175a=1 then mHH175a=1; 
if mmq176a=1 and mfq176a=1 then mHH176a=1; 
if mmq177a=1 and mfq177a=1 then mHH177a=1; 
if mmq178a=1 and mfq178a=1 then mHH178a=1; 
if mmq179a=1 and mfq179a=1 then mHH179a=1; 
if mmq1710a=1 and mfq1710a=1 then mHH1710a=1; 
if mmq1711a=1 and mfq1711a=1 then mHH1711a=1;  
/*Defining Household Expenditures*/  
if samoth_q17_1a>0 and samoth_q17_1b=1 then Mq171a=samoth_q17_1a; 
Else Mq171a=0; 
if safath_q17_1a>0 and safath_q17_1b=1 then Fq171a=safath_q17_1a; 
Else Fq171a=0; 
if samoth_q17_1a>0 and samoth_q17_1b=0 then nM171a=samoth_q17_1a; 
if safath_q17_1a>0 and safath_q17_1b=0 then nF171a=safath_q17_1a;  
if samoth_q17_2a>0 and samoth_q17_2b=1 then Mq172a=samoth_q17_2a; 
Else Mq172a=0; 
if safath_q17_2a>0 and safath_q17_2b=1 then Fq172a=safath_q17_2a; 
Else Fq172a=0; 
if samoth_q17_2a>0 and samoth_q17_2b=0 then nM172a=samoth_q17_2a; 
if safath_q17_2a>0 and safath_q17_2b=0 then nF172a=safath_q17_2a;  
if samoth_q17_3a>0 and samoth_q17_3b=1 then Mq173a=samoth_q17_3a; 
Else Mq173a=0; 
if safath_q17_3a>0 and safath_q17_3b=1 then Fq173a=safath_q17_3a; 
Else Fq173a=0; 
if samoth_q17_3a>0 and samoth_q17_3b=0 then nM173a=samoth_q17_3a; 
if safath_q17_3a>0 and safath_q17_3b=0 then nF173a=safath_q17_3a;  
if samoth_q17_4a>0 and samoth_q17_4b=1 then Mq174a=samoth_q17_4a; 
Else Mq174a=0; 
if safath_q17_4a>0 and safath_q17_4b=1 then Fq174a=safath_q17_4a; 
Else Fq174a=0; 
if samoth_q17_4a>0 and samoth_q17_4b=0 then nM174a=samoth_q17_4a; 
if safath_q17_4a>0 and safath_q17_4b=0 then nF174a=safath_q17_4a;  
if samoth_q17_5a>0 and samoth_q17_5b=1 then Mq175a=samoth_q17_5a; 
Else Mq175a=0; 
if safath_q17_5a>0 and safath_q17_5b=1 then Fq175a=safath_q17_5a; 
Else Fq175a=0; 
if samoth_q17_5a>0 and samoth_q17_5b=0 then nM175a=samoth_q17_5a; 
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if safath_q17_5a>0 and safath_q17_5b=0 then nF175a=safath_q17_5a;  
if samoth_q17_6a>0 and samoth_q17_6b=1 then Mq176a=samoth_q17_6a; 
Else Mq176a=0; 
if safath_q17_6a>0 and safath_q17_6b=1 then Fq176a=safath_q17_6a; 
Else Fq176a=0; 
if samoth_q17_6a>0 and samoth_q17_6b=0 then nM176a=samoth_q17_6a; 
if safath_q17_6a>0 and safath_q17_6b=0 then nF176a=safath_q17_6a;  
if samoth_q17_7a>0 and samoth_q17_7b=1 then Mq177a=samoth_q17_7a; 
Else Mq177a=0; 
if safath_q17_7a>0 and safath_q17_7b=1 then Fq177a=safath_q17_7a; 
Else Fq177a=0; 
if samoth_q17_7a>0 and samoth_q17_7b=0 then nM177a=samoth_q17_7a; 
if safath_q17_7a>0 and safath_q17_7b=0 then nF177a=safath_q17_7a;  
if samoth_q17_8a>0 and samoth_q17_8b=1 then Mq178a=samoth_q17_8a; 
Else Mq178a=0; 
if safath_q17_8a>0 and safath_q17_8b=1 then Fq178a=safath_q17_8a; 
Else Fq178a=0; 
if samoth_q17_8a>0 and samoth_q17_8b=0 then nM178a=samoth_q17_8a; 
if safath_q17_8a>0 and safath_q17_8b=0 then nF178a=safath_q17_8a;  
if samoth_q17_9a>0 and samoth_q17_9b=1 then Mq179a=samoth_q17_9a; 
Else Mq179a=0; 
if safath_q17_9a>0 and safath_q17_9b=1 then Fq179a=safath_q17_9a; 
Else Fq179a=0; 
if samoth_q17_9a>0 and samoth_q17_9b=0 then nM179a=samoth_q17_9a; 
if safath_q17_9a>0 and safath_q17_9b=0 then nF179a=safath_q17_9a;  
if samoth_q17_10a>0 and samoth_q17_10b=1 then Mq1710a=samoth_q17_10a; 
Else Mq1710a=0; 
if safath_q17_10a>0 and safath_q17_10b=1 then Fq1710a=safath_q17_10a; 
Else Fq1710a=0; 
if samoth_q17_10a>0 and samoth_q17_10b=0 then nM1710a=samoth_q17_10a; 
if safath_q17_10a>0 and safath_q17_10b=0 then nF1710a=safath_q17_10a;  
if samoth_q17_11a>0 and samoth_q17_11b=1 then Mq1711a=samoth_q17_11a; 
Else Mq1711a=0; 
if safath_q17_11a>0 and safath_q17_11b=1 then Fq1711a=safath_q17_11a; 
Else Fq1711a=0; 
if samoth_q17_11a>0 and Fq1711a=0 then nM1711a=samoth_q17_11a; 
if safath_q17_11a>0 and safath_q17_11b=0 then nF1711a=safath_q17_11a;  
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if Mq171a>0 and Fq171a=0 then HHHq171a=Mq171a; 
else if Mq171a=0 and Fq171a>0 then HHHq171a=Fq171a; 
else if Mq171a>0 and Fq171a>0 then HHHq171a=(Mq171a + Fq171a)/2; 
else if nM171a>0 and nF171a>0 then HHHq171a=(nMq171a + nFq171a)/2; 
else if nM171a>0 and Fq171a=0 then HHHq171a=nM171a; 
else if nF171a>0 and Mq171a=0 then HHHq171a=nF171a; 
else if samoth_q17_1a=0 and safath_q17_1a=0 then HHHq171a=0;   
if Mq172a>0 and Fq172a=0 then HHHq172a=Mq172a; 
else if Mq172a=0 and Fq172a>0 then HHHq172a=Fq172a; 
else if Mq172a>0 and Fq172a>0 then HHHq172a=(Mq172a + Fq172a)/2; 
else if nM172a>0 and nF172a>0 then HHHq172a=(nMq172a + nFq172a)/2; 
else if nM172a>0 and Fq172a=0 then HHHq172a=nM172a; 
else if nF172a>0 and Mq172a=0 then HHHq172a=nF172a; 
else if samoth_q17_2a=0 and safath_q17_2a=0 then HHHq172a=0;   
if Mq173a>0 and Fq173a=0 then HHHq173a=Mq173a; 
else if Mq173a=0 and Fq173a>0 then HHHq173a=Fq173a; 
else if Mq173a>0 and Fq173a>0 then HHHq173a=(Mq173a + Fq173a)/2; 
else if nM173a>0 and nF173a>0 then HHHq173a=(nMq173a + nFq173a)/2; 
else if nM173a>0 and Fq173a=0 then HHHq173a=nM173a; 
else if nF173a>0 and Mq173a=0 then HHHq173a=nF173a; 
else if samoth_q17_3a=0 and safath_q17_3a=0 then HHHq173a=0;  
if Mq174a>0 and Fq174a=0 then HHHq174a=Mq174a; 
else if Mq174a=0 and Fq174a>0 then HHHq174a=Fq174a; 
else if Mq174a>0 and Fq174a>0 then HHHq174a=(Mq174a + Fq174a)/2; 
else if nM174a>0 and nF174a>0 then HHHq174a=(nMq174a + nFq174a)/2; 
else if nM174a>0 and Fq174a=0 then HHHq174a=nM174a; 
else if nF174a>0 and Mq174a=0 then HHHq174a=nF174a; 
else if samoth_q17_4a=0 and safath_q17_4a=0 then HHHq174a=0;  
if Mq175a>0 and Fq175a=0 then HHHq175a=Mq175a; 
else if Mq175a=0 and Fq175a>0 then HHHq175a=Fq175a; 
else if Mq175a>0 and Fq175a>0 then HHHq175a=(Mq175a + Fq175a)/2; 
else if nM175a>0 and nF175a>0 then HHHq175a=(nMq175a + nFq175a)/2; 
else if nM175a>0 and Fq175a=0 then HHHq175a=nM175a; 
else if nF175a>0 and Mq175a=0 then HHHq175a=nF175a; 
else if samoth_q17_5a=0 and safath_q17_5a=0 then HHHq175a=0;  
if Mq176a>0 and Fq176a=0 then HHHq176a=Mq176a; 
else if Mq176a=0 and Fq176a>0 then HHHq176a=Fq176a; 
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else if Mq176a>0 and Fq176a>0 then HHHq176a=(Mq176a + Fq176a)/2; 
else if nM176a>0 and nF176a>0 then HHHq176a=(nMq176a + nFq176a)/2; 
else if nM176a>0 and Fq176a=0 then HHHq176a=nM176a; 
else if nF176a>0 and Mq176a=0 then HHHq176a=nF176a; 
else if samoth_q17_6a=0 and safath_q17_6a=0 then HHHq176a=0;  
if Mq177a>0 and Fq177a=0 then HHHq177a=Mq177a; 
else if Mq177a=0 and Fq177a>0 then HHHq177a=Fq177a; 
else if Mq177a>0 and Fq177a>0 then HHHq177a=(Mq177a + Fq177a)/2; 
else if nM177a>0 and nF177a>0 then HHHq177a=(nMq177a + nFq177a)/2; 
else if nM177a>0 and Fq177a=0 then HHHq177a=nM177a; 
else if nF177a>0 and Mq177a=0 then HHHq177a=nF177a; 
else if samoth_q17_7a=0 and safath_q17_7a=0 then HHHq177a=0;  
if Mq178a>0 and Fq178a=0 then HHHq178a=Mq178a; 
else if Mq178a=0 and Fq178a>0 then HHHq178a=Fq178a; 
else if Mq178a>0 and Fq178a>0 then HHHq178a=(Mq178a + Fq178a)/2; 
else if nM178a>0 and nF178a>0 then HHHq178a=(nMq178a + nFq178a)/2; 
else if nM178a>0 and Fq178a=0 then HHHq178a=nM178a; 
else if nF178a>0 and Mq178a=0 then HHHq178a=nF178a; 
else if samoth_q17_8a=0 and safath_q17_8a=0 then HHHq178a=0;  
if Mq179a>0 and Fq179a=0 then HHHq179a=Mq179a; 
else if Mq179a=0 and Fq179a>0 then HHHq179a=Fq179a; 
else if Mq179a>0 and Fq179a>0 then HHHq179a=(Mq179a + Fq179a)/2; 
else if nM179a>0 and nF179a>0 then HHHq179a=(nMq179a + nFq179a)/2; 
else if nM179a>0 and Fq179a=0 then HHHq179a=nM179a; 
else if nF179a>0 and Mq179a=0 then HHHq179a=nF179a; 
else if samoth_q17_9a=0 and safath_q17_9a=0 then HHHq179a=0;  
if Mq1710a>0 and Fq1710a=0 then HHHq1710a=Mq1710a; 
else if Mq1710a=0 and Fq1710a>0 then HHHq1710a=Fq1710a; 
else if Mq1710a>0 and Fq1710a>0 then HHHq1710a=(Mq1710a + Fq1710a)/2; 
else if nM1710a>0 and nF1710a>0 then HHHq1710a=(nMq1710a + nFq1710a)/2; 
else if nM1710a>0 and Fq1710a=0 then HHHq1710a=nM1710a; 
else if nF1710a>0 and Mq1710a=0 then HHHq1710a=nF1710a; 
else if samoth_q17_10a=0 and safath_q17_10a=0 then HHHq1710a=0;  
if Mq1711a>0 and Fq1711a=0 then HHHq1711a=Mq1711a; 
else if Mq1711a=0 and Fq1711a>0 then HHHq1711a=Fq1711a; 
else if Mq1711a>0 and Fq1711a>0 then HHHq1711a=(Mq1711a + Fq1711a)/2; 
else if nM1711a>0 and nF1711a>0 then HHHq1711a=(nMq1711a + nFq1711a)/2; 
else if nM1711a>0 and Fq1711a=0 then HHHq1711a=nM1711a; 
else if nF1711a>0 and Mq1711a=0 then HHHq1711a=nF1711a; 
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else if samoth_q17_11a=0 and safath_q17_11a=0 then HHHq1711a=0;  
/* Household income as defined by question 15 of mother and father */  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and safath_subject_number>0 then HHTinc15=mtm + 
ftm; 
/* Household income as defined by question 7 and 13 of mother and father */ 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and safath_subject_number>0 then 
HHTinc1713=mtmsum + ftmsum;  
/*Defining unearned income as the difference between total income from q15 and 
earned income q7*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and mtm>0 then mum157=mtm - mem;Else mum157=0;  
/*Defining unearned income as the difference between total income from q15 and 
earned income q7*/  
if safath_subject_number>0 and ftm>0 then fum157=ftm - fem;Else fum157=0;  
/*Defining household unearned income*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and safath_subject_number>0 then HHUIn157=fum157 + 
mum157; 
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and HHUIn157<0 then Lhh=samoth_subject_number;  
/*mem and fem in 1000's of dollars*/ 
memm=1000*mem; 
femm=1000*fem;  
if HHUIn157<0 then HHNU157=HHUIn157; 
Else HHNU157=.;  
/*Defining household unearned income*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and safath_subject_number>0 then HHUInc=fum + mum;  
/*Total household earned income*/  
if saMoth_subject_number>0 and safath_subject_number>0 then HHEInc=mem + fem;  
/* Grouping Expenditure Categories */  
/* Food at Home */ 
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HHFoodH=HHHq171a;  
/* Food away from home */  
HHFoodA=HHHq173a  ;    
/*Preprepared food and takeout*/  
HHFoodTO= HHHq172a;  
/* All Houshold Expenditures (housing, transportation, health and education */  
HHExpT=HHHq174a + HHHq175a + HHHq176a + HHHq177a;  
/* Housing and Household Expenditures */  
HHExp=HHHq174a;  
/* Transportation, healthcare and education */  
HHTHE=HHHq175a + HHHq176a + HHHq177a;  
/* Childrens Clothing and Shoes */  
HHExpC=HHHq178a;  
/* Womens Clothing and Shoes */  
HHExpW=HHHq179a;  
/* Mens Clothing and Shoes */  
HHExpM=HHHq1710a;  
/* Other Houshold members Clothing and Shoes */  
HHExpO=HHHq1711a;  
/*ALL HOUSEHOLD EXP BESIDES FOOD AT HOME*/  
HHEAllO=HHExpT+HHTHE+HHExpC+HHExpW+HHExpM+HHFoodA;  
/* FAMILY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE */ 
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/* CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPORTED FFS BY HUSBANDS AND 
WIVES*/  
/* DEFINITION */  
/* FATHER FFS */  
FaFFS=SAFATH_Q18;  
/* MOTHER FFS */  
MoFFS=SAMOTH_Q18;  
if samoth_q18=1 AND SAFATH_Q18=2 THEN dFFS=1;/*MOTHER MAN AND 
MAKES ALL DES*/  
IF SAMOTH_Q18=2 AND SAFATH_Q18=1 THEN dFFS=2; /*FATHER MAN AND 
MAKES ALL DES*/  
if samoth_q18=3 AND SAFATH_Q18=4 THEN dFFS=3; /*MOTHER GIVES ALLOW 
TO HUS*/  
IF SAMOTH_Q18=4 AND SAFATH_Q18=3 THEN dFFS=4; /*FATHER GIVES ALLOW 
TO WIFE*/  
IF SAMOTH_Q18=5 AND SAFATH_Q18=5 THEN dFFS=5; /*INDIVIDUAL*/  
IF SAMOTH_Q18=6 AND SAFATH_Q18=6 THEN dFFS=6; /*JOINT*/  
/* if no expenditures on food consumed at home we are deleting the family*/  
/*if HHFoodH=0 then delete;*/  
if HHTinc15=0 then delete;  
/*if hhexp=0 then delete;*/  
if dFFS<1 then delete; /*dFFS=0;*/ 
if HHExpC  = 0 then delete;  
if HHExpW=0 then delete; 
if HHExpM=0 then delete;  
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/*UNCONDITIONAL EXPENDITURES*/  
HHExpCW=HHExpC+HHExpW; 
UHHfoodH=HHfoodH*1; 
UHHFoodA=HHFoodA*1; 
UHHFoodTO=HHFoodTO*1; 
UHHExp=HHExp*1; 
UHHExpT=HHExpT*1; 
UHHTHE=HHTHE*1; 
UHHExpC=((HHExpC*1)); 
UHHExpW=HHExpW*1; 
UHHExpM=HHExpM*1; 
UHHExpCW=UHHExpC+UHHExpW; 
UHHEAllO=HHEAllO*1;  
/*ethnicity*/  
/*father*/ 
if fti_q62=5 then fwhite=1;else fwhite=0; 
if fti_q62=4 then fhisp=1;else fhisp=0; 
if fti_q62=1 then fother=1;else if fti_q62=2 then fother=1;else if fti_q62=3 then fother=1; 
else fother=0;  
/*mother*/  
if mti_q62=5 then mwhite=1;else mwhite=0; 
if mti_q62=3 then mhisp=1;else mhisp=0; 
if mti_q62=1 then mother=1;else if mti_q62=2 then mother=1;else if mti_q62=4 then 
mother=1; 
else mother=0; 
dage=fti_q60-mti_q60; 
dedu=fti_q63-mti_q63;  
/*Household family financial structure*/  
/*creation of dummy variables for conditional model*/  
/*Wife whole wage*/  
if dFFS=1 then ffs1=1;else ffs1=0;  
/*husband whole wage*/  
if dFFS=2 then ffs2=1;else ffs2=0; 
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/*husband allowance*/  
if dFFS=3 then ffs3=1;else ffs3=0;  
/*wife allowance*/  
if dFFS=4 then ffs4=1;else ffs4=0;  
/*individaul*/  
if dFFS=5 then ffs5=1;else ffs5=0;  
/*joint*/  
if dFFS=6 then ffs6=1;else ffs6=0;  
/*infants and adolescents*/  
if samoth_q6_1a>0 and samoth_q6_1a<5 then infant=1; 
if samoth_q6_1a>0 and samoth_q6_1a>5 then infant=0; 
if samoth_q6_1a>0 and samoth_q6_1a=5 then infant=0;  
if samoth_q6_1a>4.999 and samoth_q6_1a<18.1 then adolecent=1; 
if samoth_Q6_1A>0 and samoth_Q6_1A<5 then mINF1=1; 
ELSE mINF1=0; 
if samoth_Q6_2A>0 and samoth_Q6_2A<5 then mINF2=1; 
ELSE mINF2=0; 
if samoth_Q6_3A>0 and samoth_Q6_3A<5 then mINF3=1; 
ELSE mINF3=0; 
if samoth_Q6_4A>0 and samoth_Q6_4A<5 then mINF4=1; 
ELSE mINF4=0; 
if samoth_Q6_5A>0 and samoth_Q6_5A<5 then mINF5=1; 
ELSE mINF5=0; 
if samoth_Q6_6A>0 and samoth_Q6_6A<5 then mINF6=1; 
ELSE mINF6=0; 
if samoth_Q6_7A>0 and samoth_Q6_7A<5 then mINF7=1; 
ELSE mINF7=0; 
if samoth_Q6_8A>0 and samoth_Q6_8A<5 then mINF8=1; 
ELSE mINF8=0; 
if samoth_Q6_9A>0 and samoth_Q6_9A<5 then mINF9=1; 
ELSE mINF9=0; 
if samoth_Q6_10A>0 and samoth_Q6_10A<5 then mINF10=1; 
ELSE mINF10=0; 
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MINF=mINF1+mINF2+mINF3+mINF4+mINF5+mINF6+mINF7+mINF8+mINF9+mIN
F10;  
/*if samoth_Q6_1A>0 and samoth_Q6_1A>5 then INF=0; 
if samoth_Q6_1A>0 and samoth_Q6_1A=5 then INF=0;*/  
if samoth_Q6_1A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_1A<18.1 then mADO1=1; 
ELSE mADO1=0; 
if samoth_Q6_2A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_2A<28.2 then mADO2=2; 
ELSE mADO2=0; 
if samoth_Q6_3A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_3A<38.3 then mADO3=3; 
ELSE mADO3=0; 
if samoth_Q6_4A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_4A<48.4 then mADO4=4; 
ELSE mADO4=0; 
if samoth_Q6_5A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_5A<58.5 then mADO5=5; 
ELSE mADO5=0; 
if samoth_Q6_6A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_6A<68.6 then mADO6=6; 
ELSE mADO6=0; 
if samoth_Q6_7A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_7A<78.7 then mADO7=7; 
ELSE mADO7=0; 
if samoth_Q6_8A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_8A<88.8 then mADO8=8; 
ELSE mADO8=0; 
if samoth_Q6_9A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_9A<98.9 then mADO9=9; 
ELSE mADO9=0; 
if samoth_Q6_10A>4.999 and samoth_Q6_10A<108.10 then mADO10=10; 
ELSE mADO10=0;  
MADO=mADO1+mADO2+mADO3+mADO4+mADO5+mADO6+mADO7+mADO8+
mADO9+mADO10;  
TCHILD=mINF+mADO;  
FHOURW=FTI_Q4 * 4;  
MHOURW=MTI_Q4 * 4;  
IF SAMOTH_Q8<6 THEN LM1=1; 
ELSE LM1=0; 
IF SAMOTH_Q8>5 AND SAMOTH_Q8<11 THEN LM2=1; 
ELSE LM2=0; 
IF SAMOTH_Q8>11 AND SAMOTH_Q8<14 THEN LM3=1; 
ELSE LM3=0; 
IF SAMOTH_Q8>13 THEN LM4=1; 
ELSE LM4=0; 
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IF SAFATH_Q8<6 THEN LF1=1; 
ELSE LF1=0; 
IF SAFATH_Q8>5 AND SAFATH_Q8<11 THEN LF2=1; 
ELSE LF2=0; 
IF SAFATH_Q8>11 AND SAFATH_Q8<14 THEN LF3=1; 
ELSE LF3=0; 
IF SAFATH_Q8>13 THEN LF4=1; 
ELSE LF4=0; 
MW=MEM/(4*MTI_Q4); 
FW=FEM/(4*FTI_Q4); 
IF MW<0 THEN MW=.; 
IF FW<0 THEN FW=.;   
PROC CORR;  
VAR FEM MEM ; 
WITH FHOURW MHOURW MO1 FA1 FJOBIMP1 MJOBIMP1 FSPILLOVER1 
MSPILLOVER1 
FMARITALS MMARITALS MTM FTM FJOBSTRESS1 MJOBSTRESS1 
SAFATH_Q8 SAMOTH_Q8 MW FW ;RUN;   
/*COMBINED MODEL*/  
TITLE ' Combined GMM 1245 ID FFS1 USING IV';  
proc model;    
exogenous fum157 mum157 FFS1 ffs2 ffs4 ffs5 fwhite mwhite dedu dage TCHILD 
mjobstress fjobstress ; 
parms B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 B17 B18 B19 B112 B114 B115 B116 B117     B118    
            B20 B21 B22 B23 B24 B25 B26 B27 B28 B29 B212 B214 B215 B216 B217 B218  
C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C19 C112 C114 C115 C116 C117 C118  
            C20 C21 C22 C23 C24 C29 C212 C214 C215 C216 C217 C218; 
INSTRUMENTS fum157 mum157 FFS1 ffs2 ffs4 ffs5 fwhite mwhite dedu dage TCHILD  
          mjobstress fjobstress FJOBIMP1 MJOBIMP1 MO1 FA1; 
        
      HHFoodH = B10 + B11 * fem + B12 * mem + B13 * fum157 + B14 * mum157   
             + B15 * ffs1 + B16 * FFS2 + B17 * ffs4 + B18 * ffs5 + B19 * fwhite 
              + B112 * mwhite  + B114 * dedu + B115 * dage + B116 * TCHILD  
              + B117 * fjobstress + B118 * mjobstress;   
      HHFoodA = B20 + B21 * fem + B22 * mem + B23 * fum157 + B24 * mum157  
              + B25 * ffs1 + B26 * FFS2 + B27 * ffs4 + B28 * ffs5 + B29 * fwhite 
              + B212 * mwhite  + B214 * dedu + B215 * dage + B216 * TCHILD 
              + B217 * fjobstress + B218 * mjobstress; 
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UHHFoodH = C10 + C11 * fem + C12 * mem + C13 * fum157 + C14 * mum157 + C19 *  
fwhite  + C112 * mwhite  + C114 * dedu + C115 * dage + C116 * TCHILD + C117 
* fjobstress + C118 * mjobstress;  
UHHFoodA = C20 + C21 * fem + C22 * mem + C23 * fum157 + C24 * mum157 + C29 *   
fwhite + C212 * mwhite  + C214 * dedu + C215 * dage + C216 * TCHILD  
             + C217 * fjobstress + C218 * mjobstress;  
/*Test of variables across ALL Conditional equations*/  
/*Test of variables across EXPENDITUES ON FOOD AT AND AWAY FROM HOME  
in the conditional model*/  
test B10-B20=0; 
TEST B11-B21=0; 
TEST B12-B22=0; 
TEST B13-B23=0; 
TEST B14-B24=0; 
TEST B15-B25=0; 
TEST B16-B26=0;  
TEST B17-B27=0; 
TEST B18-B28=0; 
TEST B19-B29=0; 
TEST B112-B212=0; 
TEST B114-B214=0; 
TEST B115-B215=0; 
TEST B116-B216=0; 
TEST B117-B217=0; 
TEST B118-B218=0;  
/*Differences between the conditional and unconditional models*/  
TEST B11-C11=0; 
TEST B12-C12=0; 
TEST B13-C13=0; 
TEST B14-C14=0; 
TEST B19-C19=0; 
TEST B112-C112=0; 
TEST B114-C114=0; 
TEST B115-C115=0; 
TEST B116-C116=0; 
TEST B117-C117=0; 
TEST B118-C118=0; 
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TEST B21-C21=0; 
TEST B22-C22=0; 
TEST B23-C23=0; 
TEST B24-C24=0; 
TEST B29-C29=0; 
TEST B212-C212=0; 
TEST B214-C214=0; 
TEST B215-C215=0; 
TEST B216-C216=0; 
TEST B217-C217=0; 
TEST B218-C218=0;  
/*Test of variables across ALL unconditional equations*/  
/*Test of variables across EXPENDITUES ON FOOD AT AND AWAY FROM HOME in 
the unconditional model. This is the test of whether pie (total ffects) variables across 
equations are equal*/  
test C10-C20=0; 
TEST C11-C21=0; 
TEST C12-C22=0; 
TEST C13-C23=0; 
TEST C14-C24=0; 
TEST C19-C29=0; 
TEST C112-C212=0; 
TEST C114-C214=0; 
TEST C115-C215=0; 
TEST C116-C216=0; 
TEST C117-C217=0; 
TEST C118-C218=0;   
/*Test of family financial structure in each equation in the conditional model*/  
TEST B15, B16, B17, B18; 
TEST B25, B26, B27, B28;   
/*TEST WETHER EARNED INCOME OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IS EQUALLY 
SPENT in the conditional model*/  
TEST B11-B12=0; 
TEST B21-B22=0;  
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/*TEST WETHER EARNED INCOME OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IS EQUALLY 
SPENT in the unconditional model*/  
TEST C11-C12=0; 
TEST C21-C22=0;  
/*TEST WETHER UNEARNED INCOME OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IS 
EQUALLY SPENT in the conditional model*/  
TEST B13-B14=0; 
TEST B23-B24=0;  
/*TEST WETHER UNEARNED INCOME OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IS 
EQUALLY SPENT in the unconditional model*/  
TEST C13-C14=0; 
TEST C23-C24=0;  
/*TEST WETHER EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOMES OF FATHERS ARE 
EQUALLY SPENT in the conditional model*/  
TEST B11-B13=0; 
TEST B21-B23=0;  
/*TEST WETHER EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOMES OF FATHERS ARE 
EQUALLY SPENT in the unconditional model*/  
TEST C11-C13=0; 
TEST C21-C23=0;  
/*TEST WETHER EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOMES OF moTHERS ARE 
EQUALLY SPENT in the conditional model*/  
TEST B12-B14=0; 
TEST B22-B24=0;  
/*TEST WETHER EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOMES OF moTHERS ARE 
EQUALLY SPENT in the unconditional model*/  
TEST C11-C14=0; 
TEST C21-C24=0;  
 203
/*TEST WHETHER EARNED INCOME OF MOTHERS IS THE SAME FOR THE FOOD 
AT HOME AND FOOD AWAY FROM HOME EQUATIONS IN THE CONDITIONAL 
MODEL*/  
TEST B11-B21=0;  
/*FOR UNEARNED INCOMES*/  
TEST B13-B23=0;  
/*FATHERS EARNED INCOME*/  
TEST B12-B22=0;  
/*FATHERS UNEARNED INCOME*/  
TEST B14-B24=0;  
/*TESTING THE SUM OF THE PRODUCT OF THE EFFECT THAT THE FAMILY 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES HAS ON THE EXPENDITURE CATEGORY OF INTEREST 
TIMES THE EFFECT THAT THE VARIABLE OF INTEREST HAS ON FAMILY 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE*/  
TEST C10-B10; 
TEST C11-B11; 
TEST C12-B12; 
TEST C13-B13; 
TEST C14-B14; 
TEST C15-B15; 
TEST C19-B19; 
TEST C112-B112; 
TEST C114-B114; 
TEST C115-B115; 
TEST C116-B116; 
TEST C117-B117; 
TEST C118-B118;  
TEST C20-B20; 
TEST C21-B21; 
TEST C22-B22; 
TEST C23-B23; 
TEST C24-B24; 
TEST C25-B25; 
TEST C29-B29; 
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TEST C212-B212; 
TEST C214-B214; 
TEST C215-B215; 
TEST C216-B216; 
TEST C217-B217; 
TEST C218-B218;  
tEST C11-C12; 
TEST C13-C14; 
tEST C11-C12, C13-C14; 
TEST C21-C22, C23-C24; 
TEST ((C11+C13)-(C12+C14)); 
TEST ((C21+C23)-(C22+C24)); 
TEST ((B11+B13)-(B12+B14)), B15, B16, B17, B18; 
TEST ((B21+B23)-(B22+B24)), B25, B26, B27, B28;  
TEST ((B11+B13)-(B12+B14)); 
TEST ((B21+B23)-(B22+B24)); 
TEST (B11-B12), (B13-B14), B15, B16, B17, B18; 
TEST (B21-B22), (B23-B24), B25, B26, B27, B28;  
TEST C11-C13,C12-C14; 
TEST C21-C23,C22-C24; 
TEST (C10-B10), (C11-B11), (C12-B12), (C13-B13), (C14-B14), (C19-B19), (C112-B112), 
(C114-B114), (C115-B115), (C116-B116), (C117-B117), (C118-B118); 
TEST (C20-B20), (C21-B21), (C22-B22), (C23-B23), (C24-B24), (C29-B29), (C212-B212), 
(C214-B214), (C215-B215), (C216-B216), (C217-B217), (C218-B218); 
fit HHFoodH HHFoodA UHHFoodH UHHFoodA  / GMM WHITE; 
run;                 
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